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Abstract

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE METHODS THAT ARE USED TO RECRUIT COLLEGE
STUDENTS INTO THE TURKISH HEZBOLLAH.
By Tuncay Unal, PhD.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2010

Major Director: William W. Newmann, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, L. Douglas
Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs
This study aims to identify tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit
college students into joining their terrorist organization. This study based on the
assumptions that social networks and institutional structures are two main tools that are
used effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college educated students. In this
sense, the researcher claims that Social Learning theory and Social Control Theories can
be used to provide theoretical explanation to the Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategy.
Parallel to these theories assumptions, while having militants within social networks
increases the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions,
college students who are away from their families are more likely to be recruited through
social control theory assumptions.
The researcher uses individual level secondary data related to members of the
Turkish Hezbollah. The data comprised of self reports that each member submitted to the
Turkish Hezbollah as part of their recruitment process. The data are derived from the
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Turkish National Police‟s database. Initially, frequency table is used to determine which
structure and which theory best explain the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies.
Then, to decide which demographic factors increase or decrease the likelihood of being
recruited through social networks (social learning theory) or institutional structures
(social control theory), logistic regression is used. Eight independent variables are used to
identify those factors such as having Hezbollah militants within social networks, pursuing
college education while being away from family, family‟s religious ideology, having
online or campus education, family size, income level, college student‟s religiosity level,
and reason for attending Hezbollah.
The findings indicated that social networks and institutional structures are two
important tools that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah. Social networks are more
effectively used structures comparing to institutional structures. According to the results,
there are two important variables have more weight on dependent variable comparing to
other variables. While having militants within the social networks increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions, being away
from families during college education increases the likelihood of being recruited through
social control theory assumptions.

1

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Over the past three decades, countries throughout the world have struggled to
fight against terrorism due to the thousands of lives that have been lost in addition to the
billions of dollars shed to disrupt terrorist activities. Considering these tremendous losses,
terrorism obviously has a devastating effect on any given country‟s efforts to protect their
citizens as well as their economic and political interests.
1.1

Purpose of the Study
According to Crenshaw (2000), an individual‟s motivation for joining a terrorist

organization can be classified into theoretical models that generally include an
individual‟s perception of injustice, search for identity, need for belonging, and ideology,
among others. Taking these motivations into account in my study, the tactics used by the
Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students into becoming members of their terrorist
organization are identified based on the following research questions:
1. What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah,
a religiously motivated terrorist organization?
2. What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the
institutional structures and social networks?
3. Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s most successful method of recruiting?
In the first question, recruitment methods that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah
militants were examined. To answer the second question and help to identify the
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significance of each variable, eight hypotheses were developed. Each variable‟s weight
used for recruitment purposes were then assessed pertaining to two structures: (a)
institutional structure and (b) social networks. For the third research question, I strived to
develop a better theory that would provide a better explanation concerning the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. To answer this question, I examined the factors that
influence and make college students more vulnerable to be recruited from the standpoint
of two criminological theories: (a) social control and (b) social learning theories. First,
however, the target population needed to be identified according to these two important
criminological theories. College students who had the following characteristics were
excluded from this segment of my study because it was difficult to determine whether
they were recruited through social control or social learning theory perspectives: (a) those
who were with their family during their college education and stated that they were
recruited in college and had militants within the social structure; and (b) those who were
away from their family during their college education and stated that they were recruited
while away from the family and had militants within their social networks.
Briefly, social control theory states that an individual who leaves his or her native
habitat lacks the traditional social forces that could act to restrain his or her involvement
in criminal activity (Vold, Bernard, & Snipes, 2002). Earlier, Gibbs (1989) maintained
that social control theory helps to understand the conception of deviance counteraction
and the suppression of terrorism through decreasing extreme behaviors.
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On the other hand, social learning theory implies that an individual is more
inclined to learn behavior through interaction with others who may serve as the stimuli
for committing crime (Akers, Lanza, & Radosevic, 1979).
In my study, I expected that social networks in the area where a person grew up
would have a significant effect on the decision as to whether or not to commit crime(s).
Parallel to this expectancy, Ross (1993) further claimed that shared attitudes, beliefs,
values, opinions, habits, customs, traditions, and myths permit the development of
fanaticism, violence, nationalism, and terrorism in a population‟s subgroup. Ross added
that group perceptions shared by a person may diminish the risks of committing terrorist
actions, and its inspirational effect may increase a member‟s commitment to the group.
Considering the strong social network within the geographical area in which the
Turkish Hezbollah effectively operates, I postulated that the Turkish Hezbollah would be
more likely to use social networks in recruiting new militants who held college degrees.
To determine the Turkish Hezbollah‟s most effective recruiting method,
descriptive statistics were used for the first research question, and for the second and
third research questions, logistic regression was applied in order to reveal the
demographic details concerning the Turkish Hezbollah militants. This method helped to
identify the variables that lead college students to be recruited. In other words, the
independent variables (IVs) were tested over the dependent variable (DV) to observe
each IV‟s weight that increased the likelihood of being recruited. In addition, for the
second and third research questions, descriptive analyses were applied to determine the
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most successful method and to decide which theory best explained the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s recruitment methods.
In 2000, reports were seized by the Turkish National Police during an operation
against Hezbollah‟s leader. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000), these personal
reports were believed to accurately represent a view of one‟s life, and they were not
contaminated by another person‟s analysis. In addition, rather than providing subjective
information, the Turkish Hezbollah members revealed only actual self-reported
information concerning when and how they were recruited, their family structure, and
about themselves. Further, because the reports were never intended to become the
property of the Turkish National Police, there was no reason for the militants to falsify
their backgrounds. Besides, the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist
group and lying is considered to be one of the greatest sins within the seven that are
mentioned in the Qur‟an. For example, if a person lies about his or her background, it is
highly possible that he or she may be considered as an intruder within the Turkish
Hezbollah. Finally, unbiased reporting was believed to exist given that militants are
expected to provide reliable information that the Turkish Hezbollah has the power to
validate.
Turkey was selected for this research because, first, there are few academic
studies that specifically address the Turkish Hezbollah. In the modern world, government
policies should rely on academic studies because a lack of them may give incorrect policy
implications. Thus, to support the operational solutions, the Turkish government clearly
needs well-addressed policy changes in an effort to minimize terrorist activities. Second,
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social factors play important roles in Turkey. For example, in comparison to the United
States and other Western countries, an eastern culture increases the effectiveness of one‟s
social environment, wherein being from the same city, social background, and ethnicity
plays a significant role (Cakir, 2007).
Consistent to the expected findings of my study, by employing social networks to
recruit new members as opposed to institutional structures, the Turkish Hezbollah would
be more effective. As a policy implication, I implied that Turkish government officials
need policy changes such as providing better human rights, democracy, and religious
freedom against Turkish Hezbollah‟s strategies and propaganda. Thus far, it has been
shown that the current policy of responding harshly to terrorists does not solve the
problem but rather assists the Turkish Hezbollah in recruiting more militants through its
use of propaganda aimed against the Turkish government. Thus, new tactics and
strategies are needed to fight the Turkish Hezbollah. Parallel to the Turkish government‟s
efforts in becoming a member of the European Union, it must expand on social and
religious rights. Farr (2008) argued that the source of social identity is constituted by
religion, and suppressing religion creates high tension within a society. This possible
negativity over religion may, perhaps, be an effective tool used by the Turkish Hezbollah
to recruit more militants through social networks. On the other hand, providing social and
religious freedom may decrease the recruitment of new militants through social networks.
This issue will be further discussed in-depth in the section related to policy
recommendations.
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1.2

Recruitment Effectiveness
By examining the motivational factors of joining a terrorist organization, I

focused on the effectiveness of the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. In order to
provide a better perspective of each strategy, effectiveness was defined in terms of the
organization‟s successful achievement in recruiting more militants. Based on different
perspectives, effectiveness can be defined in various ways. For example, in the field of
economics, the term describes “the extent to which the desired level of output is
achieved” (Scheerens, Glas, & Thomas, 2003). On the other hand, from a human resource
perspective, Miller (2009) stated that the basic step for all types of recruitment
effectiveness is good profiling and selection. In my study, effectiveness is defined as the
Turkish Hezbollah‟s successful achievement based on the quantity of members recruited.
The number of militants recruited was each separately converted to percentages in order
to make a comparison between those who were recruited using social networks versus
those who were recruited through institutional structures. Depending on the results, I
expected my study to reveal the following.

1.2.1 Using social networks to recruit more militants
Social learning theory asserts (Vold et al., 2002) that behaviors and ideas can be
learned, and they may be supportive of criminal behavior within particular groups.
Parallel to this statement, if social networks are responsible for recruiting a larger
percentage of Turkish Hezbollah militants, considering the eastern part of Turkey‟s social
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structure, my study is expected to demonstrate that family members and relatives have a
great influence over a person‟s decision to make right or wrong choices.

1.2.2 Using institutional structures to recruit more militants
Contrary to other criminal theories‟ assumption that people naturally obey the law
if they are left to their own devices, control theory takes the opposite approach and
assumes that all people are inclined to commit crimes if they are left to their own devices.
According to control theorists, controlling forces restrain persons from committing
crimes, and weakness of these forces drives them to do so (Vold et al., 2002). Similar to
other terrorist organizations, the Turkish Hezbollah takes advantage of this environment
through its institutional structures.
If institutional structures were found to be responsible for recruiting a larger
percentage of militants, I demonstrated that the Turkish Hezbollah has very strong
institutional structures within colleges that influence other students to join the
organization.
Given that the Turkish Hezbollah members provided detailed information in their
personal reports regarding when and who recruited them, this information assisted me in
identifying the effectiveness of both strategies.

1.3

Significance of Terrorism as a Problem
Woolsey (2002) contended that many of the ideological, political, and national

hostility that motivates terrorists will remain unresolved in the 21st century. Accordingly,
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it is safe to assume that terrorists will continue to instigate violence in order to achieve
political, economic, and social changes. Clearly, finding the reasons for terrorist activities
is the core element to successfully combat terrorism. According to Gerwehr and Daly
(2006), fighting against terrorism should not only include responding to attacks and
threats but also should include proactive steps in order to diminish terrorist activities.
In my study, I strived to determine the Turkish Hezbollah‟s effective recruitment
methods as well as the underlying reasons for Hezbollah‟s support in Turkey‟s eastern
part. In the following discussion, continuing causes of terrorism are suggested.

1.3.1 Unnoticed reasons behind terrorism
According to Yayla (2005), most of the problems related to terrorism remain
unsolved, and further, most have never been researched. One main drawback in today‟s
governments and agencies concerning current terrorist threats focuses on short-term
policy resolutions. Yayla argued that a majority of the strategies designed to fight
terrorism lack long-term solutions, for example, making attempts to identify the main
causes and pursuing them in an effort to eliminate the justifications behind terrorist
organizations.

1.3.2 Determination of the terrorists
My study was designed to determine if Turkish Hezbollah militants were
recruited through either institutional structures or social networks. By doing so, perhaps
new policies for combating terrorism will be established. For example, the Turkish
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Hezbollah provides shelter or food free of charge to college students, the target
population in my study. By taking into consideration the lower income level in Turkey‟s
eastern part, these types of activities help the terrorist organization to create a sense of
sympathy for college students. In addition, the organization‟s legal structures become
extremely effective in recruiting more militants. Thus, universities may play an important
role in decreasing the number of newly recruited militants by providing lower-cost
campus housing and controlling those areas as a means of steering college students away
from terrorist organizations. Thus, I expected to find that students who came from lower
income family members would be more likely to be recruited by institutional structures
through the organization‟s provision of complimentary housing or other necessary
college commodities.
Moghaddam (2005) suggested that the more an individual becomes involved in a
terrorist organization, the more likely he or she will adhere to the organization‟s
ideologies. For the sake of their illegal organizations, many terrorists do not hesitate to
kill not only themselves but also as many civilians and innocent people as they possibly
can. For example, Al-Qaeda, one of the ruthless terrorist organizations, killed over 3,000
innocent people simultaneously on September 11th, 2001. When planning a terrorist
attack that is not suspected, this determination becomes one of the most dangerous
weapons in the world.
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1.4

Approaches to Terrorism Analysis
Although I aimed to reveal the best recruitment strategy of the Turkish Hezbollah,

I also examined the motivational factors that drive college students to join terrorist
organizations. The Turkish Hezbollah‟s militants‟ self-reports provided detailed
information concerning how and why they chose to join Hezbollah. My study was
designed to reveal the best working argument of the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new
militants. Considering the eastern part of Turkey, the area is more conservative when
compared to the western part. Although there may be some criticism regarding Turkey‟s
religious policies, the country‟s secular and democratic regime guarantees each
individual‟s religious life. In this regard, I provided a general assessment of the terrorist
mind and mindset.
Hudson (1999) discussed that identifying terrorist methods and tactics may
improve counterterrorist policies. He stated that there are five basic approaches to
analyzing terrorism. The following brief discussion of Hudson‟s basic approaches was
found to be beneficial in understanding the general insights in my study that explain why
people join terrorist organizations.

1.4.1 The Multicausal Approach
Hudson (1999) stated that terrorism usually results from multiple causal factors.
Accordingly, those factors may psychological as well as religious, economic, political,
and sociological factors. Since terrorism is a multicausal phenomenon, it would be
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erroneous and simplistic to explain an act of terrorism by a single cause such as the
psychological need of the terrorist to perpetrate an act of violence.
The causes of revolution and political violence in general may also compose the
causes of terrorism that include: (a) religious, (b) ethnic and ideological conflicts, (c)
modernization stresses, (d) poverty, (e) political inequities, (f) traditions of violence, (g)
lack of peaceful communications channels, (h) the existence of a revolutionary group, (i)
erosions of confidence in a regime, (j) governmental weakness and incompetence, and (k)
deep divisions within governing elites and leadership groups (Wilkinson, 1993).
Throughout history, terrorist groups have used not only Islam but also other
religions as a justification for their vicious activities (George, 2006). However the Qur‟an
does not advocate killing innocents nor does the Torah or the Bible. Contrary to
religiously motivated terrorist groups, all religions harshly condemn terrorist activities.
Thus, I will reveal how the Turkish Hezbollah uses religion as a tool to entice college
students.

1.4.2 Political Approach
According to this approach, political environmental factors play an important role
for terrorism. Preconditions─subnational, national and international environments─may
give some justifications for terrorists to start violence (Hudson, 1999). Preconditions, also
known as permissive causes, can be attractive to political dissidents who may be
motivators of terrorists. According to Crenshaw (1981), permissive causes consist of (a)
urbanization, (b) the transportation system that may allow a terrorist to quickly escape to
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another country, (c) communications media, (d) weapons availability, and the absence of
security measures (Crenshaw, 1981).
Although most Turkish Hezbollah militants originated from the Kurds, they do
not aspire to racial segregation that is harshly criticized by the Qur‟an. Because claiming
ethnic supremacy is not tolerated by Islam, I revealed that the Turkish Hezbollah does not
use political argument to recruit new militants

1.4.3 Organizational Approach
According to the organizational approach, terrorism is seen as a rational strategic
course of action that is decided by a group (Crenshaw, 1990). In other words, terrorism is
not committed by an individual. Although the level of individual commitment to the
group and its beliefs varies, acts of terrorism are committed by groups who reach
collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs (Hudson, 1999).
Because the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist organization,
unless someone insults Islam through the media, it does not kill people to create
propaganda (Cakir, 2007). For example, Hezbollah kills its target but does not reveal the
target, a policy that has resulted in many unknown killings especially from 1989 to 2000.
However, after the Turkish Hezbollah‟s archives were obtained in 2000, the public
learned that most of the unknown killings were perpetrated by the Turkish Hezbollah. In
my study, I did not discuss the organizational approach.
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1.4.4 Psychological Approach
According to Hudson (1999), the relatively few psychologists who study
terrorism are primarily interested in the individual terrorist or the terrorist group‟s microlevel. In essence, the psychological approach is concerned with the study of terrorists
themselves that includes their recruitment and induction into terrorist groups and their
personalities, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and careers as terrorists (Hudson, 1999). In
my study, however, I did not assess the college student through this approach.

1.4.5 The Physiological Approach
The physiological approach suggests that in any discussion of the causes of
terrorism, the media‟s role in promoting the spread of terrorism cannot be ignored.
Through media coverage, for example, the methods, demands, and goals are quickly
made known to potential terrorists. Oots and Wiegele (1985) proposed that a model of
terrorist contagion is based on physiology in which the psychological state of the
potential terrorist has important implications for society‟s stability. In their analysis,
because potential terrorists become aroused in the violence─accepting the media‟s way of
presenting terrorism─by the nature of their actions, terrorists must have an attitude that
leads them to commit violence. Oots and Wiegele added that in order to become
aggressively aroused, the potential terrorist only needs to see that terrorism has worked
for others. Accordingly, an individual moves from being a potential terrorist to being an
actual terrorist through a process that is psychological, physiological, and political.
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In my study, I did not examine the media part of terrorism for the following
reasons. Considering the low income of people who live in the area, they may not be able
to afford media sources. Therefore, I expected that very few people would be affected
through the Turkish Hezbollah‟s media propaganda.

1.5

Statement of the Problem
Turkey‟s struggle against all kinds of terrorist activities for more than four

decades set the country as a good place to develop a case study. The reasons behind
Turkey‟s varied terrorist activities lie in its geographical and historical background.
Turkey‟s unique geographical location situated between Europe and Asia causes Turkish
social life to be affected by many cultures that provide a diversified society─a hallmark
of modern Turkey (Ozeren, 2004). Although democracy and civil society are welcomed
by Turkish citizens for the most part, fundamentalist ideas may also find ground within
the society. According to Ozeren, being in the more problematic geographical location
causes Turkey to be more open to fundamentalist terrorist activities. In addition,
supported by Iranian fundamentalist groups, the Turkish Hezbollah has sympathy for the
Kurdish population who reside within the eastern part of the country (Cakir, 2007).
Especially during the cold war era when Turkey represented the only Islamic
nation in NATO, the country faced a significant threat from the Soviet Union. For
example, fundamentalist left wing groups supported by the Soviet Union murdered many
people including politicians and high ranking officers (Olcay, 1991). Turkey not only has
extremist left terror organizations within its border but also has extremist religiously
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motivated terror groups which were mostly affected by the Iran revolution in 1979
(Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006).
Beginning especially in the 1960s, Turkey suffered too much from terrorist
activities of the leftist Revolutionary People‟s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), the
separatist Kurdistan Workers‟ Party (PKK), and religiously motivated Turkish Hezbollah.
These terrorist organization activities that peaked particularly from 1990 to 1995 not only
weakened Turkey‟s political center but also challenged Turkish democracy. These
terrorist activities often destabilized political life, and some political parties were accused
of supporting extremist groups. During this period, none of the political parties gained a
majority in the Turkish Assembly to run the country and make necessary social and
economical reforms.
Following this period, beginning in 1996, Turkey has made significant
constitutional changes in terms of improving human rights and restructuring democratic
institutions for accession to the European Union. However, Onis (2003) recommended
that Turkey still needs to make important reforms by stating that decentralization,
political demilitarization, and state control over religion are some essential issues.
However, to make these changes, a parliamentary system in Turkey requires a strong
government. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, most of the governments were based on
weak and short-lived coalitions. At the same time, rapid economic and social
transformation over the past 15 years has worsened the critical problems (Kramer, 1999).
Candarli (1999) argued that the social transformation and new demographic
structure has made great changes in the Turkish political center. Unfortunately, the old
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system and its official ideology have been unable to respond to this change. In particular,
the secular elite did not want to give up their political, social, and economic privileges,
and they considered a threat to these privileges as a threat to the republic itself. Rather
than enlarging the scope and framework of democracy, these secular elite called in the
military. In addition, conflict between the left and right groups created high tension
within the country, and thousands of lives were lost throughout 48 years. As a result,
destabilization within the political life resulted in the Turkish army becoming involved
and establishing three military coups.
The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution opened new horizons for Turkish Islamist
ideology and its movements (Cakir, 2007). Because the 1980 military coup intended to
weaken the radical left and radical nationalist movements, the Turkish Hezbollah was
given the opportunity to take advantage of the process and thus became stronger.
Cakir (2007) stated that being surrounded by Iranians and Arabs, the Kurds had
significant exposure to Persian and Arabic languages resulting in madrasa (seminary)
education becoming widespread in the Kurdish populated region. Additionally, Islamic
identity helped the development of a strong clergy class with titles including mele,
sheikh, and sayyed.

1.6

The Current Gap in the Literature
For implementing attacks and sustaining operations, manpower is a crucial

resource for terrorist organizations. Hence, hindering recruitment of terrorist
organizations will disable their ability to function (RAND, 2006). To obstruct the Turkish
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Hezbollah‟s recruitment, it is therefore necessary to understand how recruitment works,
where the Turkish Hezbollah recruits, and what tool it uses, whom it targets and the
selection reasons. Thus, having a clearer picture of these recruitment strategies could help
the Turkish government to enact better policies to combat against terrorism.
Although there is much research regarding the recruitment strategies of terrorist
organizations throughout the world, unfortunately there is no scientific research relating
to the recruitment strategies of Turkey‟s terrorist groups. Parallel to Width and Fahoum‟s
(2006) “Future Research Recommendations,” I provided demographic details concerning
the recruited militants. Nichiporuk (2003) stated that high fertility rates, unregulated and
unchecked migration flows, and volatile religious and ethnic rivalries can increase
terrorist activities. He claimed that the link between demography and the causes of
extremism should be broken in order to enhance the victory against terrorism. According
to Nichiporuk, fertility rates, ethnic/religious composition, internal/international
migration, and level of human capital and population/environment interactions are very
important variables for terrorist activities. In my study, I also provided economic and
demographic details to determine the underlying reasons for joining with the Turkish
Hezbollah.

1.7

Criminological Theories and Terrorism
To clarify the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies, it is important to

address social control and social learning theories given that they represent two major
sociological theories of crime and delinquency. Thus, I used these theories to discuss the
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traditional and post-traditional criminological perspectives in explaining terrorism. First,
however, the definition of terrorism as used in my study provides general insights
regarding the relationship between crime and terrorism.
1.7.1 Definition of terrorism
Although terrorism has existed since the beginning of recorded history, defining
the term is problematic (Ferracuti, 1982). Depending on whose point of view is being
represented, terrorism has been described in various and controversial ways. For
example, terrorism may be referred to by some as a crime and a holy duty, a tactic and a
strategy, a justification of reaction against oppression, or an inexcusable abomination
(International Terrorism and Security Research, 2009). This creates a major dilemma in a
concise definition and therefore affects future studies and development of policies.
According to Victoroff (2005), there are numerous analyses of terrorism that may include
political, social, ideological, and economic aspects, many of which are typically given
less emphasis when compared to security factors in policy formation.
Thus, because there is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism, the
terms used are generally inadequate as well as frequently neglected by terrorism
researchers who prefer to cite the basic U.S. Department of State definition (Hudson,
1999): “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience.”
Traditional approaches claim that the major difference between terrorism and
crime is: Opinions are divided from both a theoretical and policy making perspective. For

19

instance, scholars who consider terrorism as a form of crime are controversial due to the
differences in motivational factors. Terrorists and criminals have diverse motivations
such as political, ideological, ethnic, or religious goals. Contrary to criminals who may be
motivated to perpetrate crime for its own sake, terrorists commit violence for specific
reasons, namely causing self-destructive reactions in a society (Asal & Wilkenfeld,
2005). Spencer (2006) asserted that terrorism that is used as a politically motivated tactic
involves the threat or use of force or violence.
Contrary to the traditional approach, Asal and Wilkenfeld (2005) maintained that
there is no motivational difference between terrorists and criminals. They claimed that
although the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was formerly a
politically motivated terrorist organization, it currently profits from drug trafficking, and
its members have always acted criminally to gain financial freedom. This is also the case
of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which remains active in the eastern part of Turkey
(Candarli, 1999). Especially over the last decades, political rebels have become criminals
while still pretending to be rebels in an effort to recruit new militants by maintaining their
legitimate public image. Clearly, most terrorist organizations, including Lebanese
Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, PKK and Hamas, operate sophisticated fund-raising networks
throughout the world (Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2005).

1.8

Similarities and Differences of Crime and Terrorism
Ferracuti (1982) claimed that although terrorists use terror, their goals and

motivations remain criminal. In addition, their actions begin with legal and accepted
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forms of dissent such as individual oral protests or petitions that easily progress to illegal
but often tolerated acts, for example, violent demonstrations, vandalism, or seizures of
property. Eventually, these actions escalate to unacceptable and illegal behavior where
sabotage, personal assaults, bombings, and kidnappings occur. Considering their final
actions, according to Ferracuti, terrorists should be approached as criminals.
In discussing the issue that terrorism often involves various kinds of crime
including kidnapping, arson, murder, and conspiracy, it is very difficult to make a
distinction between terrorism and crime (Ferracuti, 1982). Besides being involved in the
same illegal activities, other similarities between terrorists and criminals include the
actions and tactics employed by both groups (Koseli, 2008).
On the other hand, traditional scholars have declared that separate motivations
and goals create the differences between crime and terrorism. While terrorism uses
violence as a strategy to achieve political goals, it may also be used by those who oppose
existing governments (Crenshaw, 2001).

1.9

Social Learning and Social Control Theories
Although there are differences of opinion as to how terrorism and criminality are

related, both social learning and social control theories can be applied to research
concerning why individuals join terrorist groups since each theory explains why certain
individuals may be prone to engage in crime.
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1.9.1 Social learning theory
While developing his general sociological theory of crime and delinquency,
Edwin H. Sutherland relied heavily upon the work of Shaw and McKay, Chicago school
theorists (Akers, 2004). Ecological and cultural transmission theory, symbolic
interactionism, and culture had an impact on the formulation of Sutherland‟s theory.
Sutherland revised the final version of his theory in 1947, based on nine
postulates:
1. Criminal behavior is learned.
2. Criminal behavior is learned through interaction with other persons in a process
of communication.
3. The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate
personal groups.
4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes: (a) techniques of
committing the crime that are sometimes very complicated, sometimes simple; and (b)
the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes.
5. The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the
legal codes as favorable or unfavorable.
6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to
violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law.
7. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and
intensity.
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8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and
anticriminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other
learning.
9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not
explained by those general needs and values since noncriminal behavior is an expression
of the same needs and values.
Social learning theory suggests that behavior is learned not only through direct
experience but also through observation of one‟s environment. In this theory, aggression
is viewed as a learned behavior, and through observation one may learn the consequences
of the behavior. Oots and Wiegele (1985) contended that if aggression is viewed as
learned behavior, then terrorism─a specific type of aggressive behavior─can also be
learned.
Social learning theory is a modified and clarified version of Sutherland‟s
differential association theory that consists of two basic elements. First, to commit a
crime, specific techniques are needed to be learned from criminals. Second, interaction
with others provides appropriate drives, motives, attitudes, and rationalization for law
violations (Vold et al., 2002). According to Akers (2004), in the eighth principle of
Sutherland‟s theory, he asserted that criminal behavior involves all the mechanisms of
learning; however, Akers failed to identify them. To create the social learning theory,
Burgess and Akers (1966) retained all the principles of Sutherland‟s differential
association theory and combined them with differential reinforcement and other
principles of behavioral acquisition, continuation, and cessation in addition to adding
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more concepts taken from behavioral learning theory (e.g., differential reinforcement,
discriminative stimuli and internal stimuli, and schedules of reinforcement). They
contended that criminal behavior is learned in the same way that any other behavior is
learned and may be explained through the rewards or punishment a person receives from
his or her environment (Orcutt, 2002). Parallel to Orcutt‟s perspective on social learning
theory, I also argue that any individual‟s perception of crime may change depending on
the social network where the person grew up. In other words, having criminals in the
social networks increases the likelihood of an individual‟s involvement in criminal
activity.
Akers (2004) pointed out that social learning theory is not competitive with
differential association theory but rather represents a broader version. Evidence in
research that supports Sutherland‟s differential association theory supports social learning
theory as well. Furthermore, Akers maintained that social learning theory explains
criminal and delinquent behavior more thoroughly than does Sutherland‟s differential
association theory. According to Akers‟ theory, a great deal of learning between humans
occurs in nonsocial situations and social interactions by observing the consequences of
people‟s behavior from others. Akers‟ social learning theory focused on the following
four major concepts (Vold et al., 2002).
1. Differential association refers to direct and indirect association and interaction
with others who engage in certain kinds of behavior or express values, norms, and
attitudes. These patterns of interactions with others may result in either unfavorable or
favorable reactions to violating the law (Akers & Jensen, 2005).
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2. According to Akers (2004), definitions reflect the meanings of one‟s own
behavior. They may be more right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, appropriate or
inappropriate, good or bad (Vold et al., 2002).
3. Differential reinforcement refers to the balance of actual or anticipated rewards
and punishments that may be consequences of the behavior (Akers & Jensen, 2005).
4. Imitation is the act that comes after observation. The individual observes a
behavior from others and then engages in a similar behavior. According to Akers (2004),
the imitated behavior is influenced by the characteristics of the model, the observed
behavior, and the observed consequences of the behavior.
Through social learning theory, I endeavored to answer the question, “How strong
is the family structure in the recruitment of more militants?”
1.9.2

Social Control Theory
Similar to other terrorist organizations in Turkey, Hezbollah effectively uses its

broad social structure. For example, Muslim associations, mosques, publications, and
foundations are some of the tools that Hezbollah employ (Kardon, 1998). As earlier
discussed by Karmon (1997), Hezbollah supports its effectiveness within universities to
recruit and indoctrinate militants through its radical publications. More especially,
students who are living far away from their families may be easily manipulated to take
part in the organization. In this regard, Hezbollah‟s ability to recruit militants in
universities may be best tested by social control theory.
By definition, control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of
counteracting delinquency and states that strong social bonds hinder delinquency (Booth,
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Farrell, & Varano, 2008). Britt and Gottfredson (2003) contended that in order to better
understand terrorism, it should rightfully be studied within criminology. They further
stated that to achieve political ends, terrorism is related to certain elements of low social
control.
Vold et al. (2002) asserted that many theories of crime and delinquency assume
that people generally obey the rules if they are left to their own will, and there are various
special forces─biological, psychological or social─that drive them to commit crime.
Control theories, however, take the opposite side by stating that all individuals are natural
animals and if left to their own devices, they are prone to commit crime. Thus, the key
question for control theorists becomes: “Why do people not commit crime?” To answer,
they focus primarily on special forces that intercept persons from committing crime.
Therefore, the main hidden point behind not committing crime is the weakness of forces
that restrain people from doing so. Parallel to this statement, being away from social
networks increases the likelihood of being recruited by terrorist organizations.
Hirschi (1969) assumed that everyone has the potential to become delinquent and
criminal, and social controls─not moral values─maintain law and order. Thus, with a
lack of social control, one is free to commit either terrorist or criminal acts. There are
four aspects of social control discussed in the literature:
1.9.2.1 Attachment
By attachment, Hirschi (1969) referred to the extent to which a person is attached
to others. For example, as the individual becomes more attached to others, he is far less
likely to become delinquent.
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1.9.2.2 Commitment
The concept of commitment assumes that the interests and benefits of persons
living in a society are at risk if they are engaged in criminal acts, because most people
acquire their reputation and prosperity from the society in which they live. In 1957,
Jackson Toby introduced the concept of “stakes at conformity” and argued that all youths
are tempted to break the law but some risk much more than others when they give in to
those temptations. Youths who do well in the school not only risk being punished for
breaking the law, but they also jeopardize their future careers. In other words, they have
high “stakes at conformity.”
1.9.2.3 Involvement
The component of involvement proposes that if a person is engaged in
conventional activities, he or she is less likely to commit crime. The assumption is that a
person may be simply too busy doing conventional things to find time to engage in
deviant behavior.
1.9.2.4 Belief
Matza (1964) argued that people have some conventional moral beliefs but they
neutralize them to commit crime. In the first stage, Hirschi (1969) tested his theory
against social strain (the motivation aspect) and Sutherland‟s or Miller‟s theory (cultural
or group influence). Hirschi reported that contrary to strain theory [when individuals
cannot successfully reach their goals, they experience pressure which may cause them to
commit crime] (Cullen & Agnew, 2003), there was, in general, no relationship between
the delinquent acts and social class. In addition, racial differences did not play a
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significant role in self-reported delinquency (Vold et al., 2002). In Hirschi‟s analysis of
attachment to parents compared to students‟ schools and peers, scoring low on parental
bonds revealed the possibility of scoring high for crime (Leiber, 2007). Although
Hirschi‟s findings supported control theory, they were inconsistent with cultural theories.
He also found that youths who were not successful in school were more likely to commit
crime that also supported control theory.
Contrary to the findings of strain theory, Hirschi (1969) analyzed the effects of
attachment to parents, schools, and peers on reported delinquents. Regardless of race or
class, and regardless of the delinquency of their friends, Hirschi found that boys who
were more closely attached to their parents were less likely to report committing
delinquent acts than those who had less close parental attachments (Vold et al., 2002).
According to Hirschi, peers do not play important roles for committing and hindering
crime (Leiber, 2007).
According to social control theorists, terrorism emerges from a social response to
perceived deviance that stems from underspecific, observable structural conditions
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2004). McCord (2004) further stated that lack of cultural norms
and values decreases an individual‟s responsibility. Simply put, individuals who display
ineffective or weak social ties are easy targets for terrorist groups.
The Turkish Hezbollah movement is located mainly in the southeastern part of
Turkey by Kurdish citizens. To gain a better understanding of why the Turkish Hezbollah
has a broad support in this area, it is necessary to provide background information about
the Kurdish people‟s political and social life.
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1.10 Ethnic Origins of the Kurds
Barkey and Fuller (1998) argued that divisions among the Kurds along
geographical, linguistic, and political lines have played an important role. The Kurdish
population is divided territorially and linguistically among four regional states─Iran, Iraq,
Syria, and Turkey.
The Sevres Treaty (1920) “envisaged interim autonomy for the predominantly
Kurdish areas of Turkey with a view to full independence if the inhabitants of these areas
wanted this” (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). However, the Kurdish population was not
mentioned in the Lozan Treaty (1924) although the provisions of the Sevres Treaty were
reviewed.
According to Bruinessen‟s (1999), definition, Kurds include “all native speakers
of Kurmanji or Zaza, as well as those Turkish-speaking persons who claim descent from
Kurmanji or Zaza speakers who still (or again) consider themselves as Kurds.” Earlier,
Barkey and Fuller (1998) considered Kurds to be those who have “willingly been
assimilated and are . . . Turkish, and Christians who have embraced Islam (such as the
many Armenians who have assumed Kurdish Alevi identity over the centuries).”
However, during the Ottoman Empire, Islamic law recognized only non-Muslims as
minorities; hence, because Kurdish people were Muslims, they were never considered to
be members of a minority group.
Regarding Turkey‟s number of Kurds, the most widely accepted figure represents
20% of the population (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). According to the 1965 census, 2.2
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million Turkish inhabitants claimed Kurdish as their mother tongue, and 1.2 million
claimed Kurdish as their second language. The number of Zaza speakers was estimated to
be approximately 150,000 (Barkey & Fuller, 1998).
In discussing the possible factors that have played an important role on Kurdish
identity, Barkey and Fuller (1998) listed geography as one given that the people primarily
inhabited mountainous regions that were scattered and isolated from each other without
having a central state structure. Accordingly, their nomadic lifestyle also contributed to
the divergence of several Kurdish dialects. In addition, the Kurdish people generally lived
in the more isolated regions of larger empires, namely the Persian, Arab, or Ottoman,
which affected the development of their identity (Barkey & Fuller, 1998).

1.11 Ideology of the Turkish Islamic Movement
According to Karmon (1998), most scholars agree that although Turkish Islam has
many features common to other Muslim countries in the region, its uniqueness lies in the
different political and social environments. Turkish ideology is occupied with Turkish
nationalism that includes the secularist components and European identification of
Kemalism.
Contrary to other religiously motivated terror organizations in other countries,
terrorist groups in Turkey have never attacked military or security personnel, although
they lost many members in the antiterrorist campaigns that were led by the state. In
addition, they have never attacked Western targets or acted abroad even though they have
some infrastructure in Europe.
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Turkish security authorities outlined the objectives of the radical religious
movements through three stages: (a) First is the message to call people for an effort to
adopt the Islamic religion to social life and establish an Islamic state and administration
through the radicals in order to persuade the community; (b) second is for the community
to restructure in accordance with the requirements of the first stage; and (c) third is the
struggle to safeguard the Islamic way of life.
Interestingly, although religious motivated groups have struggled for the
constitution of an Islamic State, they have used leftist slogans in their publications and
they accept ex-Marxists in their ranks.
In the early 1990s, the PKK attempted to gain religious communities of Turkey‟s
southeast region. To achieve this goal, they established organizations such as the
Kurdistan Imamlar Birligi─Association of Imams of Kurdistan─(imam = the official
person assigned to each mosque). Ozeren and Van De Voorde (2006) argued that PKK
attempted to become the major power in the region by gaining those communities
through causing a fight between Turkish Hezbollah and the PKK.

1.12 The Turkish Hezbollah
As a religiously motivated terrorist organization, the major goal of the Turkish
Hezbollah is to establish a state based on Islamic laws (seriat). As a model, Iran is the
only country that has seriat. Thus, the Hezbollah foresaw three different stages to reach
their goal: propaganda (teblig), organizing (cemaat), and armed struggle (jihad).
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Beginning in the 1980s and peaking especially during the 1990s, some extremist
religious groups located in Diyarbakir, the largest city in southeast Turkey, became more
active and began to address larger populations in order to succeed in their ideological
goals. Additionally, they published numerous books and magazines in an effort to gain
more supporters. For example, publishing centers played a central role in that extremist
religious groups were able to reveal their ideology to more people as well as the
opportunity to inform, organize, and even give orders to their supporters.
Regarding the leadership and strategy of the organization, a critical problem arose
in 1993 between two groups of the Turkish Hezbollah─Ilim and Menzil. A year later, the
leader of the Menzil Group was kidnapped and murdered, and furthermore, 50 members
from both sides lost their lives in this internal fight during the second half of the 1990s
(Aras & Bacik, 2002). Between 1991 and 2003, Turkish security forces arrested 14,622
people and cleared 1,648 terror incidents (Ozeren & Van De Voorde, 2006).
Between 2000 and 2001, the Turkish National Police conducted two successful
operations against the Turkish Hezbollah which pushed the organization to underground
for a long period of time. In 2000, Huseyin Velioglu, the leader of Turkish Hezbollah,
was killed by security forces, the organization‟s archives were seized, and 61 high level
members were arrested. In total, 4,679 suspects were arrested in 2000 and 2001, and the
bodies of 67 people who were kidnapped and murdered by the organization were located.
Each new arrest and interrogation of the Turkish Hezbollah militants helped the
Turkish Intelligence Group to become more familiar with the organization. In addition,
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several more discoveries and arrests were made through these operations and the Turkish
Hezbollah systematically dismantled (Nugent, 2004).
In terms of how the Turkish Hezbollah view Iran, some facts may be helpful in
understanding the situation. For example, high level leadership, including Velioglu,
received military, political, and religious training in Iran. Karmon (1998) further
confirmed that members of the Turkish Hezbollah also receive training in Iran. Although
the organization‟s members are in favor of the methods used by Iran‟s revolution, they do
not want to be controlled by Iran. Further, although they do not accept the Islamic sect
(shic) of the Iranian people for themselves, they do not consider that it is a good idea to
discuss the differences. Despite the many problems, however, they stayed in touch with
Iranian intelligence units between 1992 and 1999.
Ozeren and Van De Voorde (2006) stated that the Turkish Hezbollah is also
known as the Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah (Hisbullahi Kurdi Shorishger) among
Iraqi Kurds because its members are predominantly made up of Sunni Muslim Kurds.
In terms of the recent situation of the Turkish Hezbollah, they have been
attempting to reestablish their high level management and regain their support groups,
and they remain active in prisons and abroad as well. As a new strategy, they avoid
armed struggles until the right time comes. As a different approach from that of the past,
the organization has been seeking peace with other religious groups and organizations in
addition to publishing books and periodicals in an effort to regain support from their
communities.
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1.12.1 Religious motivated terror organizations and the Turkish Hezbollah
Although there are demographic similarities between the Turkish Hezbollah and
the PKK, there are also serious ideological differences between them. While the Turkish
Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist organization, PKK is a Marxist Leninist
Kurdish separatist terrorist organization. Until 1996, when Irfan Cagirici, one of the
Turkish Hezbollah leaders was captured, Turkish authorities had underestimated
Hezbollah by focusing primarily on PKK.
Being a more popular issue throughout the world, it is useful to first briefly
address religious motivated terrorist organizations. Because each terrorist organization‟s
goals and strategies are different when establishing an Islamic state and society, defining
the Islamic movement is a complex task (Karmon, 1998). Sayari (1996) distinguished
terrorist groups as traditionalists and radicals as those minority groups who were inspired
by the Iranian revolution in 1979.
Additionally, Imset (1993) divided Turkey into two parts─western and
southeastern Turkey. According to Imset, while there is a resistance to the Islamic state in
the western part of the country, the southeastern part is dominated chiefly by the Kurdish
population which represents sympathy toward Islamic movements. Hezbollah, also
known as Hezbol-contra, first began to spread in southeastern Turkey.
Religious-oriented terrorist activity in Turkey began in the 1960s, and between
1967 and 1973, the leaders of Hizb ut Tahrir, the Islamic Liberation Party, were
imprisoned for attempting to change Turkey‟s constitutional structure through armed
activities (Karmon, 1998). By 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran had an enormous effect
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over the religious motivated terrorist organizations and opened new horizons for them.
As a result, hundreds of young Islamists visited Iran in search of ways to transform
Turkey into Iran (Cakir, 2007).
Similar to other terrorist organizations, the Turkish Islamic movements were
heavily affected by the military coup in 1980. However, with its beginnings in 1983, the
democratic regime encouraged the general Islamic trend, and Marxists and nationalists
lost their influence although free political space helped them to strengthen their position.
This ample space also aided the Islamic Jihad to play a noticeable role as a real terrorist
threat that committed a series of assassinations. By 1984, the Turkish Hezbollah publicly
appeared for the first time and showed support for the Iranian revolution (Karmon, 1997).
According to Karmon (1997), beginning in the middle 1980s with the conversion
of some members of the right wing nationalist movement to Islam, a significant
development occurred. Unlike their origin, they believed that their movement should not
tolerate nationalism, and contrary to PKK‟s ideology to be separated from the Turkish
Republic, Hezbollah aimed to change the laic regime to the Islamic Sharia Regime.
These militants were professionals in the field of terrorism and represented significant
operational support for the Islamic movement. They organized more especially in poor
towns and villages with a large Kurdish population among the young and unemployed. In
addition, they often structured themselves around extremist Islamic publications such as
Objektif, Tevhid, and Yeryuzu and followed the teachings of sheiks and Muslim scholars.
Karmon (1998) later discussed that the starting point of terrorist activities for
religious organizations occurred in 1990 against the Turkish secular establishment. After
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this date, a professor, journalist, political scientist, and writer were assassinated by the
Islamic Jihad and Islamic Operation.
The Turkish government, security authorities, press, and public became extremely
aware and shocked when Ugur Mumcu, one of the top prominent investigative reporters,
was killed by a car bomb in January 1993. The series of terrorist events emerged a sharp
reaction from Turkish public opinion and massive demonstrations were held. In addition,
a strong press campaign led the Turkish security forces to take swift action against both
the perpetrators and their sponsors.
For the first time, the arrests and interrogations unveiled the story behind the
killings of some Turkish secular intellectuals, and the relationship between the Islamic
Action or Movement and Iran were directly involved in acts of terrorism against the
Turkish Republic.
Due to its ethnic structure based on Kurdish minority, one of the most
controversial activities of the Turkish Hezbollah in southeastern Turkey was the killing of
PKK members whose aim was separatist ideology in the area. Between 1991 and 1993,
thousands of people were killed from each side. However, the conflict ended when an
agreement was reached between the two terror organizations to not interfere with each
other‟s activities.
A turning point toward religious oriented terrorist organizations occurred in
March 1996. Until that time, Turkish authorities underestimated these groups and thus
made no attempt to hinder their activities. In that month, the arrest of Irfan Cagirici, one
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of the leaders of Islamic action, changed this period (Karmon, 1998) whereas Turkish
security forces increased operations every year.
On January 17, 2000, the Turkish police raided a house located in the Beykoz
district of Istanbul and killed the head of Hezbollah, Huseyin Velioglu, and captured two
other key lieutenant leaders as well. Many documents were seized that unveiled
Hezbollah‟s secret relationships. Approximately one year after the Beykoz operation,
Hezbollah assassinated Diyarbakir‟s chief of police, Gaffar Okkan, as revenge for their
leader‟s death.
This incident led to the second crackdown against Hezbollah when nearly all of
its top leadership were either imprisoned or killed. As a result, these operations limited
Turkey‟s religious motivated terror groups for a long period of time. At least temporarily,
they ceased their armed attacks and entered into a phase of serious internal confrontation.
According to Cakir (2007), the Hezbollah were trying to recover, but
nevertheless, it is possible that in the near future, they may regain the power they once
had. Clearly, the decrease in terrorist activities of radical religious motivated groups was
primarily the consequence of determined counteraction taken by Turkish officials
(Karmon, 1998).

1.13 Other terrorist organizations in Turkey
Turkey does not only experience religiously motivated terrorist organizations, but
also experiences ethnic and extremist leftist terrorism. It is therefore necessary to learn
their strategies and ideologies in order to gain general insight concerning the terrorist

37

activities in Turkey. Also, revealing their recruitment strategies will help to obtain an
overall perspective regarding the terrorist activities in Turkey.

1.13.1 The PKK
The PKK was created during a term of anarchy and turmoil during the 1970s
(Barkey & Fuller, 1998). The anarchy and turmoil in this era resulted in three military
coups that resulted in harsh policies against any opposing movement. The Kurdish
movement was one of them.
The primary goal of the PKK is the creation of a unified, independent Kurdish
state. According to Barkey and Fuller (1998), the PKK sought not only independence, but
also a political and social revolution among the Kurds in order to transform Kurdish
society‟s‟ feudal structure. The PKK adopted a Marxist- Leninist left-wing antiimperialist
approach at first; however, this approach was abandoned in the new post-cold war era.
Some of the more important decisions that were taken in PKK‟s first manifesto
included:
•

The structure of the evolution will be a national democratic revolution.

•

The minimum objective will be to establish an independent non-aligned
Kurdistan State in the region.

•

The maximum objective will be to establish a state based on Marxist-Leninist
principles.

•

The proletariat will be the pioneering force of the revolution.

•

The peasants will be the major force of the revolution.
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•

The main alliance for the revolution will be the alliance between workers,
peasants and intellectual youth.

•

Propaganda activities will be supported by armed violence (Ankara Papers,
2004).

Barkey and Fuller (1998) claimed that PKK moved away from an earlier
condemnation of Islam and now speaks of political settlement within the borders of
Turkey. They further emphasized that the PKK‟s abandonment of an independent
Kurdistan is false and not convincing.
In terms of tactics, the PKK combined violence and terror with political
organizations. According to Barkey and Fuller (1998), the village guards were the top
priority target of the PKK for many years. As a result, many school teachers and civil
servants were killed, and schools and other public institutions were burned to reduce the
existence of a Turkish state in southeast Turkey. Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, once
stated that “the violence alternative may be difficult and painful, but it provides results”
(Balli, 1991, 204).
The poorer classes of peasants and workers are mainly targeted as possible new
members by PKK since these working classes generally live in the standard apartment
ghettos located on the surroundings of Turkey‟s industrial cities. The Turkish government
claims that the PKK recruits its guerrillas forcibly and then subjects them to
“brainwashing” sessions at training camps in Lebanon. In a survey conducted by Ergil
(1996) in southeast Turkey, 42% of the respondents claimed to have a family member in
the organization.
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The CIA pointed out that the PKK has made international terrorism a key weapon
in its fight for an independent homeland in Kurdish-inhabited southeastern Turkey. The
CIA viewed the PKK as a threat to U.S. facilities and interests abroad. The CIA also
noted that because the PKK has been especially active in Europe, they feared that its
tactics might become a model for other ethnic and separatist movements being spawned
in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union.
Criss (1995) claimed that Turkey was exposed to PKK attacks from Iranian soil
between 1993 and 1995; however, in 1995 Iran agreed to help Turkey eliminate PKK
camps in her territories. Criss emphasized three reasons for this policy change: (a) First
was the fear that the PKK could set an example for Iranian Kurds; (b) second was the
implications of Kurdish separatism on the balance of power in the Middle East; and (c)
the third reason was because the leadership in Azerbaijan was changed from Elcibey to
Aliyev. For example, Elcibey was ultranationalist and supported by Turkey but after this
change, Iran felt more secure and changed her attitude on the Kurdish issue.
In another article, Uslu (2007) pointed out the divisions in Turkey‟s Kurdish
community by arguing that the leadership in the Kurdish movement is not centralized as
it was intended. Although Zubeyir Aydar who resides in Europe is the head of the
political wing, but he cannot give direct orders to Murat Karayilan who is headquartered
in the mountains of northern Iraq.
Pedahzur (2005) scrutinized the recruitment strategies of the Kurdish Diaspora in
Europe and concluded that many PKK fighters were initially approached by enlistment
officers in Kurdish cultural centers where numerous young Kurdish spend their time.
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Young Kurds went through a process of indoctrination to build up their Kurdish identity
and introduce these identities to PKK. Children were also approached in their schools by
representatives of the PKK and invited to PKK‟s cultural camps where they are
brainwashed against Turkey.

1.13.2 DHKP/C (Revolutionary People‟s Liberation Party/Front)
The Federation of Revolutionist Youth Association was established in 1966 by
Turkish college students who shared communist ideas and who wanted a Turkish socialist
revolution. Later, this association was divided due to the opposing views on the method
used to achieve the revolution.
After the split, one group chose the violent and armed method or urban guerilla
tactics similar to Latin American groups. They referred to themselves as the THKP-C
(Turkey Public Liberation Party-Front) and Mahir Cayan became their leader. This group
carried out numerous terrorist acts between 1968 and 1972. In 1972, Mahir Cayan was
killed in an operation and numerous other important members of the group were arrested
by security forces.
In 1974, the government released many convicted terrorists due to a general
amnesty. After being released from prison, members of the THKP-C attempted to
reorganize the organization‟s structure. In 1976, the Revolutionist Youth Association was
established for this purpose. Before implementing their reorganization process, the
THKP-C was once again divided. The Istanbul group named themselves Dev-Genc
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(Revolutionary Youth), and Dursun Karatas became the new leader (Sol Teror Orgutleri,
1994).
In the pursuit of violent purposes, the Dev-Genc established FTKME (Fighting
Teams against Fascist Terror) to carry out armed attacks. In a couple of years, 35 security
officers, 23 soldiers, and more than 200 civilians were killed by this armed group. The
murder of former Prime Minister Nihat Erim became one of the most well known attacks
carried out by this terrorist group.
Dursun Karatas and most of the members of Dev-Genc were arrested and
convicted after the military coup in 1980. Dursun Karatas took this opportunity to use the
prison as a propaganda and education place. Karatas and his friends reorganized the
organization while they were in prison. To reveal the new tactics, Karatas wrote a book
(Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz = We are right and we are going to win) while imprisoned in
which he explained the organization‟s purpose and its future plans, including a list of
enemies who were comprised mainly of government officials, law enforcement agents,
ranking soldiers, and judges.
In 1989, Karatas and some of his friends managed to escape from prison.
Following the release of other members, the organization regained its power and began to
renew its bloody attacks. In the early 1990s, the organization succeeded to murder many
of its targets listed in Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz.
In 1991, TNP carried out successful nationwide operations against Dev-Sol; some
high level members were killed and many members of the organization were arrested
other than Karatas who managed to escape to Europe. After holding a congress in
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Damascus in 1994, Karatas declared the establishment of a new organization─DHKP-C
(Revolutionary People‟s Liberation Party-Front)─which has been active in Turkey and
Europe since that time. More especially in recent years, however, its function and
effectiveness have decreased due to the security forces operations.
DHKP-C attempted to have a simultaneous revolution in the urban and rural
areas. In this sense, they differed from other revolutionary terrorist organizations. The
DHKP-C foresaw five phases of revolution that included: (a) Vanguard war, (b)
increasing vanguard struggle and starting a guerilla fight, (c) expanding and spreading
guerilla war beyond the country, (d) becoming connected with local units, and (e)
realization of a communist revolution.
The primary goal of DHKP-C is to change the current regime in Turkey and
replace it with a new one based on Marxist and Leninist ideology. DHKP-C considers
itself to play the leading role in enlightening the mass population and creating a
revolution in Turkey.
Parallel to PKK‟s recruitment strategy, DHKP/C generally recruits new militants
through its legal structures. According to Alkan (2003), university student associations
are actively used by DHKP/C for recruitment purposes. For example, new university
students are invited join social activities that are held by DHKP/C where they are
approached by leaders of the association.
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1.14 Recruitment Strategies of Other Terrorist Organizations in the World
Gerwehr and Daly‟s (2006) study regarding Al-Qaeda revealed that potential
recruits are generally persuaded through media channels, local networks (i.e., peer groups
and relatives), or institutional structures (e.g., mosques or legally established college
associations). According to Gerwehr and Daly, Al-Qaeda looks for people who are
dissatisfied with their jobs or resentful of the police or military organizations. Media
channels are used for organizing meetings and other activities to reach larger groups.
Contrary to Al-Qaeda, media channels are less likely to be used by the Turkish Hezbollah
considering the technological improvement of the region.
A recent study conducted in 2009 by the International Crisis Group revealed that
the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)─a separatist movement active in northern
Malaysia─(Wikipedia, 2009) recruits young Malay Muslims especially from private
Islamic schools. Contrary to my expectations, the Turkish Hezbollah recruits more
militants from state colleges versus private colleges, whereas BRN recruitment efforts are
more effective in private colleges. According to the International Crisis Group, this
difference stems from BRN‟s ideology that represents an ethno-nationalist insurgency
which aims to reclaim the Patani Sultanate‟s independence. Since BRN is nationalist
terrorist organization, local private schools provide the organization with tremendous
support.
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1.15 Research Questions and Hypotheses
Although there are no scientific methods that can explain how the Turkish
Hezbollah recruits more militants, two general methods have been used according to
official Turkish records (Van Police Department, 2009):
1. Institutional structures play one of the important roles to persuade an
individual to join the Turkish Hezbollah. For example, institutional structures organize
movie times, concerts, and other social activities. During these activities, possible
candidates are linked to experienced Turkish Hezbollah militants.
2. Social networks include another tool that the Turkish Hezbollah uses to
effectively recruit new militants. Typically, Turkish Hezbollah members meet with their
younger relatives in mosques where they attempt to convince the youngest to follow the
philosophy of the Turkish Hezbollah in order to attract new members and thereby
enhance their social standing within the organization. In other words, an individual is
brainwashed and motivated through this strategy of sharing values and ideologies related
to the Turkish Hezbollah.
In regard to these two effective recruitment methods, the following research
questions are answered in my study:
1. What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah,
a religiously motivated terrorist organization?
2. What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the
institutional structures and social networks?
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3. Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s most successful method of recruiting?
I focused on Turkish Hezbollah militants who already had or were working on
obtaining a college degree. They were either educated in their home town or out of their
home town. Students who were educated away from their home towns and were
subsequently recruited by institutional structures of Hezbollah were considered to have
weak social bonding ties that support the assumptions of social control theory. On the
other hand, college students who were educated in their home town and recruited through
their social networks revealed that social networking is an effective tool for Hezbollah to
recruit new militants and supports the assumptions of social learning theory. In relation to
social control and social learning, two major criminal justice theories, I tested the
following hypotheses and then provided information related to their expected results:
H1:

Social networks and institutional structures are two general methods used
extensively by the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new college student militants
within universities.

H2:

Institutional structures have been used more effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah
than social networks for recruiting new militants holding college degrees.

H3:

Social networks have been used more effectively than institutional structures of
the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new militants holding college degrees.

H4:

Social learning theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants
holding college degrees engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.
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H5:

Social control theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants
holding college degree engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.

1.16 Methods
In my study, I used secondary data to measure the probability of a college student
joining the Turkish Hezbollah religiously motivated terrorist organization dependent
upon whether he or she was affected by social networks or the organization‟s institutional
structures.
Because I compared cases involving the probability of college students engaging
in the Turkish Hezbollah through social network or institutional structures of the terrorist
organization on different variables, quantitative methods were used to answer three
research questions. The logic of using quantitative analysis is simple in that both
dependent and independent variables can be measured through its data collection method.
In my study, I further explained the factors that determine why Turkish Hezbollah
members choose to join the terrorist organization. Five hypotheses were tested through
the following dependent and independent variables.

1.16.1 Dependent and Independent Variables
1.16.1.1 Dependent variable (DV).
The dependent variable (DV) consisted of recruitment type (social network = 1 or
institutional structure = 0). College educated Turkish Hezbollah members were divided
into two groups: (a) those recruited through the social network (social learning theory)
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and (b) those recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah‟s institutional structures (social
control theory or absence of social networks).

1.16.1.2 Independent variables (IV).
In regard to gender (IV1), males (0) are more likely than females (1) to become
members of the Hezbollah as revealed by the organization‟s personal reports which
indicated that females represent very few members (only 3%). Since the number of
female militants is not significant, gender was omitted from the discussion contained in
the data analysis section. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) an inadequate
sample size for the classified variables may not reflect the true values of a parameter. In
my study, therefore, conclusions regarding gender were difficult to make due to the small
sample size of females in comparison to males.
Location of college, the second independent variable (IV2), refers to students
attending colleges in their same home town (0) or in a different city (1). Therefore, the
question posed in my study was: “In pursuing a college education, does being away from
social networking affect the likelihood of being recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah?”
Location of college represents one of the important parameters in my study.
College students who received their education in their own home towns were grouped to
determine the effectiveness of recruitment methods through social networks, and those
students who received their college education out of their home town and had no relatives
within the Turkish Hezbollah were grouped to determine the effectiveness of the terrorist
organization‟s institutional structures. Since all Hezbollah militants provided detailed
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information in self-reports concerning how they were recruited, the data provided clear
information about the Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies.
If social control proves to be more accurate, the impact of this variable is
expected to show that college students who are away from their families are more likely
to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah‟s institutional structures when compared to
college students who remain with their family while pursuing a college education. In this
case, my study revealed that the Turkish Hezbollah established an effective institutional
structure within colleges.
On the other hand, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, the
variable is expected to show that college students who are either with or away from their
families are more likely to be recruited by social networks. As previously discussed in the
literature review, the region has strong social networks that affect an individual to join
the terrorist organization.
College type (IV3) includes private (0) and state (1) colleges. In my study, I
expected that private college students would be less likely to be recruited by the Turkish
Hezbollah, given that they are comprised of wealthier students who are typically less
likely to be recruited when compared to state college students. In addition, private
schools are equipped with more resources that allow for closer follow-up relating to a
student‟s progress, and relations with students‟ parents are generally stronger in
comparison to state colleges. These advantages provide more opportunities for parents to
keep sound family ties. Because my study did not have a large enough sample size of
private colleges, this variable was excluded from the equation. Because nearly 99% of the
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college educated militants received their education from state colleges is another reason
that the variable was eliminated from the model.
Regarding online education (IV4), there are two types of college education
available in Turkey. One is online education (0) while the other is campus education (1).
Online education does not require that a student relocate to another city and therefore
keeps the social network strong. It is believed that if a person has no relatives within the
Turkish Hezbollah and holds an online education, the chances of being recruited by the
Hezbollah are significantly lower (social control theory). However, if a person has
relatives within the Hezbollah as well as an online education, the chances of becoming
recruited by the Hezbollah are significantly higher.
In the event that social control theory proves to be more accurate, my study is
expected to show that college students who obtained an online education are less likely to
be recruited by the institutional structures. However, if social learning theory proves to be
more accurate, my study is expected to show that college students who have Turkish
Hezbollah members within their family are more likely to be recruited through the
Turkish Hezbollah‟s social network.
The fifth independent variable, family size (ratio) (IV5), is based on the number of
children. Most of the families in the eastern part of Turkey have large families. For
example, those who have less than four children are considered to be a small family size,
those having between 4 to 6 children are considered to be a normal family size, and
families with more than six children are considered to represent a large family size.
According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), the larger the number of children in a
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family, the greater is the likelihood that they will be delinquent. In my opinion, if a
family does not have any relatives within the Turkish Hezbollah, a smaller family size
may decrease the likelihood of being recruited by Hezbollah.
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who are
reared in small families are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah when
compared to those reared in a large family. However, if social learning theory proves to
be more accurate, there will be no significant difference between college students who
are reared in either large or small families.
The sixth independent variable, family income (IV6), represents college students
who come from either poor, normal, or rich families. As the well-being of the family of
origin improves, it is believed that the probability of joining the Turkish Hezbollah will
decrease. In considering the average Turkish family monthly income, earnings will be
divided into the following three levels as identified by Erdogan (2002): (a) poor ($1,200
or less); (b) average ($1,201 to $3,500); and (c) rich ($3,501 and above).
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who come
from families with rich income level backgrounds are less likely to be recruited by the
institutional structures. Because rich college students are generally expected to prefer
private schools, having monetary independence will most likely increase the likelihood of
taking part in social activities which, in turn, decreases the likelihood of being contacted
by the Turkish Hezbollah. In this case, college students will be more likely to share
common social norms and ideas that denounce terrorist activities. On the other hand, if
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social learning theory proves to be more accurate, my study is more likely to reveal that
there is no significant difference between the rich and poor college students.
The seventh independent variable focused on the ideological background (IV7) of
recruited Hezbollah militants. This variable was identified as religious versus
nonreligious. In my study, I expected that religious college students would be more prone
to propaganda and be influenced by the organization‟s institutional structures, even if
there were no Hezbollah militants within their social networks.
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, religious college students who
are away from their families are likely to be recruited through institutional structures.
However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, religious college
students, either with their family or away from family, are more likely to be recruited by
their social networks.
The eighth (IV8) independent variable is the ideology of the family. As mentioned
above, family has a great influence over the Kurdish originated individuals. In addition,
college students who come from a religious family background are considered to be more
supportive to religious ideologies. Although terrorism literature does not support the idea
that religious individuals are more prone to commit terrorist acts (Ozeren, 2004), the
results of this variable are interesting. If social control theory proves to be more accurate,
college students who come from religious families are more likely to be recruited by the
institutional structures. However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate,
college students who come from religious families, either with their family or away from
family, are more likely to be recruited by their social networks.
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The ninth (IV9) independent variable is whether or not militants exist within the
social network of college students. This is one of the important variables in my study
since its value increases the effectiveness of the assumptions held by social learning and
social network theories. If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college
students who have militants in their social networks and receive their education away
from their family are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures.
However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, college students who
come from religious families, either with their family or away from family, are more
likely to be recruited by their social networks.
The tenth and final independent variable includes reasons for attending Hezbollah
(IV10) is represented by the following explanations:
1 = Religion: People who believe there is no religious freedom; the Turkish State
is against Islam.
0 = Other reasons: People who join the Turkish Hezbollah due to other reasons
than religion.
Each of the college students had different reasons for attending the Turkish
Hezbollah. Therefore, either social networks or institutional structures may play
significant roles in a terrorist organization‟s use of the above arguments to recruit more
militants.
If social control theory is more accurate, institutional structures of the Hezbollah
are used to recruit more militants by using the above arguments. However, if social
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learning theory is more accurate, social networks of the Hezbollah are used to recruit
more militants by using the above arguments.

1.16.2 Regression Equation
The regression consisted of one dependent variable (DV) and eight independent
variables (IV). To weight the likelihood of each IV‟s effectiveness, logistic regression
was used. Since my study was designed to determine the likelihood that the Turkish
Hezbollah uses a particular type of recruitment, logistic regression best fits the model.
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), logistic regression can be used in the
following four ways: (a) to predict a DV on the basis of continuous and/or categorical
IVs; (b) to determine the percent of variance in the DV explained by the IVs; (c) to rank
the relative importance of IVs; and (d) to assess the interaction effects and to understand
the impact of covariate control variable.
The following equation was used to calculate the probability of the Turkish
Hezbollah employing a particular recruitment type:
Ŷ=

eu
e a b1 x1 b2 x2 b3 x3 ...

1  e u 1  e a b1 x1 b2 x2 b3 x3 ...

Ŷ shows the likely predicted value. Regarding the dependent variable, there are
two probabilities in the equation that militant college students are recruited by either
social networking (1) or through the institutional structures (0). Because “social
networks” are represented by (1), the calculated likelihood shows the likelihood of social
networks being used to recruit militants.
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To determine the power of each variable on the dependent variable─predicting the
dependent variable from the independent variables─I used:
U = a+b1X1+b2X2+b3X3+….
The probability of a college educated militant being recruited by social networks is
represented by U. These estimates reveal the relationship between the IV and the DV where
the DV is on the logit scale. In addition, the amount of increase (or decrease, if the coefficient
sign is negative) is revealed in the predicted logs of being recruited by social networks.
Holding all other predictors constant, it shows that one unit will either increase (or decrease)
in the IV.
1.16.3 Population and Sample
Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that population, the aggregate of all cases,
confirms the designated set of specifications. O‟Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner (2003)
further stated that for large groups, it is impossible to contact every member in order to
collect data besides requiring a tremendous commitment of both financial resources and
time. The main purpose for sampling is to provide the conceptual basis to make accurate
estimates of the entire population‟s values. Sampling allows the researcher to gather
information on a targeted group in a much shorter amount of time when the sample of the
entire set is accurately represented (Nachmias &Nachmias, 2000).
In my study, the population consists of college students with Kurdish descent who
were recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. In 2000, the Turkish National Police captured
the Turkish Hezbollah‟s database which included 7,000 self reports. Out of these 7,000,
there were 339 college educated militants of which I have obtained all of their self
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reports. Since it is compulsory for every member to submit their self reports after being
recruited, I dealt with the entire target population which represents the sample of my
study. The research question focused on how these educated militants are recruited
through either the institutional structures of the Turkish Hezbollah or through social
networks.
Considering the strong family ties that are prevalent in the southeastern part of
Turkey which is highly populated by Kurdish-origin citizens, Hezbollah recruits more
militants through social ties that are best explained by the social learning theory. On the
other hand, Hezbollah uses its legal structures effectively to recruit college students who
are pursuing an education away from their home towns. For this group, which is
explained in the data collection and instrument section, students who have Hezbollah
militants in their social networks are excluded from my study. Rather, I attempted to
discover whether or not Hezbollah really does, in fact, use its legal structures to
effectively recruit militants. For this group, I will test the social control theory to
determine if Hezbollah‟s recruitment methods support or do not support the theory.
1.16.4 Data Collection and Instrument
In my study, I will use secondary data or data that are collected for a specific
purpose. According to O‟ Sullivan et al. (2003), this method offers a researcher the
following advantages: (a) reduces cost, (b) enables studies to be conducted that are
otherwise impractical, is helpful for comparative and longitudinal studies, and secondary
analysis is a necessary element for an open science.
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The Turkish Hezbollah collected data from its members as a means of gaining
more insight about the organization and its members. Without these data, it would have
been practically impossible to gain knowledge concerning Hezbollah‟s recruitment
tactics. Thus, conducting a survey with Hezbollah members was not feasible. Therefore, I
obtained the necessary data from Hezbollah database records retained by the Turkish
National Police Intelligence Department.

1.16.5 Limitations
As with other data collection methods, secondary data analysis has certain
limitations as summarized by Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) in the following manner:
(a) The data may not include all of the instruments that the researcher hopes to find; (b)
researchers may have difficulty in obtaining access to reach the data that contain
variables of interest since the original investigator may not release the information; and
(c) if the researcher does not have sufficient information concerning how the data were
collected, he or she may encounter difficulties with internal and external validity when
determining potential sources of bias, errors, or problems.
Although it is not clear how many Turkish Hezbollah militants actually exist in
Turkey, after the 2000 police raid against the Turkish Hezbollah leader, 7,000 militants‟
self-reports were seized along with other important information regarding the
organization. Since the Turkish National Police (TNP) used that information to eliminate
Hezbollah‟s power, the terrorist organization has subsequently taken more effective
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cautions in unveiling its activities. Thus, beginning from that time to the present, the TNP
does not have access to the most up-to-date information concerning the organization.

1.16.6 Data Analysis
Initially, I used a frequency table to identify the Turkish Hezbollah‟s most
commonly used structure to recruit militants. Then, I analyzed the data by using logistic
regression analysis. The dependent variable was measured by the probability of becoming
a member of the Turkish Hezbollah either through institutional structures or by social
networks. Depending on this assumption, each independent variable was included in the
equation to appraise their effectiveness over the dependent variable. The type of college
attended─whether located in or outside an individual‟s home town─provided valuable
information regarding Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategy. Therefore, I compared the
percentage between the number of recruited individuals by social networks and the
number of recruited individuals by institutional structures. In addition to the influence of
remaining in or leaving home towns to attend college over the dependent variable, I
attempted to locate other independent variables in order to calculate each IV‟s influence
over the dependent variable.

1.16.7 Reliability and Validity
Babbie (2007) stated that reliability is a matter of using a particular technique that
yields the same results each time when applied to the same object. My dataset included
most of the Turkish Hezbollah militants‟ self reports which were designed as a form to
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obtain information concerning the militants‟ families, backgrounds, and how they were
recruited. I believe that the data are reliable, because since the form contained clear and
easy to understand questions for every militant. In addition, these reports were prepared
for the terror organization itself and not for the police. Since the Turkish Hezbollah is a
religiously motivated organization, it is believed that every member provided correct
information about themselves.
Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that validity refers to the question “Am I
measuring what I intend to measure?” (p. 149). In my study, I searched for the answer to
how the Turkish Hezbollah recruits its militants. Because every militant provided detailed
information in their self reports concerning their recruitment, I am confident that these
reports will help to identify how militants are recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah.

1.17 Conclusion
My study provides detailed and accurate information regarding the strategies used
by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students. According to Candarlil (1999),
having a false secularist policy such as pressuring religious people, increases the tension
of conservative people against the state especially in the Kurdish populated area. Like
other terrorist organizations, the Turkish Hezbollah exaggerated all of these policy issues
and used them as propaganda to create a group of people who view the state as the enemy
of Islam as well as help them recruit more people either through social networks or
through the organization‟s institutional structures.
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Similar to other terrorist organizations in Turkey, the Turkish Hezbollah has
strong and effective institutional structures within colleges located especially in the
metropolis cities of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir where they can recruit militants through
these institutional establishments. Parallel to social control theory‟s argument that being
absent from social bonds cause individuals to become more inclined to commit crime, if
this theory proves to be more accurate, the data will reveal the following.
College students who remain with their social structure while pursuing their
education are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. Additionally, it is
expected that college students who are distanced from their social networks during their
educational pursuit are more likely to be recruited by the Hezbollah.
On the other hand, the Turkish Hezbollah also uses local structures to recruit
militants. For example, especially through mosques and Imams, Hezbollah gains
sympathy and is thus able to recruit more militants. Besides considering family ties in the
area, I expected that the Turkish Hezbollah is more likely to use family ties to recruit new
militants. In other words, young Kurdish people are more apt to accept or follow the
Turkish Hezbollah‟s propaganda if their elders support this message. For example, in the
traditional rural Kurdish society, it is expected that the views of elders are respected by
the younger generation.
If social learning theory proves to be more accurate, the data will reveal that
college students who remain with their social structure while pursuing their education and
have relatives who are part of the Turkish Hezbollah are more likely to be recruited by
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the social networks. This reveals that family ties are strong enough to recruit new
militants.
Whichever the case, the findings of my study provide valuable information
regarding the most effective recruitment strategy used by the Turkish Hezbollah. Most
importantly, my study provides a more in-depth analysis in understanding and resolving
some of the negative issues that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah as a propaganda tool
to recruit more militants. By revealing these findings, the Turkish government may,
perhaps, be led to establish policy changes in the region. Considering the ethnic and
religious structure of the area, Turkey clearly needs additional reforms in order to reap
better human rights, democracy, and religious freedom. I believe that my study divulges
Turkey‟s need to make dramatic changes concerning the following topics.

1.17.1 Religion.
Because Islam does not recognize any priesthood, this can exercise authority or
interpret the laws of Allah (the God) (Choudry, 1993). However, other than Arabs, as
diverse ethnic groups such as the Persians and Turks embraced Islam, they created their
unique versions by blending religion in with their previous cultural practices and social
arrangements. Along the way, they devised a group of clergymen that enabled the state to
control the education and socialization of believers (Koker, 1995). However, under the
influence of a positivist argument, the founders of the Turkish Republic claimed that
religion in general, and Islam specifically, prevented modernization and sustained
backwardness. They perceived religion as the basic reason for the disintegration of the
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Ottoman Empire as well as a main threat to the stability and longevity of the new regime,
an idea that is not accepted by many. Thus, they followed the example of the Ottomans in
controlling religion under government hierarchy (Kologlu, 1999) by instituting the
Directory of Religious Affairs.
On the other hand and parallel to Selcuk‟s (1999) argument, I believe that
promoting pluralism and multiculturalism is the key to broaden and deepen the practice
of democracy in Turkey. Differences of opinions, beliefs, cultures, and lifestyles neither
threaten the regime‟s stability nor create chaos; on the contrary, recognizing them is the
best way to secure Turkish democracy and secularism. Instead, it is argued that the ideal
situation exists when government control over religion is decreased and religious
activities are organized by civil societal organizations.

1.17.2 Economy.
Although economic theory does not provide a very convincing answer as to
whether poverty is one of the important root causes of terrorism (Krueger & Maleckova,
2003), Hamm (1998) claimed that economic poverty is, in fact, connected to terrorism.
Considering the economic background of the eastern part of Turkey, there is an
unbalanced share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For example, when compared to
the eastern part of Turkey, the western part is industrialized and more developed (State
Institute of Statistics, 2003). Clearly, fighting against terrorism should be supported by
economic developments in the eastern area.
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1.17.3 Unemployment.
Unemployment is another economic variable that has an effect on terrorism. For
example, Bloch (1957) argued that loss of a job increases social inhibition which, in turn,
drives individuals to become more prone to criminal activities. In support, Ellis (1991)
stated that having a high proportion of unemployment increases the crime rate.
Accordingly, I expect that the higher unemployment rate in the eastern area is another
reason for terrorism and creating new jobs will assist in eliminating the Turkish
Hezbollah.

2
2.1

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
This literature review provides information regarding the recruitment strategies of

terrorist organizations through the perspectives of social control and social learning
theories. In this section, the following four major points are addressed that relate to my
study.
In the first section, the way in which scholars have observed terrorism and
criminology are examined. In addition, I will provide justification as to why
criminological theories are used to analyze terrorism. As Ferracuti (1982) argued,
because terrorists‟ goals and motivations remain criminal, terrorism may be studied
through criminal theories.
In the second section, social control and social learning theories are explained and
some studies pertaining to these theories are summarized. I have also provided details
concerning how these theories are used to analyze the Turkish Hezbollah. It is my belief
that having terrorists within social networks increases the likelihood of being recruited
through these networks. On the other hand, my study is expected to reveal that
institutional structures are another effective recruitment tool used by the Turkish
Hezbollah. I hypothesized that college students who obtain their degrees away from their
families are most likely to be recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah‟s institutional
structures due to the students‟ weak social bonds.
In the third section, theories associated with terrorist recruitment are summarized
and then related back to social control and social learning theories. Like other terrorist
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organizations in the world, the Turkish Hezbollah also uses the same recruitment patterns
found to be important variables in differential recruitment theory (personal ties,
organizational ties, and social networks), the net model (institutional structural weekend
activities), and the funnel model (identity building and commitment validation). It is my
belief that low self-control and social control help the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit more
militants through its institutional structures. On the other hand, a crime or terror-praised
society increases the likelihood of individuals being recruited into terror or crime
organizations through social networks.
Finally, I will identify whether or not there is a relationship between religion and
terrorism as well as discuss theories related to religion and terrorism. Rapoport (1999)
stated that there are four types of modern terrorism and each have different ideologies.
For example, the anarchist wave attempted to commit political assassinations in order to
ignite a popular uprising, the anticolonial wave attempted to obtain independent states,
the new-left wave stemmed from a political climate (especially the cold war), and finally,
the religious wave used religion as a justification for terrorism.
How religion as a factor in terrorism relates to social control and social learning
theories will also be examined in this section. Theoretical literature has suggested that
having more ideology in the political system minimizes terrorist activities, and religious
ideology, whether fundamentalist or not, should take part in the legal political system.
From the social control theory perspective, college students who have weak bonds and
religious ideology are more likely to be recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah‟s
institutional structures. Parallel to the findings of social learning theory, I believe that
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having militants within relatives is expected to increase the likelihood of being recruited
by social networks.

2.2

Criminological Theories and Terrorism
In this section, I will first examine the way in which scholars have traditionally

observed terrorism. After providing their traditional perspectives on terrorism and
criminology, the various definitions of terrorism and the ways in which I examined other
scholars‟ views are discussed.
There are many conditions that may provoke terrorism. For example, not only
deprived and uneducated people may be terrorists, but the affluent and well-educated
people may be terrorists as well. While it is not difficult to find terrorists among
psychopathic and normal healthy people in addition to both sexes and of all ages, the list
is easy to extend. While explaining terrorism, however, the main point that any academic
researcher should consider is the wide diversity of conditions and the target population.
Conversely, this variability of the conditions and the heterogeneity of the target
population create difficulty in oversimplifying terrorism (Katja & Brynjar, 2000).
Another drawback for the close study of terrorism is the unavailability of target
populations.
Diverse types and complex forms of terrorism have greatly complicated the task
of determining the causes of terrorism. For example, most academic studies written after
1968 focused on the causes of terrorism within different levels of explanations (e.g.,
individual, group, environmental, and international). By the groundbreaking analytical
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frameworks of Martha Crenshaw, Jerrold Post, John Horgan, and Andrew Silke, the best
understood include the individual and group levels (SNDC, 2006). Their research
provided a new outlook for discovering how and why militants join terrorist
organizations, which group dynamics work within terrorist organizations, and what
obligatory factors influence disengagement from terrorism.
Crenshaw (1981) stated that the direct causes of terrorism should be scrutinized
on background conditions that positively encourage resistance against the state. These
conditions may not only create an environment in which terrorism is possible, but they
also provide direction and motivation for the terrorist movement. According to
Crenshaw, the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable minority is one
reason that causes terrorism. Some theoretical researchers have suggested that the idea of
justice or fairness may also be related to attitudes toward violence. The second condition
that relates to terrorist activities is the lack of opportunity for political participation.
Finally, government use of unusual and unexpected force in response to reform attempts
or protests often lead to terrorist retaliation. These background conditions for terrorism
are largely used as propaganda tools to recruit new militants who view terrorism as a
morally acceptable way to overcome the government (Crenshaw, 1981).
Yilmaz (2009) stated that, depending on their point of interest, terrorism theories
may be assessed within four categories:
•

Strategic theories: Terrorism is used as an instrument to achieve certain goals
by rational actors.
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•

Structural theories: Internal dynamics of political organizations may cause
terrorism.

•

Psychological theories: Emphasize the influence of personality, gender, age,
education, political affiliation, etc. on an individual level.

•

Sociological theories: Like psychological theories, they emphasize the
influence of individual factors.

While strategic and structural theories focus on decision to act determinants,
psychological and sociological theories focus on individual characteristics and their likely
responses to different kinds of terrorism.
Although many researchers have stated that focusing on underlying causes,
motivational factors, and grievances imply a kind of justification for violence, it is clear
that terrorism studies and their future potential will help to devise balanced and effective
long term measures (Katja & Brynjar, 2004).
In consideration of terrorism research related to Turkey, there have been few
academic studies conducted until only the last couple of years. However, by sending
students to the United States for the purpose of earning higher academic degrees has
provided Turkey with reliable and important research. On the other hand, Turkey must
still identify the recruitment strategies used by terror groups. Although there are
numerous studies regarding the recruitment strategies of terrorist organizations
throughout the world, unfortunately, there are no scientific studies regarding terrorist
group recruitment strategies in Turkey.
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Therefore, to identify and formulate an in-depth analysis concerning the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies, I will use social control and social learning theories
that I believe are the most applicable theories that can reveal their recruitment methods.
For example, strong relative relations and the Turkish culture of showing respect for the
ideas of their elders make young Kurdish originated citizens easy targets for the Turkish
Hezbollah. Considering this social phenomenon, I anticipate that the Turkish Hezbollah
uses social networks to recruit most of its militants.
On the other hand, the Turkish Hezbollah‟s legal structures are extremely
effective and well-organized especially within state colleges. For example, the Hezbollah
provides either free or very low prices for food and shelter to college newcomers.
Although, the newcomers may not have any militants within their families, they are
brainwashed into the Turkish Hezbollah‟s house and thus may possibly be recruited.
Besides and as discussed by Hirschi (1969), an individual who has a lack of social control
is free to commit either terrorist or criminal acts.
To determine the effectiveness of the Turkish Hezbollah‟s legal structures, I will
seek out Turkish Hezbollah members who were away from their families, had no
Hezbollah militants among their relatives, and were recruited by the legal structure of the
Hezbollah when they were in college. My study is expected to reveal that those groups of
students are more likely to be recruited through institutional structures.
Crenshaw (1983) stated that each terrorist group is unique and any study related
to them should be researched in the context of their own natural history and culture.
Parallel to Crenshaw‟s argument, Turkey‟s geographical location as well as its historical
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background provides a diversified society (Ozeren, 2004). Therefore, the Turkish
Hezbollah should be evaluated within Turkey‟s strategic structure. Contrary to global
Islamist terror groups, the Turkish Hezbollah targets only the Turkish Republic and
attempts to change the current regime to Shari‟a.
As stated by Karmon (1997), Turkish Hezbollah‟s members are primarily of
Kurdish origin. Here, it is initially important to establish why this group prefers to be part
of the terrorist organization and how they are recruited. Although I do not intend to look
directly into why this group prefers to be part of the Turkish Hezbollah, it is, however,
important to provide demographic information about college students who chose to take
part in the terror organization.
According to a study conducted by RAND (2006), manpower is a crucial resource
for terrorist organizations in carrying out attacks and sustaining operations.
Consequently, hindering the recruitment tactics of terrorist organizations will disable
their ability to function. To obstruct the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment, it is therefore
necessary to understand how recruitment works, where recruitment takes place, what are
the demographic profiles of recruited students, and discovering the underlying reasons
behind why students select to join the Turkish Hezbollah. Obviously, having a clear
picture of these recruitment strategies could assist the Turkish government in developing
better policies to combat against terrorism.
Parallel to Width and Fahoum‟s (2006) future research recommendations, I will
provide demographic details gathered through the recruited militants themselves. For
example, the Turkish Hezbollah members provided detailed information in their self
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reports that included their family size, ideology of their relatives, and the process of their
families‟ migrations from one place to another, among other pertinent personal data.
Nichiporuk (2003) stated that high fertility rates, unregulated and unchecked
migration flows, and volatile religious and ethnic rivalries can increase terrorist activities.
He claimed that the link between demography and the causes of extremism should be
broken in order to enhance the victory against terrorism. To Nichiporuk, fertility rates,
ethnic/religious composition, internal/international migration, level of capital, and
population/environment interactions are very important variables relevant to terrorist
activities. My study also provides economic and demographic details to determine what
specific motivational factors and underlying reasons lead college students to join the
Turkish Hezbollah.
My study is based on the real personal reports which were given to the Turkish
Hezbollah by its members. It is my belief that the data are reliable and accurate because
the form had clear and easy to understand questions asked of every militant. Importantly,
these reports were prepared for the terror organization itself and not meant for the police.
In addition to these features, it is believed that every member provided truthful
information about themselves given that the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated
organization. Otherwise, their reputation within the terror organization would be
diminished. These features increase both the reliability and validity of my data. As
mentioned earlier, the unavailability of direct sources related to the militants is one
important drawback to any study on terrorism. However, the availability of personal
reports in my study is expected to eliminate this criticism.
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In my study, I expect to discover effective recruitment strategies that the Turkish
Hezbollah uses to recruit college students. In addition, I expect to establish the
underlying reasons why the militants chose to participate in the terrorist organization.
Considering the ideological background of southeastern Turkey, an individual‟s religious
reasons are anticipated to be the most important issue for joining terrorist activities.
Parallel to Crenshaw‟s (1981) argument, the lack of opportunity for some ideologies may
cause terrorist activities.

2.2.1 Definitions of terrorism
Mueller (1979) acknowledged that throughout history, most nations have
experienced the phenomenon that is known today as terrorism. According to Crenshaw
(1981), the study of terrorism can be structured into three questions: (a) Why does
terrorism occur? (b) How does the process of terrorism work? and (c) What are the social
and political effects of terrorism?
In the traditional literature, terrorism was categorized into two variations:
traditional and revolutionary. Jaspal (2008) argued that while the traditional view
considers terrorism to be state originated, the revolutionary view identifies terrorism as a
developed protest against political and social injustice and is used as a tool to win
freedom and to bring about social and political changes. According to Jaspal, current
academic studies characterize terrorism widely as the “weapon of the weak,” “violence
for effect,” and “violence for political purposes.”
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Although research related to terrorism has a critical and important function to
educate the broader public, politicians, and counter terrorism units, these studies have
generally failed in their predictive capacity of terrorist events according to the Swedish
National Defense College (SNDC) (2006).
While terrorism has existed since the beginning of recorded history, defining the
term is problematic (Ferracuti, 1982). Szabo (1979) implied that “terrorism is one of
those terms that is difficult to define but easy to use” (p. 5). Depending upon whose point
of view is being represented, terrorism has been described in various and controversial
ways. For example, terrorism may be referred to by some as a crime and a holy duty, a
tactic and a strategy, a justification of reaction against oppression, or an inexcusable
abomination (International Terrorism and Security Research, 2009). Thus, the lacking of
a common consensus in defining terrorism has created a major dilemma in academic
research and has therefore affected future studies and policy development.
According to Victoroff (2005), there are numerous analyses of terrorism that may
include political, social, ideological, and economic aspects. Unfortunately, many are
typically given less emphasis when compared to security factors in policy formation.
Thus, because there is no single and universally accepted definition of terrorism,
the terms used are generally inadequate as well as frequently neglected by terrorism
researchers who prefer to cite the basic U.S. Department of State definition (Hudson,
1999) that includes the “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to
influence an audience.”
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To make an analysis about the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies, I chose
social control and social learning theories that represent two major sociological theories
of crime and delinquency. Because terrorist organizations had difficulty in determining
their political and monetary support from other countries after September 11, this
conjuncture caused terrorist groups to change the types of crimes they committed. For
example, to fund their organization, they chose to commit criminal behaviors (e.g., drug
trafficking, property crimes, gambling, etc.) that would help them raise funds rather than
committing terrorist crimes. Since the types of crimes committed by terrorist groups are
generally criminal, I believe that criminological theories can be used to explain terrorism.
To support this argument, I will discuss the traditional and post-traditional criminological
perspectives in relation to terrorism.

2.2.1.1 Traditional approach
In the traditional approach, divided opinions from both a theoretical and policy
making perspective creates the major difference between terrorism and crime. Due to the
difference in motivational factors, for instance, some scholars have objections in
considering terrorism as a form of crime.
Although terrorists may have diverse motivations such as political, ideological,
ethnic, or religious goals, criminals generally look for personal gains. Contrary to
criminals who may be motivated to perpetrate crime for its own sake, terrorists commit
violence for specific reasons, namely to create self-destructive reactions in a society
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(Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2005). Spencer (2006) asserted that when terrorism is used as a
politically motivated tactic, the threat or use of force or violence is involved.
By summarizing the differences between criminals and terrorists, Gadek (2008)
claimed that there are basic criteria and components that distinguish crime from terrorism
that include the following:
•

While the terrorist is generally often well trained and state supported,
criminals has little backing. Therefore, the violence and level of destruction
are much greater in terrorism when compared to criminals. Criminals always
seek opportunistic targets. On the other hand, terrorists have a specific goal in
mind that is generally more symbolic than opportunistic.

•

Contrary to terrorists, criminals run for cover when they are pursued by the
police. For example, terrorists generally commit crimes for terrorist
propaganda, and they want to be recognized as perpetrators of the crime, and
they often enjoy taking credit.

On the other hand, traditional scholars have declared that separate motivations
and goals create the differences between crime and terrorism. While terrorism uses
violence as a strategy to achieve political goals, it may also be used by those who oppose
existing governments (Crenshaw, 2001).

2.2.1.2 Post Traditional Approach
Contrary to the traditional approach, Asal and Wilkenfeld (2005) maintained that
there is no motivational difference between terrorists and criminals. As an example, they
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claimed that although the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was
formerly a politically motivated terrorist organization, it currently profits from drug
trafficking, and its members have always acted criminally to gain financial freedom. This
situation is also the case in the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that remains highly active
in the eastern part of Turkey (Candarli, 1999).
Especially over the last decades, political rebels have become criminals while still
pretending to be rebels in an effort to recruit new militants by maintaining their legitimate
public image. Clearly, most terrorist organizations, including the Lebanese Hezbollah,
Al-Qaeda, PKK, and Hamas operate sophisticated fund-raising networks throughout the
world (Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2005).
Hamm (2005) revealed that some terrorist groups have traditional sources for
funding their activities. However, when those sources dry up, terrorists utilize organized
crime to make up the difference. According to Hamm (2005), terrorist groups will
increasingly participate in drug trafficking and other illegal activities that will help them
to gain money and material, especially with the decline of state-sponsored terrorism.
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) represents one such organization. For example,
IRA fund raising efforts were cracked down by the U.S. law enforcement in the early
1970s that caused the organization to search for new sources of revenue. In doing so, the
IRA asked its own members to commit crimes with ethnic mobs such as smuggling cars
and weapons, running protection, managing underground brothels, et cetera (Dishman,
2001).
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Ferracuti (1982) claimed that although terrorists use terror, their goals and
motivations remain criminal. Accordingly, their actions begin with legal and accepted
forms of dissent such as individual oral protests or petitions that easily progress into
illegal but often tolerated acts (e.g., violent demonstrations, vandalism, or property
seizures). Eventually, these actions escalate to unacceptable and illegal behavior where
sabotage, personal assaults, bombings, and kidnappings occur. Considering their final
actions, Ferracuti stated that because most of the terrorists‟ actions are criminal, they
should be approached as criminals.
In discussing the issue that terrorism often involves various kinds of crime
including kidnappings, arson, murder, and conspiracy, Ferracuti (1982) further claimed
that it is very difficult to make a distinction between terrorism and crime. Koseli (2008)
further stated that besides being involved in the same illegal activities, other similarities
between terrorists and criminals include the actions and tactics employed by both groups.
In the field, I believe that terrorism is an evolving phenomenon that requires
developing technology, a common understanding to prevent terrorism, motivations,
financing, and support mechanisms, especially after the September 11 attacks proved that
a global effort is crucial in minimizing terrorism. Today, most countries have realized
that those which underestimate terrorism or have sympathy toward particular terrorist
groups can be the starting point of a devastating attack to those countries. Because all
terrorist groups think that the only way to reveal their ideology to the public is to kill
more people, this understanding may be overturned in countries that create safe havens to
terrorist groups. Especially when terrorist groups have no other chance to commit crimes
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inside other countries, this will be the case. Therefore, minimizing terrorism requires
maximum cooperation and serious information-sharing with other countries. Each
terrorist organization should be researched and supported from a reliable and objective
academic perspective.
Willis, Evans, and LaGrange (1999) argued that most current criminological
theories are applied to specific cases, and any generalization may be nil given that they
are attributed to different geographic locations. According to Willis et al., however, there
are always exceptions and alternative theories may better explain the phenomena.
The Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism prepared by the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2007) suggested that a strong
criminal justice element is crucial to an effective and prevention-focused response to
terrorism that should consist of a broad range of short- and long-term plans that address
the underlying conditions that help to spread terrorism. As mentioned earlier, the war
against terrorism should include global efforts and cooperation. Considering the
campaign‟s broad experience in promoting and facilitating international cooperation, its
operational capacity and field expertise point to the criminal justice system as one of the
most effective academic areas to combat terrorism.
From this perspective, I believe that social control and social learning theories are
two important criminological theories that should help to identify whether social
networks or institutional structures best explain the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment
method.
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As discussed earlier, treating terrorists as problematic personalities does not solve
the terrorism problem. Rather, their behaviors should be studied through societal
influences that may lead researchers to scrutinize the militant‟s social network. In my
study, social learning theory is expected to provide an in-depth analysis related to the
Turkish Hezbollah militant‟s recruitment patterns and strategies.
On the other hand, social control theory in my study is hypothesized to explain
the Turkish Hezbollah‟s process involved in the recruitment of college students. Parallel
to the arguments of social control theory, my study includes college students who are
away from their families and have weak social bonds. From this perspective, I anticipate
that social control theory will be the best criminological theory to clarify the recruitment
pattern of college students.

2.3

Social Learning and Social Control Theories
Although there are differences of opinion as to how terrorism and criminality are

related, both social learning and social control theories can be applied to research
concerning why individuals join terrorist groups because each theory explains the reasons
that certain individuals may be prone to engage in crime. As mentioned above, both
theories are expected to reveal important tactics and methods relating to recruitment
strategies of the Turkish Hezbollah.
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2.3.1 Social learning theory
There are several criminological theories that offer an explanation as to why
individuals engage in criminal behavior (Akers, 1977; Hirschi, 1969). Social learning is
one theory that has important tools which describe criminal behaviors. According to
Akers (1979), the modeling and imitation research conducted by Bandura and Barab
(1973) provides important contributions to this theory.
Social learning theory suggests that behavior is learned not only through direct
experience but also through observation of one‟s environment. In other words, people
learn by observing other people‟s behavior, outcomes, and attitudes. Akers et al. (1979)
pointed out that the more individuals delineate criminal behavior as good (positive
definition) or at least justify or neutralize the behavior as unwanted (negative definition),
the more likely they are to engage in crime. Bandura (1973) claimed that most human
behavior is learned by observation through modeling. For example, while people are
learning others‟ behavior, they have interaction with significant groups wherein they
evaluate their norms, attitudes, and orientations as good or bad. These behaviors are
generally verbal and cognitive which can be directly reinforced or they may be stimuli for
other behavior. Bandura (2005) schematized the social learning theory as shown in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Social learning theory as schematized by Bandura (2005)
While developing his general sociological theory of crime and delinquency,
Edwin H. Sutherland relied heavily upon the work of Shaw and McKay, Chicago school
theorists (Akers, 2004). Ecological and cultural transmission theory, symbolic
interactionism, and culture had an impact on the formulation of Sutherland‟s theory.
In 1947, Sutherland revised the final version of his theory based on nine postulates:
1. Criminal behavior is learned.
2. Criminal behavior is learned through interaction with other persons in a process
of communication.
3. The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate
personal groups.
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4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes: (a) techniques of
committing the crime that are sometimes very complicated, sometimes simple; and (b)
the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes.
5. The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the
legal codes as favorable or unfavorable.
6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to
violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law.
7. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and
intensity.
8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and
anticriminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other
learning.
9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not
explained by those general needs and values since noncriminal behavior is an expression
of the same needs and values.
Social learning theory is a modified and clarified version of Sutherland‟s
differential association theory that consists of two basic elements. First, to commit a
crime, specific techniques are needed to be learned from criminals. Second, interaction
with others provides appropriate drives, motives, attitudes, and rationalization for law
violations (Vold et al., 2002).
According to Akers (2004), Sutherland‟s eighth principle asserts that criminal
behavior involves all mechanisms of learning; however, Akers failed to identify them. To
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create the social learning theory, Burgess and Akers (1966) retained all the principles of
Sutherland‟s differential association theory and combined them with differential
reinforcement and other principles of behavioral acquisition, continuation, and cessation
in addition to adding more concepts taken from behavioral learning theory (e.g.,
differential reinforcement, discriminative stimuli and internal stimuli, and schedules of
reinforcement). They contended that criminal behavior is learned in the same way that
any other behavior is learned and may be explained through the rewards or punishment a
person receives from his or her environment (Orcutt, 2002).
According to research conducted by Jessor, Graves, Hanson, & Jessor (1968),
individuals who are tolerant or show positive attitudes toward illegal substance usage are
much more likely to use illegal drugs than are those who have negative attitudes toward
substance use. Peer and parental influences were also two important variables found to
have either a positive or negative effect on teenage drug behaviors. In addition, Jessor et
al.‟s research revealed that teenagers who have a relationship with peers who are users
initially learn the definition and jargon that is favorable to use of illegal substances and,
in turn, they begin to use them.
Akers (2004) pointed out that social learning theory is not competitive with
differential association theory but rather represents a broader version. Research evidence
that supports Sutherland‟s differential association theory also supports social learning
theory. Akers further maintained that social learning theory explains criminal and
delinquent behavior more thoroughly than Sutherland‟s differential association theory.
According to Akers‟ theory, much learning between humans occurs in nonsocial
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situations and social interactions by observing the consequences of people‟s behavior
from others. Akers‟ social learning theory focused on the following four major concepts
(Vold et al., 2002):
1. Differential association refers to direct and indirect association and interaction
with others who engage in certain kinds of behavior or express values, norms, and
attitudes. These patterns of interactions with others may result in either unfavorable or
favorable reactions to violating the law (Akers & Jensen, 2005).
2. According to Akers (2004), definitions reflect the meanings of one‟s own
behavior. They may be more right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, appropriate or
inappropriate, good or bad (Vold et al., 2002).
3. Differential reinforcement refers to the balance of actual or anticipated rewards
and punishments that may be consequences of the behavior (Akers & Jensen, 2005).
4. Imitation is the act that comes after observation. The individual observes a
behavior from others and then engages in a similar behavior. According to Akers (2004),
the imitated behavior is influenced by the characteristics of the model, the observed
behavior, and the observed consequences of the behavior.
Hughbank and Hughbank (2009) stated that social learning theory is the
persuasion that makes people aggressive by observing others behavior to achieve an
illegal goal or be rewarded as a result of committing violent acts. According to Hughbank
and Hughbank, social learning theory was initially developed for criminal justice
practitioners to learn an individual‟s behavior in an environment that encourages violent
and unstrained conduct. However, when terrorism became a worldwide problem, social
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learning theory could be further used to explain and examine how terrorist organizations
recruit new militants. In addition, the theory could help to identify how individuals seek
personal acceptance within a terrorist organization through union safety, fellowship, and
solidarity.
Parallel to Hughbank and Hughbank‟s (2009) argument, Ryan, Vanderlick, and
Matthews (2009) concurred that terrorism is learned behavior which is taught through
specific ways. Saper (1988) claimed that because terrorism is a learned behavior, it does
not result from a dysfunctional or problematic personality but rather is generally a result
of societal influences and unique learning experiences. In this theory, aggression is
viewed as a learned behavior, and through observation one may learn the consequences
of the behavior. Oots and Wiegele (1985) contended that if aggression is viewed as
learned behavior, then terrorism─a specific type of aggressive behavior─can also be
learned.
Ryan et al. (2009) claimed that contrary to the general perception of terrorism,
while achieving a political goal is the primary objective, harming others is the secondary
objective. According to Ryan et al., numerous researchers believe that the ultimate goal
of terrorists is not to terrorize any society but to use terrorism as a tool to legitimize
political goals when diplomacy fails to meet their needs. Gaynor (2002) concluded that
whether religious, political, or otherwise, learned ideological values are simply
antecedents to terrorist behavior which does not prove that terrorists have personality
defects. Crenshaw (1988) also accepted that terrorism is a rational behavior based on the
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learned belief that violence to achieve political goals is effective, feasible, and even
morally justified in the eyes of the perpetrators.
According to Rabbie (1991), demographic variables such as age, sex, and
occupation are oversimplified and that many, perhaps most, terrorists are normal people
who are typically young males from the middle or professional classes. Ferracuti (1982)
also attempted to make generalizations regarding the Italian Red Brigade terrorists by
concluding that they are politically and actively controlled with no specific difference in
their family backgrounds. From the psychological perspective, these two studies revealed
that there is no notable difference between criminals and terrorists. Similar to Rabbie‟s
findings, Crenshaw (1988) concluded that terrorist behavior is strategically rational and
stems from the learned belief that is used to justify terrorism in a feasible, effective, and
moral way.
Bandura‟s (1998) social learning theory of aggression states that observation and
imitation of an aggressive model are followed by violence and this theory helps to
explain reconstructed moral imperatives. Teenagers who are in the middle of political
conflict may witness terrorist behaviors and they may imitate them through their culture‟s
public praise of terrorists. Through this process, religion maybe used to justify terrorist
behaviors.
Victoroff (2005) asserted that audiovisual tapes, compact disks, books, and web
sites are some of the tools that terrorists use to justify their killings, assault, and behavior.
He infers that the social learning can influence some young students toward terrorism.
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For example, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) states the importance of jihad
through its publication as follows (Alexander, 2002, 57):
“We must imprint on the minds of generations of Muslims that the Palestinian
problem is a religious one . . . I indeed wish to go to war for the sake of Allah! I will
assault and kill, assault and kill, assault and kill.”
Porta (1990) interviewed 28 imprisoned Marxist terrorists to determine how they
were recruited and the reasons for joining the terrorist group. The following two points
summarize her findings:
•

For most of the terrorists, ideological commitment did not play a significant
role in choosing to join the terrorist organization.

•

Living in the same neighborhood and hanging out in the same places were
more important for most of the terrorists.

Most research that has been conducted on social learning theory has revealed
strong to moderate support between social learning variables and delinquent, criminal,
and deviant behavior (Akers & Jensen, 2005). Akers et al. stated that in comparison to
other theories, when social learning theory is tested against other theories by using the
same data, generally but not always, the dependent variable gives more support in
explaining deviant behaviors.
Similar to the perspective held by other social learning theory scholars, I argue
that any individual‟s perception of crime may change depending on the social network in
which the person grew up. In short, having criminals in one‟s social network increases
the likelihood of an individual‟s involvement in criminal activities.
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Through social learning theory, my study is designed for me to answer the
following question: “How strong is the Turkish Hezbollah‟s social structure in recruiting
more militants?” Parallel to Porta‟s (1990) findings, I anticipate that most Turkish
militants are more likely to be recruited through social networks as opposed to the
Hezbollah‟s institutional structures. For example, being active in the more conservative
area of Turkey, the Hezbollah has an advantage over the religious order to respect one‟s
elders.
As discussed by Laciner (2007), religion is one of the most important mediators in
Turkey‟s social life, and the Hezbollah is one of the fundamentalist religious terrorist
organizations in the country. Thus, religion is used by this terror group to recruit more
militants. To achieve this goal, the group intends to recruit new militants through its
social networks by presenting religious talks within mosques or in its nongovernmental
legal organizations. In addition, one militant within any family is used as a Trojan effect
in which the remaining family members create an easy target for the Turkish Hezbollah.
Uslu (2007) inferred that the Turkish Hezbollah urges its militants to pursue younger
family members to become a part of its organization.
Parallel to above argument, if social learning theory is more accurate in explaining
the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies, then my study should reveal that social
networks rather than institutional structures are the best tools used to recruit more
militants.
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2.3.2

Social Control Theory
Social control theory explains the direct relationship between social bonds and

crime that can be summarized in one statement: The weaker the social bond, the more
likely an individual is to commit crime. However, there are many explanations to
describe the actual meaning of social control theory, and an agreed upon definition differs
among scholars as summarized below:
•

Social control is the use of power with the goal of influencing the behaviors of
others (Wood, 1974).

•

Social control involves persuading individuals to believe, do, think, and feel
as others want them to (Lumbey, 1924).

•

Parsons (1951) referred to institutional means in terms of social control but
constructed more physical aspects to society‟s power by describing social
control‟s mechanism as “a motivational process in one or more individual
actors which tends to counteract a tendency to deviate” (p. 206).

•

Social control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of counteracting
delinquency and states that strong social bonds hinder delinquency (Booth et
al., 2008).

Hirschi‟s (1969) social control theory was the first fully developed social bonding
theory, and because the theory takes a more prosocial approach, it is particularly
attractive to most scholars (Andriot, 2005). According to Andriot, social control theory
does not try to explain why individuals commit criminal acts but rather attempts to
explain why individuals prefer to conform to conventional norms.
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Vold et al. (2002) asserted that many theories of crime and delinquency assume
that people generally obey rules if they are left to their own will, and there are various
biological, psychological, or social special forces that may drive them to commit crime.
Control theories, however, take the opposite side by stating that all individuals are
natural animals and if left to their own devices, they are prone to commit crime. Thus, the
key question for control theorists becomes: “Why do people not commit crime?” In
answer, control theorists focus mainly on social forces that intercept persons from
committing crime. Therefore, the main hidden point behind not committing crime is the
weakness of forces that restrain people from doing so. Similar to this argument, being
away from social networks increases the likelihood of becoming recruited by terrorist
organizations.
Hirschi (1969) assumed that everyone has the potential to become delinquent and
criminal, and social controls─not moral values─maintain law and order. According to the
social control assumption, individuals will engage in delinquent behavior when their
social bond to society is weakened (Alston, Harley, & Lenhoff, 1995). Thus, with a lack
of social control, it is possible for an individual to commit either terrorist or criminal acts.
Hirschi‟s social bond concept is comprised of the following four elements: (a)
attachment, (b) commitment, (c) involvement, and (d) belief.
2.3.2.1 Attachment
Attachment refers to the strong ties between individuals and parents and their
schools and peers. Hirschi (1969) stated that as the individual has stable and strong
attachments to others within a society, he or she is far less likely to commit delinquent
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behavior. Conversely, weak attachments and unconcerned behavior about others‟ wishes
cause individuals to deviate from social expectations. According to Hirschi‟s findings,
attachment to schools and parents are the most important contributing factors to hinder
the commitment of crimes (Andriot, 2005).

2.3.2.2 Commitment
The concept of commitment assumes that in a society, a person‟s interests and
benefits are at risk if he or she is engaged in criminal acts, because most people acquire
their reputation and prosperity from the society in which they live. In 1957, Jackson Toby
introduced the concept of “stakes at conformity” by arguing that all youths are tempted to
break the law; however, some risk much more than others when they surrender to those
temptations. For example, youths who do well in school not only risk being punished if
they break the law but they also jeopardize their future careers. In other words, they have
high “stakes at conformity.”
According to Andriot (2005), commitment refers to future aspirations in which
school grade is a strong measure. For example, an individual who is willing to participate
in society by becoming educated, creating a positive reputation, and starting a family will
be less likely to commit delinquent behavior due to the consequences of losing his or her
positive social role (Hirschi, 1969).
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2.3.2.3 Involvement
The involvement element proposes that if a youngster is engaged in conventional
activities (e.g., school clubs and associations, sports, etc.), he or she is less likely to
participate in criminal activities (Andriot, 2005). In other words, it is assumed that the
more an individual is simply too busy being involved in positive activities, the less likely
he or she will find time to engage in delinquent behavior (Hirschi, 1969). Sutherland also
shared the same view that joining conventional activities is a major deterrent for
committing crimes. A Turkish proverb best explains the importance of involvement:
“The devil tempts all other men, but that idle men tempt the devil.”

2.3.2.4 Belief
Belief describes individuals who accept the validity of rules and those who
enforce the rules (Andriot, 2005). School rules and teachers are good examples. The
theory infers that if individuals agree with societal norms, they are more likely to obey
them.
According to Hirschi (1969), there is variation in an individual‟s perception of
obeying societal rules. The absence or weakness of intimate relations with
others─especially parents in most cases─causes the affect of belief to decrease.
Andriot (2005) inferred that conformity is achieved when individuals bond to
society through each of the four elements (attachment, commitment, involvement, and
belief). He added that the stronger the bond, the more likely are individuals to refrain
from committing crimes.
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Hirschi (1969) tested his theory against social strain (the motivation aspect) and
Sutherland‟s or Miller‟s theory (cultural or group influence). Contrary to strain theory, or
when individuals cannot successfully reach their goals, they experience pressure which
may cause them to commit crime (Cullen & Agnew, 2003), Hirschi found no general
relationship between delinquent acts and social class. Further, racial differences did not
play a significant role in self reported delinquency (Vold et al., 2002). Hirschi‟s analysis
of attachment to parents, schools and peers found that scoring low on parental bonds
showed the possibility of scoring high for crime (Leiber, 2007). Although Hirschi‟s
findings supported the control theory, they were inconsistent with cultural theories. In
further support of the control theory, he found that youths who were unsuccessful in
school were more likely to commit crime.
Contrary to the findings of strain theory, Hirschi (1969) analyzed the effects of
attachment to parents, schools, and peers on reported delinquents. Regardless of race or
class, and regardless of the delinquency of their friends, Hirschi found that boys who
were more closely attached to their parents were less likely to report committing
delinquent acts than those who had less close parental attachments (Vold et al., 2002).
According to Hirschi, peers do not play important roles for committing and hindering
crime (Leiber, 2007).
Although there are numerous scholars who support social control theory, some
have criticized Hirschi‟s theory. For example, Wiatrowski, Griswold, and Roberts (1981)
argued that there is no simultaneous or direct relationship between attachment,
commitment, involvement, and belief as Hirschi claimed. Rather, the relationship is more
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complex and hierarchical. According to Wiatrowski et al., Hirschi did not explain how
his four elements might work simultaneous to affect the possibility of delinquent
behavior. They further argued that an in-depth analysis of the social bonding elements
revealed that there was very little effect of commitment on delinquent behavior.
However, compared to the other elements, belief was a very strong mediator for
delinquency, and parental and school attachments decreased the likelihood of committing
crime.
Junger and Marshall (1997) conducted a study consisting of Turkish, Surinamese,
Moroccan, and Dutch male youths to determine whether or not social control theory was
applicable to cross-ethnic lines. Consistent with social control theory predictions, they
found that the theory measured family integration, school integration, beliefs, and leisure
time activities. They concluded that within each of the ethnic groups, a strong bond to
society is a protector against delinquent behavior whereas a weak bond results in higher
levels of delinquent behaviors.
Akers (1994) considered social control theory to be one of the best theories that
provide explanations regarding juvenile delinquency. Because my study relates to college
educated students or college newcomers who are between ages of 18 to 30, I predict that
social control theory may best reveal how Turkish Hezbollah militants are recruited.
In accordance to social control theory, terrorism emerges from a social response
to perceived deviance that stems from underspecific and observable structural conditions
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2004). McCord (2004) further stated that lack of cultural norms
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and values decreases an individual‟s responsibility. Simply stated, individuals who
display ineffective or weak social ties make easy targets for terrorist groups.
Britt and Gottfredson (2003) contended that in order to better understand
terrorism, the issue should be rightfully studied within the realm of criminology. They
further stated that to achieve political ends, terrorism is related to certain elements of low
social control.
Similar to other terrorist organizations in Turkey, Hezbollah effectively uses its
broad social structure. For example, Muslim associations, mosques, propaganda,
publications, and foundations are only some of the tools employed (Kardon, 1998).
Earlier, Karmon (1997) found that the Turkish Hezbollah supports its effective
recruitment strategies within universities by indoctrinating militants through its radical
publications. Typically, students who are living a far distance from their families are
especially vulnerable and thus easily manipulated into participating in the organization.
In this regard, if social control theory is more accurate in explaining Turkish Hezbollah‟s
recruitment process, then my study should expect to show that when compared to social
networks, institutional structures are the best tools that the Turkish Hezbollah employ to
successfully recruit more militants.
As discussed earlier, the Turkish Hezbollah is located primarily in the eastern part
of Turkey that is dominated by the Kurdish people. Because the area is surrounded by
Iranians and Arabs, the Kurds have significant exposure to the Persian and Arabic
language resulting in madrasa (seminary) education being widespread in the region
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(Cakir, 2007). In addition, an Islamic identity helps in the development of a strong clergy
class with titles including mele, sheikh, and sayyed.
When individuals‟ bonds to society are central, social control theories hold that
marginalization of certain individuals is increased while social bonds are more structural
and weak. Considering all the world religions, Islamic countries have stronger religious
institutions. According to Willis et al. (1999) individuals who have weak bonds to society
may also be prone to greater deviance and criminality. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990)
also found that ineffective parenting can be the result of an individual‟s low self-control.
If social control theory is more accurate, I expect to find that Turkish Kurds who
have weak bonds and weak religious ideologies will be the most likely college students to
be recruited by the Hezbollah through institutional structures.

2.4

Recruitment Theories and Recruitment Patterns of Terror Organizations
A clear understanding of the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment process and tactics

used that are revealed in my study may assist governments in developing effective
strategies that will hinder the efforts of terrorist organizations to enlist more militants.
Importantly, a combination of theories and overall patterns related to the recruitment
tactics are also provided.
According to Gerwehr and Daly (2006), terrorist organizations must use specific
recruitment tactics given that there is little room for error and failure in the process that
may lead to severe consequences for the terrorists. Because there is no single method that
fits all terrorist organizations, their tactics may differ accordingly. As suggested by
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Gerwehr and Daly, the following theoretical literature related to recruitment reveals a few
common structures.

2.4.1 The Political Process Model
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, (1996) stated that the political process model
proposes three factors that scrutinize social movement: (a) the framing process, (b)
mobilizing structures, and (c) the political process model.
The framing process can create the perception of injustice toward a situation and
the possibility of changing injustice through group work that may motivate people to
participate in illegal movements. According to Qi (2005), mobilizing structures may
facilitate the recruitment movement. Finally, political opportunity relates to the shifting
power between challengers or participants of a social movement and the government.
Thus, the stability problem may create power changes between these groups.

2.4.2 Differential Recruitment Theory
According to Snow, Zurcher, and Eklandolson (1983, the differential recruitment
theory attempts to determine why one individual becomes involved in terrorist activities
while another remains inactive. Qi (2005) inferred that micro structural factors such as
personal and organizational ties and social networks are the most significant variables
related to an individual‟s participation in social movements, and a personal connection
between potential recruits, movement activists, and personal ties are the most common
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predictors. According to this theory, the following process between recruiters and recruits
includes:
(1) Define the objectives for movement organizations or activities;
(2) Define recruitment needs based on these objectives: whom and how many does
the organization or the activity need to recruit to achieve the defined
objectives?
(3) Define the means of reaching the target population and solicit application;
(4) Reach the target population and solicit applications with defined and
undefined means;
(5) The screening process;
(6) Admission;
(7) Applicants accept or reject admission; and
(8) Evaluate the recruitment result and adjust recruitment strategies for the next
round of recruitment (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987).
Although there are some differences according to the society‟s cultural and
sociological background, it is possible to observe that most of the tactics used by terrorist
groups are similar.
Gerwehr and Daly (2006) claimed that effective recruitment strategies should be
based on the target and its social, historical, and cultural context. This is especially
necessary for illegal and marginal groups given the consequences that getting caught may
create severe results for the terror groups; thus, the possibility of making an error should
be minimized. Consequently, while terrorist groups maintain access to the target
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population, nearly all groups must disguise their activities by changing their dress,
meeting places, use of language, types of activities, and names to avoid any interference
from official authorities. Although there are a vast variety of recruitment tactics, a review
of empirical literature on terrorist groups reveals some basic structures.

2.4.3 The Net Method
In this pattern, the target population is equitably engaged. Some of the used
recruitment strategies have included sending videotapes to every student or inviting them
to weekend activities. This approach is often used when there is minor opposition in the
target population to the terrorist organization. The net model is widely used by Al-Qaeda
and has been proven more effective in Pakistan. My study is expected to find that the net
model is also widely used by the Turkish Hezbollah through its legal structures. Similar
to Al-Qaeda, the Turkish Hezbollah generally uses mosques to gather large populations.

2.4.4 The Funnel Method
The funnel model is used when a recruiter believes that a target population is ready
for motivation and propaganda. Through this approach, identity building and validation
of commitment are structured by the terrorist organization. This technique is effective
within radically polarized groups.
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2.4.5 The Infection Method
Generally, a target population is isolated or may be very difficult for the terror
organization to reach. To infiltrate within the target population, a trusted agent may be
inserted into the group in order to have a direct and personal connection. This method is
more likely to be successful in recruiting targets such as the military and police. For
example, an infiltrator may covert selected targets who are dissatisfied with their jobs.
The infection method is more successful in an environment such as Tanzania or Kenya.

2.4.6 The Seed Crystal
The target population may be so inaccessible that the trusted agent may not be put
into this situation. In this case, recruiters may look forward to provide a context for self
recruitment. If this method is successful in recruiting new militants, they often follow the
infection pattern.
Hamilton (2000) inferred that a low level of self-control and social control may
combine to influence individuals to commit crime. According to Hamilton, inner (self
components) and external (social structure) pressures and seductions lead to a path of
deviant behavior. Parallel to the discussions on differential recruitment theory,
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) asserted that motivation towards crime is constant for
every individual and his or her low social bonds compel these impulses. In my study, I
infer that low self-control and social control change an individual‟s perception of social
movements, and the change may cause the individual to be an easy target for terrorist
organizations. Pinkley (2004) stated that poor, naïve single men who are desperate
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individuals with low social bonds are vulnerable to brainwashing and recruitment into
terror.
In the social learning perspective, changes in rates of crime are largely dependent
upon early learning experiences. This theory assumes that any individual who lives in a
crime or terror-praised society is more likely to be recruited by criminal or terror groups.
According to social learning theory, social structure plays a significant role in one‟s
decision as to whether or not commit crime. As discussed by Vold et al. (2002), ideas and
behaviors may be learned and those behaviors may be supportive of delinquency within a
particular group. In my research, I expect that social networks will prove to have a very
important influence on college students who live in the south eastern part of Turkey.

2.5

Recruitment Strategies of Other Terrorist Organizations in the World
In Gerwehr and Daly‟s (2006) study, how Al-Qaeda recruits its militants revealed

that potential participants are generally persuaded through media channels, local
networks (peer groups and relatives), or institutional structures (such as mosques and
legally established college associations). According to Gerwehr and Daly, Al-Qaeda
searches out people who are dissatisfied with their jobs or resentful toward police or
military organizations. Media channels are used for organizing meetings and other
activities to reach larger groups. Contrary to Al-Qaeda, media channels are less likely to
be used by the Turkish Hezbollah considering the technological improvement of the
region. Besides, Turkey has very strict rules that forbid media terrorism propaganda .
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A recent study conducted in 2009 by the International Crisis Group revealed that
the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a separatist movement active in northern Malaysia
(Wikipedia, 2009), recruits young Malay Muslims primarily from private Islamic
schools. Contrary to my expectations, the Turkish Hezbollah recruits more militants from
state colleges than from private ones, whereas BRN recruitment efforts are more effective
in private colleges. According to the International Crisis Group, this difference stems
from BRN‟s ideology that represents an ethno-nationalist insurgency which aims to
reclaim independence of Patani Sultanate. Because BRN is nationalist terrorist
organization, local private schools provide the organization with tremendous support.
Similar to Al-Qaeda and BRN, the Turkish Hezbollah effectively uses social
networks and institutional structures to recruit militants. When comparing BRN and AlQaeda to the Turkish Hezbollah, Northern Malaysian inhabitants provide a great amount
of support to BRN activities, and terrorism is praised within the society. Although the
Turkish Hezbollah does not enjoy such strong support in the southeastern part of Turkey,
having militants within any family has the Trojan effect for the Turkish Hezbollah. For
example, after having militant(s) within any social group, other members become easy
targets for the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit new militants. The religious role to respect
elders is especially used as a tool to create effective propaganda within that group(s).
Al-Qaeda‟s strategy to recruit new militants also has common similarities with the
Turkish Hezbollah. Like Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah has well-organized legal structures that
allows the organization to hold meetings and other social activities to create a chance to
spread propaganda over crowded populations.
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2.6

Religion and Terrorism
The ideology of religious warfare not only gives individuals the illusion of

empowerment, but also provides public attention and importance to the religious
organizations and ideas. Although each of the terrorist groups has its own distinctive
history and culture, they have three common ideologies (Juergensmeyer, 2002). First,
they reject the idea of compromising with liberal values and secular institutions. Second,
radical religious movements refuse secular society‟s boundaries that keep religion private
rather than intruding into public life. Finally, religious movements attempt to create a
new form of religiosity that rejects weak modern substitutes for the more vibrant and
demanding forms of religion.
Sageman (2004) contended that brotherhood, mutual sharing, and spiritual support
are the basic tools of religious terrorist groups in recruiting new militants. Sageman
added that the religious group causes a delineating function for its newly recruited
militants in ways that are not seen within other rival political movements. Berman and
Laitin (2008) concluded that contrary to other terrorist groups, a promise of rewards in
the afterlife is one of the effective motivating forces for possible targets. I believe that
religiosity level is one of the important variables that increase the likelihood of becoming
recruited.
Especially over the last decades, violent radical religious groups have become a
serious global threat. Ozeren (2004) pointed out that although religious faith itself does
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not cause violence and terrorist activities, it is, unfortunately, interpreted to justify an
attack on social structure.
Ideology and altruism play significant roles for religious terrorist groups.
Especially during the first phase, commitment to terrorist organization‟s goals and
spiritual benefits of supporting a good cause are sufficient incentives for many militants
(Juergensmeyer, 2004).
Similar to the definition of terrorism, there is no consensus in defining religious
terrorism. According to Perlmutter (2004), each scholar has his or her own definition.
Therefore, I prefer to use the Federal Bureau of Investigation and State Department‟s
definition:
“Religious terrorism is defined as any act of violence or threatened use of violence
by a group or individual with the intent of intimidating individuals, citizens or
governments in the furtherance of religious objectives.”
Rapoport (1999) identified four waves of modern terrorism where each has its own
ideological identity. In order to make a comparison between religious and other types of
terrorism, it is useful to discuss these waves. According to Rapoport (2004) the following
four waves illustrate the general ideological trends in terrorism over the past 130 years:
•

The wave of anarchist violence was anarchistic in character and is considered
to be the first global terrorist experience. The main characteristics of this wave
were political assassinations where terrorist groups were expected to ignite a
popular uprising by targeting specific political representatives. According to
the European Research Project (ERP) (2008), this wave was quite effective
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that caused President Roosevelt to “ask in December 1901 for international
treaties among all civilized powers to make anarchism a crime against the law
of nations and to empower the federal government to deal with this crime.”
According to ERP, this was the first call for an international battle against
anarchist terrorism, 100 years prior to President George W. Bush‟s call for a
war on religious terrorism.
•

The anticolonial wave emerged in the 1920s that stemmed from the Treaty of
Versailles which was signed in 1919. After having victory against old
empires, the European victors did not allow ethnic groups to have independent
states. As a result, terrorist groups appeared in Palestine. The anticolonial
wave diminished with the fall of the colonial empires in the 1950s.

•

The new-left wave emerged in the 1960s. According to ERP‟s report, the
Western political climate that was characterized by the Vietnam War and cold
war was the main reason for this wave. Terrorist groups were active in Latin
America, the United States, and Europe. Political conflict within states caused
terror groups to locate state sponsors such as Libya, Iran, and the Soviet
Union for example. The end of the cold war that resulted in a decrease of state
sponsored terrorism was the main reason behind the dwindling of this wave.

•

Religious wave: Rapport (2004) stated that the Iranian revolution and the
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union comprised the root causes of the
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religious wave. For example, religion was used as an ideological justification
to sustain terrorist attacks. Although there were other religions used as a tool
to justify the terrorist attacks, most scholars argued that this wave was
predominantly characterized by fundamentalist Islamist terrorism. The main
specification in this wave was the existence of suicide terrorism.

Thompson (2006) briefly schematized the differences between the third wave and
fourth wave as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Comparing the differences between the third and fourth waves.
Contrary to other terrorist groups, religious terrorist leaders encourage newly
recruited militants to participate in terrorist violence by holding out the promise of
heavenly rewards or retribution. Some militants choose to participate in terrorist activities
because of the fear of being punished an after life. The leaders provide cash payments
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after successful operations. They also promise to provide money to the families of
martyrs in return for their deadly attacks (Juergensmeyer, 2004).
According to Juergensmeyer (2004), when compared to other terrorist groups,
religious terrorism is more violent and brutal because the leaders legitimize their actions
as morally and spiritually right. Hoffman (1993) also concurred that approximately a
quarter of all terrorist groups and half of the most dangerous groups in the world are
motivated mainly by religious concerns.
On the other hand, Emerson and Hartman (2006) contended that with
modernization of the world, the role of religion becomes smaller and smaller while
secularization becomes more socially acceptable, and religious faith becomes more
individualized. Social life is regulated according to policies and procedures,
administrative rules, science, et cetera. Contrary to the viewpoint of secularists, however,
religion is resurging around the globe, and some religious people endeavor to fortify the
borders of religion. Emerson and Hartman claimed that as fundamentalist movements can
be found in the Middle East, Africa, North America, Asia, and Latin America, every
religion can be used to justify terrorist activities.
Moghaddam (2008) inferred that violent extremism is one of the leading problems
in contemporary societies. According to Ozeren (2004), there should be three
circumstances to motivate believers to shift their behaviors towards violent action: (a)
perception of threat to believers‟ values; (b) theology should be transformed into a dogma
produced through textual interpretation; and (c) violence should be embraced as a means
for preserving faith in believers.
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Noyon (2003) pointed out that Islam and democracy are compatible, and
democratic participation encourages moderation. Noyon also maintained that the absence
of democratic politics and Islamist violence are related. On the other hand, Dalacoura
(2006) stated that the casual link between the democratic deficit and Islamist terrorism is
not proven and needs further research. According to Dalacoura, there is no simple casual
relationship between democracy and terrorism in the world. In her study, she defined the
following three types of Islamist terrorism.

2.6.1 Transnational Islamist Terrorism: Al Qaeda
The lack of political pluralism and opportunity for participation in the political
system, civil liberties, and repression of the regimes are a few of the reasons for
transnational terrorism.

2.6.2 Islamist Terrorism and National Liberation: Hezbollah and Hamas
Unlike transnational Islamist terrorism, Hezbollah and Hamas are complex
political and social movements. For example, Hezbollah plays an increasingly important
political and social role in Lebanon, and the organization participates in national elections
as a political party that caused its leadership to move away from insisting on sharia law.
Similar to Hezbollah, Hamas is a social and political movement as well as a terrorist
organization.
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2.6.3 Terrorism and domestic Islamist insurgencies: the Turkish Hezbollah and the
Islamic Action Front
These types of terrorism emerged in the context of domestic insurgencies against
established governments. The political exclusion and repression of the Islamist
movement created a casual link between terrorism and democracy. For example,
excluding an indiscriminate repression of the Islamic Action Front (FIS) from the
Algerian democratic system led some of its members to join radical Islamist groups.
Similar to FIS, the Turkish Hezbollah believes that the Islamist movement was
excluded from the Turkish political system. Velioglu, the founder and previous leader of
the Turkish Hezbollah who was killed in 2000, stated that Muslims are merely oppressed
by the current regimes, and if regimes are destroyed by Islamic movements and replaced
by Islamic states, the problem would be solved to a great extent (Atalar, 2006). Similar to
FIS leaders, Velioglu tried to participate in the Turkish political system; however, he did
not get a chance to reveal his religious ideology to the broader public.
Beginning in the 1980s, the Turkish Hezbollah emerged and attempted to address
its ideological goals. According to Nugent (2004), the Turkish Hezbollah intended to
replace the secular and constitutional Turkish state with an Islamic law (seriat) based
state. To achieve this goal, the Turkish Hezbollah tried to get support from Iran and sent
most of its leaders to Iran for military, political, and religious training. According to
Hezbollah‟s ideology, there were three steps to be followed:
•

Propaganda (teblig): People should be persuaded to adopt Islamic rules that
lead to Islamic state and administration.
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•

Community (cemaat): The community should be restructured according to the
requirements of the first stage.

•

Armed struggle (jihad): The Islamic way of life should be safeguarded
through armed struggle.

Throughout history, terrorist groups have used not only Islam but also other
religions as a justification for their vicious activities (George, 2006). Consistent with
George, I believe that terrorism is not a war for religion but a war for power. For
example, religion is one of the most important tools used by terrorist organizations to
obtain more power or to keep what power they have.
In my study, I will discuss the importance of political participation to minimize
terrorist activities through various ideologies. To me, the more that ideology takes part in
the political system, fewer arguments will be used to legitimize terrorist activities appears
to be a common consensus among scholars.

2.7

Ideology of the Turkish Radical Islamic Movement
According to Karmon (1998), most scholars agree that although Turkish Islam has

many features with other Muslim countries in the region, its uniqueness lies in different
political and social environments. For example, Turkish ideology is tied up with Turkish
nationalism and includes the secularist components and European identification of
Kemalism.
Contrary to other religiously motivated terror organizations in other countries, the
terrorist groups in Turkey have never attacked military or security personnel; however,
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they lost numerous members in the antiterrorist campaigns led by the state. In addition,
they have never attacked Western targets or acted abroad even though they have some
infrastructure in Europe.
Turkish security authorities outlined the objectives of the radical religious
movements through the following three stages:
First is the message to call people for an effort to adopt the Islamic religion to
social life and establish an Islamic state and administration through the radicals to
persuade the community.
Second is to restructure the communities in accordance with the requirements of
the first stage.
Third is the struggle to safeguard the Islamic way of life.
Interestingly, although religious motivated groups struggle for the constitution of
an Islamic State, they use leftist slogans in their publications, and they accept ex-Marxists
in their ranks.
In the early 1990s, the PKK attempted to gain religious communities of Turkey‟s
southeast region. To achieve this goal, they established organizations, namely the
Kurdistan Imamlar Birligi – Association of Imams of Kurdistan – (imam = the official
person assigned to each mosque). Ozeren and Van De Voorde (2006) argued that the
PKK‟s attempt to become the major power in the region by gaining those communities
resulted in a battle between the Turkish Hezbollah and the PKK.
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2.8

Research Questions and Hypotheses
Although there are no scientific methods that can explain how the Turkish

Hezbollah recruits more militants, two general methods have been used according to
official Turkish records (Van Police Department, 2009):
(a)

Institutional structures play one of the important roles to persuade an
individual to join the Turkish Hezbollah. For example, institutional
structures organize movie times, concerts, and other social activities. During
these activities, possible candidates are linked to experienced Turkish
Hezbollah militants.

(b)

Social networks are another tool that the Turkish Hezbollah employ to
effectively recruit new militants. Typically, Turkish Hezbollah members
meet with their younger relatives in mosques where they attempt to
convince the youngest to follow the philosophy of the Turkish Hezbollah in
order to attract new members and thereby enhance their social standing
within the organization. In other words, an individual is brainwashed and
motivated through this strategy of sharing values and ideologies related to
the Turkish Hezbollah.

In regard to these two effective methods, I will provide answers to the following
research questions:
1.

What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish
Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist organization?
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2

What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by
the institutional structures and social networks?

3.

Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s most successful method of recruiting?

My study focuses on Turkish Hezbollah militants who have already or are
working on earning a college degree. They are either educated in their home towns or out
of their home towns. To analyze how they were recruited, the total population consists of
two main subpopulations: (a) those attending college in their home towns and (b) those
who are away from home. Students who are educated away from their home towns and
subsequently recruited by institutional structures of Hezbollah are considered to have
weak social bond ties that support the assumptions of social control theory.
College students who are educated in their home towns and recruited through
their social networks will reveal that social networking is an effective tool for Hezbollah
to recruit new militants and thus support the assumptions of social learning theory.
Employing two major criminal justice theories─social control and social learning─five
hypotheses were tested followed by information related to their expected results:

H1:

Social networks and institutional structures are two general methods used
extensively by the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new college student militants
within universities.
I expect that the Turkish Hezbollah commonly recruits its militants through
social and institutional structures. To test this hypothesis, 339 seized personnel
records of recruited college students were used. Each Hezbollah member provided
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accurate information pertaining to how they are recruited. The total population
was included to determine whether social networks or institutional structures were
used more frequently by the Hezbollah in recruiting new militants.

H2:

Institutional structures have been used more effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah
than social networks for recruiting new militants holding college degrees.
Institutional structures include one of the effective tools used by the Turkish
Hezbollah to recruit new militants. To test this hypothesis, all recruited college
students were included in the model. The results of my study are expected to
reveal that social networks are a more effective way of recruitment; therefore, I
anticipate that this hypothesis will be rejected.

H3:

Social networks have been used more effectively than institutional structures of
the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new militants holding college degrees.
One of Islam‟s important teachings requires younger individuals to respect
their elders, a rule that is strictly enforced especially among relatives. The Turkish
Hezbollah benefits from this teaching, and social networks play an important role
for recruiting more militants. I believe that social learning theory best explains the
effectiveness of Hezbollah militants to persuade college students to participate in
criminal behaviors over their relatives. My study is expected to reveal that when
compared to institutional structures; social networks are more effectively used by
the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit new militants.
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H4:

Social learning theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants
holding college degrees engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.
College students who have relatives and peer groups involved with the
Turkish Hezbollah increases the likelihood of being recruited through social
networks. In addition, society‟s perception of valuing terrorist activities increases
this possibility.

H5:

Social control theory is more likely to explain how Turkish Hezbollah militants
holding college degree engage in the Turkish Hezbollah.
Although H5 appears to be similar to H2, the target population is different.
Contrary to H2, I excluded two groups from the model.


First group is the college students who were with their families, had
militants within their social networks, and were recruited through
institutional structures are excluded from this hypothesis.



Second group is the college students who were away from their family,
recruited in college, and had militants within their social networks

I expect that when compared to social control theory, a better explanation for
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategy will be social learning theory.
To test the hypotheses, the perspectives of social control and social learning
theories are used. In the next chapter, my study is designed to determine the more
effective method of recruitment as well as the variables that increase the likelihood of
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recruitment. The methods section provides detailed information regarding the statistical
techniques used in my study.

3
3.1

CHAPTER THREE: METHODS

Introduction
The purpose of this study is to identify tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to

recruit college students into joining their terrorist organization. In this chapter, the
methods used to examine the various recruitment strategies are described. The first
section includes the research design, research questions, and hypotheses. In addition, a
discussion relating to how each variable was operationalized is presented.
The second section provides an in-depth discussion gathered from a unique
dataset that describes the Turkish Hezbollah militants, how they were recruited, their
economic profiles, whether any other militants exist within their social networks, if their
college education was obtained in their home towns or away from their family, their
ideology as well as their families, justification for joining the Hezbollah, and personal
demographic characteristics.
The third section describes the selected statistical analysis techniques and
procedures used to examine the data. To reveal the best type of recruitment tactics used
by the Hezbollah, a frequency table is applied to answer the first research question. Next,
logistic regression is employed for the second and third research questions to determine
important independent variables that influence the behavioral characteristics of recruited
militants.
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3.2

Research Design and Analyses Techniques
Silke (2004) pointed out that empirical research on terrorism should be

maximized and conducted from a broad perspective. According to Silke, fighting
terrorism from the perspective that it is the work of madmen or the devil is a mistaken
concept that not only weakens the war on terrorism but also provides propaganda tools
for terrorist groups. More recently, Plumper and Neumayer (2010) claimed that
measuring terrorism is notoriously difficult, because there are no precise definitions that
distinguish terrorism from ordinary crimes or guerrilla warfare. Laqueur (2003) cautioned
that the causes of terrorism, terrorists, and their motives have changed over time. In other
words, there is a broad variety of terrorist organizations and groups with each having a
different motivation, decision making structure, and psychology. Yilmaz (2009) also
criticized research with methodological problems that have been unable to develop an
understanding of terrorism, particularly from an exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive
levels.
The unavailability of militants is another drawback for scholars to propose
effective policy recommendation. For example, empirical data on terrorism at both the
group and individual levels are in short supply due to terrorist networks that are not
accessible as pointed out by LaFree and Ackerman (2009). Although research related to
the effectiveness of counterterrorism methods has grown rapidly over the last decade, it is
still infrequently evaluated with strong empirical studies according to LaFree and
Ackerman.
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I believe that the explanatory and descriptive explanations in my study will add to
the sparse body literature related to militant recruitment. My data contain detailed
information regarding recruited college militants‟ ideological backgrounds, the ideologies
of their families, when and where they were enlisted, the type of political motivations, the
organization‟s structure that played the most important role in persuading them to join,
and whether or not they were married at the time of recruitment.
To address the research questions in my study, individual level secondary data
related to members of the Turkish Hezbollah are used. The data are comprised of self
reports that each member submitted to the Turkish Hezbollah as part of their recruitment
process. The data are cross sectional given that each member was required to
immediately hand in his or her own individual report. In a most generic sense, I utilized a
quasi-experimental research design to address the research questions.
Because I compared cases involving the probability that college students joined
the Turkish Hezbollah through social networks or the terrorist organization‟s institutional
structures, quantitative logistic regression methods were employed. The logic of using
quantitative analysis was not difficult given that both dependent and independent
variables can be measured through this data collection method. Finally, factors and
certain variables that are expected to increase the likelihood of college students becoming
recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah are discussed and explained.
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3.2.1 Research Questions (RQ) and Hypotheses
1. What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah,
a religiously motivated terrorist organization?
2. What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the
institutional structures and social networks?
3. Does social control theory or social learning theory best explain the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s most successful method of recruiting?
The statistical methods applied to each research question are shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Statistical Methods Used for Each Research Question
Research Question
1

Frequency Table

Research Question
2

X

Logistic
Regression

Research Question
3

X

X

X

3.2.1.1 Research Question One
Research question 1 was designed to determine the methods used by the Turkish
Hezbollah to recruit militants. In order to answer this question, every recruited student
was included in the equation. I expect to show that the Turkish Hezbollah uses two
general methods that may be through either social networks or institutional structures.
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The target population includes all students who either completed or attended
college in their own home towns and those who completed or attended college away from
their families. In my study, I infer that while the first group is vulnerable to be recruited
through social networks, the second group is more vulnerable to be recruited through the
Hezbollah‟s institutional structures.
H1: The Turkish Hezbollah uses two general methods to recruit college students:
institutional structures and social networks.
H2: Using social networks is a more effective method in recruiting college
educated militants when compared to institutional structures.
In comparison to institutional structure methods, most militants are recruited
through social networks. On the other hand, the Turkish Hezbollah effectively uses its
legal structures to recruit college students who are pursuing an education away from their
home towns.

3.2.1.2 Research Question Two
Although establishing the most frequently used recruitment methods provides
valuable insight into ceasing the process, it is important to determine which variables
increase the likelihood that college students will be recruited through either the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s institutional structure or social networks. Those variables help to identify the
demographic profiles of the terrorist organization‟s militants.
In order to identify the significance of each variable in answering RQ 2, eight
bivariate hypotheses were developed that propose a relationship between the more
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frequently used recruitment methods and other factors, namely online or campus type of
education; having militants within social networks; family‟s religiosity, attendance at a
private or state university, family size, educated in home town or away from the family,
and family‟s income.
The strength of each IV‟s weight over the DV was tested through logistic
regression in which the odds ratio of each variable was compared with others to
determine which variables made a difference in recruitment methods. According to
Garson (2010), the odds ratio can be summarized as the value of the independent variable
that increases or decreases the log odds of the dependent variable.

3.2.1.3 Research Question Three
Research question 3 provides a better theory in explaining the various recruitment
strategies used by the Turkish Hezbollah. To answer this question, the factors that
influence vulnerable college students into joining the organization are identified
according to two criminological theories: (a) social control theory and (b) social learning.
However, students with the following characteristics were excluded from research
question 3 due to the difficulty in determining from which perspective they were
recruited: (a) those who stayed with their family during their college education and stated
that they were recruited in college and had militants within the social structure; and (b)
those who were away from their family during their college education and stated that they
were recruited while away from the family but had militants within their social networks.

(a) Social control perspective
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Social control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of counteracting
delinquency and postulates that strong social bonds hinder delinquency whereas weak
social bonds increase one‟s likelihood of committing crime. Therefore, students who
displayed weak social bonds by being away from their family during their college
education and did not have any militants within their social networks were considered to
be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah from the perspective of social control theory.

(b) Social learning perspective
Recruited students who were either with or away from their families during their
college education and had Turkish Hezbollah militant(s) within their social networks
were considered to be targeted and recruited from the perspective of social learning
theory which postulates that people learn criminal behaviors through modeling the
observations of others.
H11: Social learning theory provides a better explanation regarding the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies when compared to social control theory.
Initially, a frequency table is used to determine which theory best explains the
Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategy, than independent variables are included in the
equation to get their weight over the DV and develop hypotheses are tested.

3.3

Independent Variables and Sources of Hypotheses
For each independent variable, two hypotheses were developed. While the first

developed for RQ 2 relates to the most frequently used recruitment structure (i.e., social
networks or institutional structures), the second hypothesis developed for RQ 3 appears
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to be the best theory in providing an explanation for the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment
strategy.

IV1: Any_milt_wth_SN (having Hezbollah militants within the social network).
Because terrorists organize themselves as secret networks in order to cover their
unlawful activities, they use more stable and reliable sources to recruit new militants.
Sageman (2004) inferred that family relations and peer groups are two important
components that may lead an individual to join terrorist organizations. In Sageman‟s
study of 172 militants, their biographical data revealed that other militants within their
social networks made young Muslims more vulnerable for recruitment by terrorist
organizations.
Hypothesis 3 was developed to determine the effectiveness of the recruitment
process when other militants exist within social networks. Through the level of this
variable, I examined whether there was any significant difference in terms of being
recruited through social networks or institutional structures. Logistic regression was
utilized to describe the strength of association by either social networks or institutional
structures by interpreting the odds ratio. Related hypotheses within IV1 include:
H3: Having Hezbollah militants within one‟s social structure increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional
structures. (Developed for RQ 2)
H12: Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared
to social control theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)
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IV2: Wth_or_awy_frm_fmly (Pursuing college education while away from
family).
Gibbs (1989) stated that social control is a very important variable that increases
or decreases the likelihood of being recruited by terrorist organizations. According to
Gibbs, strong social control is a general deterrence to committing crimes. Given that
terror groups often seek out easy targets, colleges represent preferred environments.
Likewise, the Turkish Hezbollah uses a variety of institutional structures to recruit more
militants within colleges. According to my own experiences, most legal or illegal
structures of fundamentalist groups are especially active during the first month of each
semester. These time periods provide a great opportunity to meet newcomers who are
away from their families and in search of inexpensive shelter and food. The odds ratio
and significance level of IV2 provides valuable information as to whether it will
contribute to having a significant effect on the model.
H4: Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the
likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social
networks. (Developed for RQ 2)
H13: Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared
to social learning theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)
IV3: Family ideology (Family‟s religious ideology).
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First, it is necessary to mention that four main religions strictly condemn
terrorism. However, this may be misinterpreted by religious groups to justify their
activities. For example, Ozeren (2004) inferred that terrorist groups do not distinguish a
direct relationship between religion and recruitment. Hypothesis 5 measures the
vulnerability level of religious families compared to nonreligious families by using the
odds ratio and significance level of logistic regression.
H5: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional
structures. (Developed for RQ 2)
H14: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared
to social control theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)

IV4: Online_camp (Having an online education).
Students who receive online college education are with their families while
pursuing their degrees. From the social control perspective, being with families keep
social bonds strong; thus, these groups of students are less likely to be recruited. Contrary
to obtaining an online education, campus-educated students may be either with or away
from their families. Hypothesis 6 compares the vulnerability between college students
who have online versus campus educations.
H6: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be
recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks. (Developed
for RQ 2)
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H15: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be
recruited through social control theory when compared social learning theory
assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)

IV5: Family_size (Family size).
Yayla (2007) stated that family size is directly related to family control over
siblings. In other words, crowded families have less chance to interact equally with each
sibling. As a result, having more children in a family is expected to result in weak social
bonds that are reasons why individuals may be more vulnerable for recruitment. If this
hypothesis proves to be true, college students who come from large households, are away
from their social networks, and have no militants within their social networks are more
likely to be recruited through institutional structures due to weak social bonds.
H7: The larger the family size, the more likely are college students to be recruited
through institutional structures. Although they may remain with their families and have
no militants within their social networks while pursuing their college education, they are
still more likely to be recruited through institutional structures rather than social
networks. (Developed for RQ 2)
H16: The larger the family, the more likely are college students to be recruited
through social control theory assumptions. Although they may be with their families and
have no militants within their social networks while pursuing their college education,
they are still more likely to be recruited through social control assumptions rather than
social learning theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)
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IV6: Income_level (Income level).
The Turkish National Police (TNP) researched 1,077 imprisoned and arrested
terrorists in order to produce new procedures and tactics to fight and prevent terrorist
activities. According to their findings, 70% of the respondents originated from lower
level income groups when compared to the general population (Yayla, 2007). To identify
the recruitment effectiveness of coming from low income level families, the vulnerability
of this group in my study is tested by logistic regression. In other words, the odds ratio of
the lower level family income group is compared to the odds ratio of the higher level
family income group to determine whether there is a significant difference between
recruitment through social networks or institutional structures.
H8: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be
recruited by institutional structures when compared to social networks. (Developed for
RQ 2)
H17: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be
recruited through social control theory assumptions. (Developed for RQ 3)
IV7: Militants_ideology (College student‟s religiosity level).
This IV compares the types of „recruited religious students‟ (religious = 1) to
„recruited nonreligious college students‟ (nonreligious = 0) according to the Hezbollah
militants‟ self reports that provided detailed information regarding their religious life
before joining the organization. The probability of college students‟ recruitment type is
obtained through an odds ratio which is to help making comparison between the religious
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college students and non religious depending on their religiosity level before joining the
Turkish Hezbollah.
H9: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the
likelihood of being recruited by institutional structures. (Developed for RQ 2)
H18: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions. (Developed for
RQ 3)

IV8: Pol_motiv (Reason for attending Hezbollah)
Because the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist organization,
my study will show that there is a significant difference between religion and other
factors in terms of recruitment. This IV examines the weight of religion on the DV to
determine whether there is a significant difference between being recruited through
institutional structures or social networks.
H10: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social
networks. (Developed for RQ 2)
H19: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social
learning theory assumptions. (Developed RQ 3)
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3.4

Measurements

3.4.1 Dependent and Independent Variables
3.4.1.1 Dependent variable (DV)
Because RQ 1 reveals the most frequently used structure, only a frequency table
was applied. In RQ 2, the dependent variable is the type of recruitment method used to
reveal the effectiveness of the IVs. The findings of my study will show that most college
students are recruited through social networks or institutional structures in which those
methods are DVs. Accordingly, students who are recruited through social networks
(social learning theory = 1) and those who are recruited through the Turkish Hezbollah‟s
institutional structures (absence of social networks = 0) are expected to be DVs.
Research question 3 examines the theories that provide a better explanation
relating to the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. Accordingly, the type of
theories (1 = social learning, 0 = social control) that provide a better explanation
encompasses the third research question‟s DV.

(a) Social networks
i-

Friends

Individuals satisfy their psychological and social needs within social groups by
becoming members of reputable organizations, respected adults, being loved or loving,
and establishing one‟s self (Centre of Excellence, 2008). As discussed earlier, social
learning theory postulates that peers have a tremendous influence over their fellow
colleagues, and this relationship can result in unexpected negative behaviors that may
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lead to the commission crime(s). For example, young people may be influenced by their
delinquent peer groups and become drug addicts or unconsciously find themselves within
a terrorist organization. Through institutional structures, a majority of terrorist
organizations attempt to recruit more militants by taking advantage of workplaces, high
schools, universities, and neighborhood friendships.

ii-

Relatives

Relative is a term that refers to people who are related to one another through
blood or marriage and formed through marriage, birth, or adoption. Within these kinship
ties, a social relationship is established and distinctions are created between them (Centre
of Excellence, 2008).
Regardless of whether Turkish people live in large cities or small villages, strong
ties are connected to relatives. Self reported testimonies of recruited Turkish militants
reveal that terrorist organizations take best advantage of these strong kinship
relationships.

(b) Local and regional institutions
A Turkish person who is from the same part of a village, province, country, et
cetera is referred to as a fellow countryman, a term that is generally used to create an
opportunity to begin a friendship. Thus, terrorists use these institutional structures as an
opportunity to effectively recruit more members. Generally, people who migrate from
smaller cities to larger metropolis cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir for either
immigration or educational purposes initially look for local legal institutions that can
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provide benefits. Fellow countrymen play a significant role in these institutions by
acquiring more college students who move to these metropolises. In other words, terrorist
organizations take advantage of these relationships developed through local institutions
(Centre of Excellence, 2008).
Social and cultural activities that include tea parties, picnics, concerts, sporting
activities, movies, meetings between friends, youth camps, et cetera are other methods
that create opportunities for getting to know new people. Terrorist organizations prefer to
recruit members through these kinds of activities that are generally sponsored by
foundations, cultural centers, bookstores, associations, and political parties.

3.4.1.2 Independent variables (IVs)
a. Gender (IV1)
As revealed by the Hezbollah organization‟s personal reports, males (1) are more
likely than females (0) to become members. As indicated in the reports, females
represented only 5% or 17 out of 339 college students. Given that the number of female
militants is not significant, gender is therefore omitted from the discussion contained in
the data analysis section of my study. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) an
inadequate sample size for the classified variables may not reflect the true value of a
parameter. Thus, conclusions in my study would be difficult to make given the small
female sample size.

b. Location of college (IV2)
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The second independent variable refers to students who are either attending
colleges in their home town (1) or in a different city (0). The question to be answered is:
“In pursuing a college education, does being away from social networks have a
significant influence that increases the likelihood of being recruited by social
institutions?”
Location of college represents an important parameter in my study. Students who
received a college education in their own home towns are grouped in order to determine
the effectiveness of recruitment methods through social networks, and students who
received their college education away from their home towns and have no relatives
within the Turkish Hezbollah are grouped to determine the effectiveness institutional
structures within the terrorist organization. Since all Hezbollah college militants provided
detailed information in their self reports regarding how they were recruited, the data
provide clear information concerning Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies.
If social control proves to be more accurate, the impact of this variable is
expected to show that college students who were away from their families are more likely
to be recruited through institutional structures versus those college students who
remained with their families while pursuing a college education. In this case, my study
will also reveal that the Turkish Hezbollah has established an effective institutional
structure within colleges.
On the other hand, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, the
location of college variable is expected to show that college students who are either with
their families or away from their families are more likely to be recruited by social
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networks. As discussed in the literature review, Turkey‟s region has strong social
structures and having militants within social networks affect an individual‟s decision to
join Hezbollah‟s terrorist organization.

c. College type (IV3)
College type includes private (0) and state (1) colleges. I anticipate that students
attending private colleges are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. In
contrast to state colleges, private colleges are generally comprised of wealthier students
who are typically less likely to be recruited. Private colleges are also equipped with more
resources that allow closer follow-up relating to a student‟s progress, and relationships
between their parents are generally stronger than students who attend state colleges.
These advantages provide more opportunities for parents to keep sound family ties.
However, the data reveal that none of the militants were recruited from private colleges.
Because the sample size is inadequate, this variable is therefore excluded from my
equation.
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, my study is expected to show
that the Turkish Hezbollah has fewer recruitment opportunities over private versus state
colleges which also confirms that family members have more control over their children
who attend private educational institutions.
Conversely, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, my study will
most probably indicate that when recruiting militants, the Turkish Hezbollah is likely to
prefer state over private colleges. Given that the majority of private colleges are profitseeking institutions which provide amenities to their students, they do not wish to tolerate
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any illegal activities that may negatively affect their retention rate. Because private
colleges also have strong networks designed to hinder the structured activities of terrorist
organizations, state colleges versus private colleges represent the most favorable
recruitment grounds.

d. Online or campus education (IV4)
There are two types of college education opportunities available in Turkey: (a)
online (0) and (b) campus (1). Online education does not require a student‟s relocation to
another city and therefore keeps the familial social networks strong. In other words, if
there are no militants within the social networks of a student who obtains an online
education, the chances of being recruited by the Hezbollah are significantly lower (social
control theory). However, if an online educated student has relatives within the
Hezbollah, the chances of also becoming recruited are significantly higher.
In the event that social control theory proves to be more accurate, my study is
expected to show that college students who have an online education as well as no
militant relatives are more likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah through
institutional structures.
Conversely, in the event that social learning theory proves to be more accurate,
my study is expected to show that college students who have relatives that are members
of the Turkish Hezbollah are more likely to be recruited through the organization‟s social
network regardless of whether they are with or away from their families.

e. Family size (IV5)
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The fifth independent variable, family size, is based on the ratio of households to
number of children. Within the eastern part of Turkey, families are typically large. For
example, small families usually consist of less than four children whereas families having
four to six children are considered to be average, and more than six children represent a
large family size. According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), the greater the number of
children in a family, the greater is the likelihood that they will be delinquent. In my
opinion, a smaller family size may decrease the probability of being recruited through
institutional structures if a family does not have any relatives within the Turkish
Hezbollah.
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who were
reared in small families are less likely to be recruited by institutional structures than are
those who were reared in a large family.
However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, there will be no
significant difference between college students who were reared in either large or small
families.

f. Family Income (IV6)
The sixth independent variable, family income, corresponds to college students
who come from either poor, average, or rich backgrounds. As the family‟s well-being of
origin improves, it is believed that the probability of joining the Turkish Hezbollah will
decrease. Likewise, recruited college educated militants who come from wealthy families
are more likely to be recruited through social networks if they have militants within their
social networks. I believe that an individual who has enough financial resources to
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support his or her own needs when away from his or her family is less likely to make
contact with institutional structures. In other words, the more likelihood recruitment
scenario is through a militant‟s own social networks. In considering the average Turkish
family monthly income, earnings are divided into the following three levels as identified
by Erdogan (2002): (a) poor (< $1,200), (b) average ($1,201 to $3,500), and (c) rich (>
$3,501)
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who come
from rich family income levels are less likely to be recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah
given that they generally prefer private colleges. Thus, having monetary independence is
most likely to increase the likelihood of participating in social activities that, in turn,
decreases the likelihood of being contacted by the Turkish Hezbollah. In this case,
college students will be more likely to share common social norms and ideas that
denounce terrorist activities. In my study, I presume that college students who are
recruited through institutional structures are more likely to be from the low income
group.
On the other hand, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, my study
will more likely reveal that there is no significant difference between rich and poor
college students given that crime is praised within social networks.
g. Militants‟ ideological backgrounds (IV7)
The seventh independent variable focuses on the ideological backgrounds of
recruited Hezbollah militants who are identified as religious or nonreligious. In their self
reports, recruited college students identified themselves as religious or non religious
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depending on their daily religious practices. Hence, ideological level of the college
students is identified as religious (1) versus non religious (0).
I assume that religious college students will be more prone to propaganda and
influenced by Hezbollah‟s institutional structures even if they do not have militants
within the organization‟s social networks.
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, religious college students who
are away from their families while pursuing a college education will be more likely
recruited through Hezbollah‟s institutional structures.
However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, regardless of
whether religious college students are with or away from their families, they will be more
likely recruited through their social networks.

h. Ideology of the family (IV8)
The eight independent variables (IV8) include the recruited militant‟s family
ideology. As previously mentioned, family has a tremendous influence over Kurdish
originated individuals, and college students who were reared in a religious family are
considered to be more supportive to religious principles. Although the literature does not
support the idea that religious individuals are more prone to commit terrorist acts
(Ozeren, 2004), it will be interesting to see the results of this variable. Like their
religiosity level, college students also discussed their families‟ religious ideology and
classified them as religious or non religious. Parallel to their religiosity level, recruited
college students‟ families are identified religious (1) versus non religious (0).
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If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college educated students who
come from religious families will be more likely recruited through Hezbollah‟s
institutional structure.
However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, college students
who come from either religious families or nonreligious families will be more likely
recruited through social networks.

i. Having or not having militants within social
networks (IV9)
The ninth important independent variable (IV9) in my study represents whether or
not militants exist within the social networks of college students that increases the
effectiveness of social learning theory assumptions and social networks.
If social control theory proves to be more accurate, college students who have
militants in their social networks and are educated away from their family will be more
likely recruited through the Hezbollah‟s institutional structures.
However, if social learning theory proves to be more accurate, college students
who have militants in their social networks, whether with or away from their families, are
more likely to be recruited through social networks.

j. Political motivation to attend the Turkish
Hezbollah (IV10)
The tenth and final independent variable (IV10) includes reasons for joining the
Turkish Hezbollah that is represented by the following explanations.
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1 = Religion: People who believe there is no religious freedom; the Turkish State
is against Islam.
Religion is a set of beliefs that systematize supernatural powers which are sacred
and include believing in God and worship. According to Islamic scholars, religion is a
system of divine laws in which wisdom is conveyed to be a person‟s most beautiful and
best thought through his or her own free will.
Whether radical or not, Turkey has various understandings and movements that
perceive and interpret Islam differently. According to the Centre of Excellence (2008),
groups who make falsified religious interpretations recruit militants either through their
institutional or social structures by using people‟s religious feelings (0 = Other reasons
besides religion that people join the Turkish Hezbollah).
Each college student militant has different reasons for joining the Turkish
Hezbollah. However, because the Turkish Hezbollah is a religious organization, my study
is expected to show that religion as an independent variable increases the likelihood of
being recruited. Therefore, either social networks or institutional structures use religion
as a strong variable to recruit more militants.
If social control theory is more accurate, institutional structures of the Hezbollah
will be used to recruit more militants by using the above arguments.
If social learning theory is more accurate, social networks of the Hezbollah will
be used to recruit more militants by using the above arguments.
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3.5

Regression Equation
Regression consists of one DV and eight IVs in which the IVs are applied for both

the second and third research questions. To weigh the likelihood of each IV, logistic
regression is used. Since my study is designed to determine the likelihood that the
Turkish Hezbollah employs a particular type of recruitment, logistic regression best fits
the model. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), logistic regression can be used in
the following four ways:
(a) To predict a DV on the basis of continuous and/or categorical IVs; (b) To determine
the percent of variance in the DV explained by the IVs; (c) to rank the relative
importance of IVs; and (d) to assess the interaction effects and understand the impact of
covariate control variable.
The following equation is used to calculate the IV‟s weight on the DV:
Ŷ=

eu
e a b1 x1 b2 x2 b3 x3 ...

1  e u 1  e a b1 x1 b2 x2 b3 x3 ...

The likely predicted value is shown by Ŷ. In the dependent variable, there are two
probabilities in the equation that militant college students are recruited either by social
networking (1) or through institutional structures (0). Because “social networks” are
represented by (1), the calculated likelihood shows the likelihood of social networks
being used to recruit militants.
To determine the power of each IV on the DV─predicting the dependent variable
from the independent variables─I used the following equation:
U = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 +….
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Mann-Whitney‟s U statistic is the probability of a college-educated militant
becoming recruited by social networks. These estimates reveal the relationship between the
IVs and the DV where the DV is on the logit scale. In addition, the amount of increase (or
decrease, if the coefficient sign is negative) is revealed in the predicted logs of being
recruited by social networks which shows that one unit will either increase or decrease in the
IV, holding all other predictors constant.

3.6

Population and Sample
Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that population or the aggregate of all

cases, confirms the designated set of specifications. O‟Sullivan et al. (2003) further stated
that it is impossible for large groups to contact every member in order to collect data
besides requiring a tremendous commitment of both financial resources and time. The
main purpose for sampling is to provide a conceptual basis to make accurate estimates for
the entire population‟s values. According to Nachmias and Nachmias, sampling allows
the researcher to gather information on a targeted group in a much shorter amount of time
when the sample of the entire set is accurately represented.
In my study, the population consists of 339 college students with Kurdish descent
who were recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah. In 2000, the TNP confiscated the
Hezbollah‟s database that consisted of 7,000 self reports submitted by college educated
militants of which I gained access to 339 of them. Because it is compulsory for every
member to submit their self reports upon recruitment, I dealt with the entire target
population which represents my sample. The research questions focus on how these
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educated militants were recruited through either the Turkish Hezbollah‟s institutional
structures or the militants‟ own social networks?
Considering the strong family ties that are prevalent in Turkey‟s southeastern part
and highly populated by Kurdish-origin citizens, the Hezbollah recruits more militants
through social networks that are best explained by the social learning theory. On the other
hand, Hezbollah uses its legal structures to recruit college students who are pursuing an
education away from their home towns. In my study, I examined whether the Hezbollah
really, in fact, does use its legal structures effectively to recruit college educated
militants. Social control theory is tested in this group to determine if Hezbollah‟s
recruitment methods either support or do not support the theory.

3.7

Data Collection and Instrument
For my study, I used secondary data collected for a specific purpose. by the

Turkish Hezbollah According to O‟Sullivan et al. (2003), secondary data offers a
researcher the following four advantages: (a) reduces costs, (b) enables studies to be
conducted that are otherwise impractical, (c) is helpful for comparative and longitudinal
studies, and (d) is a necessary element for an open science.
The Turkish Hezbollah collected self reported data from its members as a means
of gaining more insight about the organization and its members. Without these data, it
would have been practically impossible to gain the necessary knowledge concerning
Hezbollah‟s recruitment tactics. Thus, conducting a survey with Hezbollah members
would not be feasible to reveal organization‟s recruitment tactics. I obtained pertinent
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data from Hezbollah database records retained by the Turkish National Police
Intelligence Department in 2000.

3.8

Limitations
As is true with other data collection methods, secondary data analysis has certain

limitations as summarized by Nachmias and Nachmias (2000): (a) the data may not
include all instruments that researchers hope to find; (b) researchers may have difficulty
in obtaining access to reach data that contain variables of interest because the original
investigator may not release information; and (c) if the researcher has insufficient
information concerning how data are collected, internal and external validity difficulties
may arise when determining potential sources of bias, errors, or problems.
Although it is not clear how many Hezbollah militants actually exist in Turkey,
after the 2000 police raid against the Turkish Hezbollah leader, 7,000 militants‟ selfreports were seized together with other important information regarding the organization.
Because the TNP used that information to eliminate Hezbollah‟s power, the terrorist
organization has subsequently taken more effective cautions to conceal its activities.
Thus, beginning from 2000 to the present, the TNP does not have access to the latest
information concerning the organization.

3.9

Data Analysis
Data were analyzed through frequency tables and logistic regression analysis in

which three research questions were applied:
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•

Research question 1 was designed to establish the Turkish Hezbollah‟s
recruitment strategies among college educated Hezbollah militants. The data
are expected to reveal that the terrorist organization utilizes two main
recruitment tactics: social networks and institutional structures. To determine
which recruitment structure is more effective, percentage scale frequency
tables are used.

•

In research question 2, to obtain the weight of eight IVs over the DV, eight
hypotheses were developed and tested by applying logistic regression to the
equation.

•

Although the same statistical method used for RQ 2 was applied to the third
research question, the target population was different from RQ 2. For RQ 3,
college students who had the following specifications were excluded from my
study because it was not clear as to whether the militant was, in fact, recruited
through institutional structures.
Group 1 (N = 4): College students who were with their families when
pursuing a college education, were recruited in college, and had/have
militants within their social networks (institutional structure efficiency).
Group 2 (N = 8): College students who were away from their family when
pursuing a college education, were recruited in college, and had/have
militants within their social networks (institutional structure efficiency).
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Similar to Group one, I had difficulty in identifying the precise
reasons that lead an individual to participate in Hezbollah‟s terrorist
organization.
Through RQ 3, Hezbollah‟s recruitment methods were examined
to determine whether social control theory or social learning theory best
explain the process. Similar to RQ 2, the weight of eight independent
variables were tested through logistic regression and a comparison
between the first and second model are provided.

3.10 Reliability and Validity
Babbie (2007) maintained that reliability is the matter of a particular technique
that yields the same results each time when applied to the same object. My dataset
includes a self reported form that obtained information concerning Turkish Hezbollah
militants‟ families, backgrounds, and how they were recruited. I have no reason to
believe that the data are unreliable given that the form was written in clear and easy to
understand questions for every militant. Besides, these reports were prepared for the
terrorist organization itself and not for the police. Since the Turkish Hezbollah is a
religiously motivated organization, it is believed that every member provided accurate
information.
Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) stated that validity refers to the following
question: “Am I measuring what I intend to measure?” (p. 149). In my study, I searched
for the answer to how the Turkish Hezbollah recruits its militants. Since every militant‟s
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self reports provided detailed information about how they were recruited, I believe that
those reports will help to identify the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment techniques that
may further hinder their operations.

4

CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This chapter is comprised of the statistical methods that were run to answer the
research questions.
To answer the first research question, a frequency table was used to determine the
Turkish Hezbollah‟s most commonly used structure to recruit college students: “What
methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish Hezbollah, a religiously
motivated terrorist organization?”
To answer the second research question, demographic details of the recruited
college students were identified through the use of logistic regression: “What are the
demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the institutional structures
and social networks?” Eight IVs were included in the model, and their weight over the
DV was also tested using logistic regression.
In answer to the third research question which is “Does social control theory or
social learning theory best explain the Turkish Hezbollah‟s most successful method of
recruiting?” a frequency table and logistic regression were used. Comparing to RQ 1 and
RQ 2, the sample size of RQ 3 was different from them. After applying these methods, in
terms of assess the each IV‟s weights on the DV, I compared the results of independent
variables that are used in RQ 2 and RQ 3.
4.1

Research Question One
What methods are used to recruit college students into the Turkish
Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist organization?
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4.1.1 Frequency Table for Research Question One
Frequency tables provide graphical displays and statistics that are useful for
describing many types of variables (SPSS, 2007). For the first research question, a
frequency table was developed to determine the Turkish Hezbollah‟s most frequently
used method to recruit college students. Using this frequency procedure, 339 college
students were included in my study as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Frequency Table for Research Question One
Institutional Structure (IS) vs. Social Network (SN) Recruitment
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Institutional Structure
(IS)

155

45.7

45.7

45.7

Social Network (SN)

184

54.3

54.3

100.0

Total

339

100.0

100.0

Hypotheses 1 and 2
H1: The Turkish Hezbollah uses two general methods to recruit college students:
institutional structures and social networks.
H2: Using social networks is a more effective method in recruiting college
educated militants when compared to institutional structures.
Among 339 college educated students, 184 (54.3%) were recruited through social
networks (SN) and 155 (45.7%) were recruited through institutional structures (IS). The
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data revealed that none of the students were recruited by any other methods. Parallel to
my expectations, SN and IS are two of the most important recruitment tools used by the
Turkish Hezbollah. When the methods of recruitment were compared between the two
groups of students, social networks rather than institutional structures proved to be the
most preferred method as depicted in Figure 3. As noted in the literature review, peer
groups and relatives have a tremendous influence over the younger population in the
southeastern part of the Turkey.

Figure 3. Frequency of recruitment through institutional structures or social networks.

4.2

Research Question Two
What are the demographic profiles of the individuals who are recruited by the
institutional structures and social networks?
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Logistic regression was used to obtain the demographic details of college
educated Hezbollah militants in which eight IVs were included in the equation. Through
logistic regression, each IV‟s weight on the DV are discussed in addition to their effects
on the likelihood of being recruited through either IS or SN. The eight variables in the
equation included: (a) having or not having any militants within social networks
(any_milt_wth_SN); (b) being away from or with family while pursuing a college
education (wth_or_awy_frm_fmly); (c) ideology of the family (famly_ideolgy); (d)
having an online or campus education (online_cam); (e) family size (family_size_grp);
(f) income level of family (income_level); (g) militants‟ ideologies (militants_ideology);
and (h) political motivation (pol_motiv). The DV for the equation was the type of tactics
used by the Hezbollah to recruit college educated militants.

4.2.1 Logistic Regression for Research Question Two
In order to predict the categorical DV with two or more categories, logistic
regression helped to test the models. Hypotheses 3 through 10 were tested through binary
logistic regression in which the effect of each IV over the DV is discussed according to
their coefficient values (B) and odds ratios (exp[B]). In my study, a dichotomous
dependent variable included two categories, either institutional structures or social
networks.
In order to help determine the percent of variance in the DV explained by the IVs,
logistic regression was the method used to predict a DV through continuous and/or
categorical independent variables. Through this statistical model, it was also possible to
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rank the relative importance of IVs in order to assess the interaction effects and to
understand the impact of covariate control variables. According to Garson (2010), odds
ratios help to show the impact of predictor variables.
In my study, two categorical independent variables were included in the model:
income_level (income level) and family_size_grp (family size). The „Forced Entry
Model‟ was used to assess the predictive ability of the IVs while controlling for other
predictor effects in the model.

4.2.1.1 How well does the model reveal the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies?
According to outputs derived from SPSS, my study consisted of 339 samples with
no missing cases in the data as shown in Table 3. Table 4 further reveals that the model
had a discrete DV containing two original values that were defined according to the type
of recruitment tactics used by the Hezbollah, either institutional structures or social
networks.

Table 3. Case Processing Summary for RQ 2
Unweighted Casesa
Selected Cases

Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total

Unselected Cases
Total
a

N

Percent

339

100.0

0

.0

339

100.0

0

.0

339

100.0

If weight is in effect, see classification Table 6 for the total number of cases.
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Table 4. Dependent Variable Encoding for RQ 2
Original Value

Internal Value

Institutional Structure (IS)

0

Social Network (SN)

1

After defining the variables that were included in the equation of my study, SPSS
provided an additional table which revealed two categorical variables in the
equation─family size and family income level (UCLA, 2010) (see Table 5). According to
the coding, family size was grouped into three categories: (a) small (N = 25), (b) average
(N = 141), and large (N = 173). Family income level also consisted of three categories:
(a) poor (N = 195), (b) average (N = 119), and rich (N = 25).

Table 5. Categorical Coding of Variables for RQ 2
Parameter Coding

Family Size

Income Level

Frequency

(1)

(2)

25

1.000

.000

Average Family Size

141

.000

1.000

Large Family Size

173

.000

.000

Poor

195

1.000

.000

Average

119

.000

1.000

25

.000

.000

Small Family Size

Rich
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In terms of classification, Table 6 reveals that 184 out of 339 college students
were recruited through social networks and 54.3% were recruited through social
networks.

Table 6. Classification Table

a, b

for RQ 2
Predicted
Institutional Structure or
Social Network

Observed

Institutional
Structure

Social
Network

Percentage
Correct

0

155

.0

0

184

100.0

Step 0 Institutional
IS
Structure (IS) or
SN
Social Network (SN)
Overall Percentage
a

54.3
b

Constant is included in the model; Cut value = .500

Table 7 represents the small model that excludes IVs. Here, p = .116 or a
significance level that revealed the model was not statistically significant at the .05 level.
Since IVs were excluded, explaining the model was therefore not feasible.

Table 7. Variables in the Equation for RQ 2

Step 0

Constant

B

SE

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

.172

.109

2.475

1

.116

1.187

In general, the Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients depicted in Table 8
explained the model‟s statistical significance in relation to the IVs. As shown, statistics
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for the step, model, and block were identical because stepwise logistic regression or
blocking was not utilized. The value given in the Sig. column represents the probability
of obtaining a chi-square statistic to determine whether or not the null hypothesis was
true. In the model, chi-square equaled a high of 190.621 which was significant for 10
degrees of freedom (df) at the .000 significance level.

Table 8. Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for RQ 2

Step 1

Chi-square

df

Sig.

Step

190.621

10

.000

Block

190.621

10

.000

Model

190.621

10

.000

The summary illustrated in Table 9 provides information concerning the model‟s
usefulness. In other words, the predicted power of the model was explained by the IVs.
2

2

The Cox and Snell R and Nagelkerke R values show the amount of variation in the DV
2

2

explained by the model. Cox and Snell R had a value of .430, while Nagelkerke R had
2

a value of .575. According to Cox and Snell‟s R , 43% of the variability was explained
2

by this set of variables. In addition, Nagelkerke R suggested that 57.5% of the variability
was explained by this set of variables.

Table 9. Model Summary for RQ 2
Step

-2 Log likelihood
1

a

276.849

a

2

2

Cox & Snell R

Nagelkerke R

.430

.575

Estimation terminated at iteration 5 since parameter estimates changed by < .001.
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Table 10 represents an output classification for dichotomous DVs. As shown, the
columns reveal the two predicted DVs while the rows indicate the two observed DV
values. The model had an 83.8% correct rate (76.1%, institutional structures; 90.2%,
social networks.
a

Table 10. Classification Table for RQ 2
Predicted
Institutional Structure or Social
Network
Institutional
Structure

Observed
Step 1 Institutional
Structure (IS) or
Social Network
(SN)

Social Percentage
Network
Correct

IS

118

37

76.1

SN

18

166

90.2

Overall Percentage

83.8

a

Cut value = .500.

4.2.1.2 Interpreting the meaning of each coefficients (associated with IVs) and
comments on the statistical significance of each coefficient
Logistic regression coefficients simply illustrate the change in the predicted
logged odds of experiencing an event or having a characteristic for a one unit change in
the IVs. The coefficients had the exact same interpretation as the coefficients in
regression other than the DV units of represented logged odds (Garson, 2010). This
model‟s output is presented in Table 11 in which each coefficient‟s power and
hypotheses were interpreted as follows.
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Hypothesis 3
H3: Having Hezbollah militants within one‟s social structure increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional
structures.
The logistic regression coefficient revealed that a one unit increase for having
militants within social networks (any_milt_wth_SN) increased the logged odds of being
recruited through social networks by 2.857 while holding others constant. This
coefficient was both significant and different than 0 (p = .000). Due to the one unit
change in having militants within social networks, the Exp(B) was 17.415 signifying that
a positive value (e

any_milt_wth_SN

– 1 = 16.415) increased nearly 16 times for the

likelihood of college students being recruited through social networks.
The model indicated that rejecting the null hypothesis was true at the p = .05 level
of significance. Parallel to the literature review, most recruited college students are
statistically and significantly affected by their social networks. My study also supported
the assumption that family relations and peer groups may lead an individual to join
terrorist organizations, specifically the Hezbollah. Considering the strong social familial
ties in the eastern part of Turkey, college educated individuals were more likely to be
recruited through social networks if they had or have militant relatives involved in the
Hezbollah. Compared to other independent variables in the equation, having militants
within social networks had a greater effect that increased the likelihood of being recruited
into the terrorist organization through social networks.
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Hypothesis 4
H4: Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the
likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social
networks.
The logistic regression coefficient for being with or away from one‟s family while
pursuing a college education (wth_or_Awy_frm_fmly) revealed that a one unit increase
for this variable increased the logged odds of being recruited through social networks by
.882 while holding others constant. The coefficient for being with or away from one‟s
family was both significant and different than 0 (p = .016). Due to a one unit change in
being with or away from one‟s family, Exp(B) indicated that a negative value
(e

wth_or_awy_frm_fmly

– 1 = .586) decreased the likelihood of being recruited through social

networks by 41.4%.
In addition, whether with or away from one‟s family while pursuing a college
education was another variable that had a significant effect upon the likelihood of being
recruited by the Hezbollah through either institutional structures or social networks. Even
if college students had no militants within their social networks, they were recruited when
they were away from their families. Parallel to the literature review, strong social control
is a general crime deterrence in which the Turkish Hezbollah‟s institutional structures
take advantage of college students who are distanced from their families.

Hypothesis 5
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H5: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional
structures.
The logistic regression coefficient revealed that a one unit increase for family
ideology (famly_ideolgy) increased the logged odds of being recruited through social
networks by .107 while holding others constant. The coefficient for family ideology was
not significant or different than 0 (p = .753). Due to a one unit change in family ideology,
the Exp(B) positive value (e

famly_ideolgy

– 1= .113) was 1.113 indicating that there was an

11.3% increase in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks.
A review of the literature suggested that there was no link between religious
ideology and terrorism. For example, Pape (2005) researched suicide bombings from
1980 to 2003 and concluded that media news coverage regarding suicide bombings were
profoundly misleading. Contrary to the public‟s general perception, suicide terrorism
stems from political rather than religious conflicts according to Pape. Sheehan (2000)
also claimed that terrorists portray their causes in religion and cultural terms; however,
this is only a tactic to conceal their political goals.
The family ideology variable revealed that both institutional structures and social
network methods had no significant difference in the Hezbollah‟s recruitment of college
students. In other words, being reared in a religious family did not significantly
contribute to either types of recruitment.

Hypothesis 6
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H6: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be
recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks.
The logistic regression coefficient for online or campus education (online_camp)
revealed that a one unit increase decreased the logged odds of being recruited through
social networks by -.797 while holding others constant. The coefficient for online or
campus education was significant as well as different than 0 (p = .037). Due to the one
unit change in online or campus education, the Exp(B) of having campus education had a
negative value of .451 (e

online_camp

– 1 = -.549) or a 54.9% decrease in the likelihood of

being recruited through social networks.
Consistent with the literature, a significantly higher number of campus educated
college students were recruited through institutional structures rather than social
networks. This also confirmed two important issues: (a) College students who pursue an
online education are recruited through social networks significantly more frequently
when family militants participate in terrorist organizations; and (b) college students who
are with their families and have no militants within their social network are less likely to
be recruited through social networks. This variable is another indicator that strong social
bonds decrease the likelihood of recruitment and also confirm that college students who
are away from their families are more likely to be recruited through institutional
structures. Running a cross tabulation between recruitment type and online or campus
education might help to develop a clear picture regarding this relationship for H6 and
identify the most effective recruitment methods. Table 11 presents a summary of the
variables in the equation.
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Table 11. Variables in the Equation for RQ 2
B
a

Step

Having Hezbollah militants
within Social Networks

2.857

SE
.373

58.768

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

.000

17.415

.016

.414

1

Being away from family
during college education

-.882

.366

5.800

1

Family Ideology

.107

.339

.099

1

.753

1.113

Online or Campus Education

-.797

.382

4.352

1

.037

.451

4.522

2

.104

Family Size
Family Size (1)

.665

.601

1.224

1

.269

1.944

Family Size (2)

.677

.333

4.147

1

.042

1.969

2.479

2

.289

Income Level

a

Wald

Income Level (1)

-.961

.645

2.220

1

.136

.383

Income l=Level (2)

-.702

.663

1.120

1

.290

.496

Militant‟s Ideology

-.201

.343

.341

1

.559

.818

Political Motivation

-.716

1.039

.474

1

.491

.489

Constant

.557

1.238

.202

1

.653

1.745

Variable(s) entered in step 1: Any_milt_wth_SN, Wth_or_Awy_frm_Fmly, Famly_ideolgy, Online_camp, Family_Size_grp,
Income_level, Militants_ideology, Pol_motiv.
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As illustrated in Table 12, Pearson‟s chi-square value was rather high with a
significant relationship (p = .000). Among the 96 militant students who pursued online
educations, 84.4% were recruited through SN and 90.3% who had campus educations
were recruited through IS as shown in Table 13. This result was parallel to my
expectation that college students who pursued online educations were more likely to be
recruited through social networks. Because they were with their families, the likelihood
of being recruited through institutional structure was extremely low that may be
explained through the assumptions of social learning and social control theories. For
example, if an individual has a militant within his or her social networks and stays with
his or her family, he or she is more likely to be recruited through social networks rather
than institutional structures. Likewise, if an individual is away from his or her family, he
or she is more likely to be recruited through institutional structures unless there is a
militant within his or her social network.

Table 12. Chi-square Tests for Hypothesis 6

Value

df

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)

Pearson‟s chi-square

48.886

1

.000

Continuity correction

47.208

1

.000

Likelihood ratio

53.044

1

.000

Fisher‟s Exact Test
Linear-by-linear
Association

48.741

N of valid cases

339

1

.000

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.000

.000
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Table 13. Recruitment Type and Campus Education for Hypothesis 6
Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN) * Online or Campus Education Crosstabulation
Online or Campus Education

Institutional Structure (IS) or
Social Network (SN)

Institutional
Structure (IS)

Social Network
(SN)

Total

Online
Education

Campus
Education

Total

15

140

155

% within Institutional Structure (IS) or
Social Network (SN)

9.7%

90.3%

100.0%

% within Online or Campus Education

15.6%

57.6%

45.7%

% of Total

4.4%

41.3%

45.7%

81

103

184

% within Institutional Structure (IS) or
Social Network (SN)

44.0%

56.0%

100.0%

% within Online or Campus Education

84.4%

42.4%

54.3%

% of Total

23.9%

30.4%

54.3%

96

243

339

% within Institutional Structure (IS) or
Social Network (SN)

28.3%

71.7%

100.0%

% within Online or Campus Education

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

% of Total

28.3%

71.7%

100.0%

Count

Count

Count
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Hypothesis 7
H7: The larger the family size, the more likely are college students to be recruited
through institutional structures.
Family size (Family_size) represented a categorical variable comprised of three
categories: (a) small, (b) average, and (c) large. A large family size was coded as “3” in
which logistic regression kept the higher valued category reference by default. According
to the .05 significance level, family size did not overall affect the DV and was therefore
not significant (p =.104).
Hence, the large size family reference variable was possible to compare with the
small and average size family. Accordingly, the odds of being reared in an average family
compared to a large one was increased by a factor of 1.96 when controlling for other
variables in the model. Likewise, the odds of being reared in a small family when
compared to a large family was increased by a factor of 1.94 when controlling for other
variables in the model.
In relation to the significance level, family size did not have any significant
influence that increased the likelihood of being recruited for either institutional structures
or social networks. However, in order to determine which group was highly recruited by
each structure, cross tabulation must be applied to develop a clear picture of the
recruitment type according to family size.
As shown in Table 14, cross tabulation revealed that 51% of the recruited college
educated militants came from large families, 41.6% came from average size families, and
only 7.4% were reared in small size families.
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Table 14. Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 7
Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN) * Family Size Group Crosstabulation
Family Size Groups
Average Family
Small Family Size
Institutional Structure (IS) or

Institutional Structure (IS)

Social Network (SN)

Count
% within Institutional Structure

Size

Large Family Size

Total

12

58

85

155

7.7%

37.4%

54.8%

100.0%

48.0%

41.1%

49.1%

45.7%

3.5%

17.1%

25.1%

45.7%

13

83

88

184

7.1%

45.1%

47.8%

100.0%

52.0%

58.9%

50.9%

54.3%

3.8%

24.5%

26.0%

54.3%

25

141

173

339

7.4%

41.6%

51.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

7.4%

41.6%

51.0%

100.0%

(IS) or Social Network (SN)
% within Family Size Groups
% of Total
Social Network (SN)

Count
% within Institutional Structure
(IS) or Social Network (SN)
% within Family Size Groups
% of Total

Total

Count
% within Institutional Structure
(IS) or Social Network (SN)
% within Family Size Groups
% of Total
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In terms of each recruitment method, family dispersion according to the
institutional structure included the following: 54.8% of the recruited militants were from
large families, 37.4% were from average size families, and a mere 7.7% were from small
size families.
The social network‟s family dispersion revealed that 47.8% of the recruited
militants were from large families, 45.1% were from average size families, and only
7.1% were from small size families.
In sum, within small size families, approximately 48% of the college educated
militants were recruited through institutional structures whereas approximately 52% were
recruited through social networks. Within average size families, the Hezbollah recruited
41.1% of the college educated militants through their institutional structures and 58.9%
through social networks. Finally, within large size families, while 49.1% of the college
educated militants were recruited through Hezbollah‟s institutional structures, 50.9%
were recruited through social networks.
According to the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies, these statistics reveal
that there is no significant difference between family size and being recruited by either
social networks or the institutional structures.

Hypothesis 8
H8: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be
recruited by institutional structures when compared to social networks.
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Income level (Income_level) was another categorical variable that consisted of
three categories: (a) poor, (b) average, and (c) rich. Garson (2010) inferred that
categorical variables should be interpreted according to the omitted reference category
similar to OLS regression. Because logistic regression keeps the higher valued category
as a default reference, rich was used as the reference variable to make a comparison
between poor and average income families. In comparison to rich families, the odds of
being from a family with average economic power was decreased by a factor of .496
when controlling other variables in the model. Likewise, the odds of being from a family
with poor economic power when compared to rich families was decreased by a factor of
.383 when controlling other variables in the model.
Parallel to the literature, there was no significant difference between institutional
structure and social networks in terms of recruitment strategies used by terrorists.
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) claimed that any connection between education, poverty,
and terrorism is complicated, indirect, and quite weak. According to Kruger and
Maleckova, political conditions play a significant role for terrorism when compared to
economic conditions.
Given that income level was a categorical variable, a cross tabulation table was
required to reveal the relationship between recruitment methods and each income
category. Accordingly, Table 15 shows that Pearson‟s chi-square value was quite low and
had no significant relationship (p = .138) between each variable.
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Table 15. Chi-Square for Hypothesis 8
Value
a

df

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

Pearson‟s chi-square

3.959

2

.138

Likelihood ratio

3.981

2

.137

Linear-by-linear association

3.788

1

.052

N of valid cases

339

a

No cells (.0%) have an expected count < 5. The minimum expected count = 11.43.
As shown in Table 16, cross tabulation revealed that among college educated

militants who came from poor families, 50.3% were recruited through institutional
structures and 49.7% were recruited through social networks. According to this finding,
there was no large difference between both recruitment types.
Within average income family militants, 40.3% were recruited through
institutional structures and 59.7% were recruited through social networks. As revealed by
the statistics, most militants who came from average income families were recruited
through social networks.
On the other hand, among college educated militants who came from rich
families, 36% were recruited through institutional structures and 64% were recruited
through social networks. According to these statistics, militants who came from wealthy
families were most likely to be recruited through social networks which were comparable
to my expectations. I believe that individuals who have enough resources to support their
needs while away from their families are less likely to make contact with institutional
structures. Thus, the more likelihood scenario for them would be recruitment through
social networks and having militants within their social networks.
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Table 16. Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 8
Institutional Structure (IS) or Social Network (SN) * Income Level Crosstabulation
Income Level
Poor
Institutional Structure (IS)
or Social Network (SN)

IS

SN

Total

Count

98

Normal
48

Rich
9

Total
155

% within IS or SN

63.2%

31.0%

5.8%

100.0%

% within Income Level

50.3%

40.3%

36.0%

45.7%

% of Total

28.9%

14.2%

2.7%

45.7%

97

71

16

184

% within IS) or SN

52.7%

38.6%

8.7%

100.0%

% within Income Level

49.7%

59.7%

64.0%

54.3%

% of Total

28.6%

20.9%

4.7%

54.3%

195

119

25

339

% within IS or SN

57.5%

35.1%

7.4%

100.0%

% within Income Level

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

% of Total

57.5%

35.1%

7.4%

100.0%

Count

Count
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Hypothesis 9
H9: College student‟s religiosity level is more likely to increase the likelihood of
being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks.
The logistic regression coefficient of -.201 for militant‟s ideology
(militants_ideology) revealed that a one unit increase for this variable decreased the
logged odds of being recruited through social networks by .201 while holding others
constant. The coefficient for militant‟s ideology was not significant and was not
significantly different than 0 (p = .559). The Exp(B) militant‟s ideology was .818
(emilitants_ideology – 1 = -182) (negative value) indicating that there was an 18.2% decrease
in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks due to the one unit change in
militants‟ ideology.
As earlier discussed in Hypothesis 3, the literature suggested that there is no link
between religious ideology and terrorism. Parallel to this argument and from the
perspective of either type of recruitment, Hypothesis 9 revealed that there was no
significant difference in terms of militant college students‟ ideology. Parallel to my
expectancy, having religious ideology decrease the likelihood of being recruited through
social networks.

Hypothesis 10
H10: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social
networks.
The logistic regression coefficient of -.716 for political motivation (Pol_motiv)
showed that a one unit increase decreased the logged odds of being recruited through
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social networks by .716 while holding others constant. The coefficient for political
motivation was neither significant nor significantly different than 0 (p = .491). The
Exp(B) was .489 meaning that (epol_motiv – 1 = -511) (negative value) there was a 51.1%
decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks due to the one unit
change in political motivation.
Political motivation was also another IV that did not have a significant effect on
the DV. In other words, there was no difference between institutional structure and social
networks in terms of college students being motivated to participate in terrorist groups.
The hypotheses and findings for RQ 2 are identified in Table 17.

4.3

Research Question Three
Does social control theory or social learning theory better explain the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s most successful method of recruiting?
Research question three was designed to provide a better theory in explaining the

various recruitment strategies used by the Turkish Hezbollah. As stated in RQ 3, the
Turkish Hezbollah uses two structures to effectively recruit college educated students,
institutional structures and social networks. Recruitment through institutional structures
meets the assumptions of social control theory. In other words, being away from one‟s
family often results in weak social bonds that may lead to the commission of crime(s). On
the other hand, recruitment through social networks meets the assumptions of social
learning theory or behavior is learned through direct experiences as well as through
observation of one‟s environment.
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Table 17. Hypotheses and Findings for Research Question 2 (SN = Social Networks, IS = Institutional Structures)
Hypotheses

Key findings

Sig. Level

H3: Having militants within SN increases the likelihood of being
recruited by SN

Increases the likelihood nearly 16 times of being recruited
through SN compared to IS

p = .000

H4: Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family
increases the likelihood of being recruited through IS when
compared to SN

41.4% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited by SN
compared to IS

p = .016

H5: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies
increases the likelihood of being recruited through social
networks when compared to institutional structures.

11.3% increase in the likelihood of being recruited through SN

p = .753

H6: College students who obtain a campus education are more
likely to be recruited through IS when compared to SN

54.9% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SN

p = .037

H7: Having a large family size increases the likelihood of being
recruited by IS

Small family militants recruited by SN (48% versus 52%),
Average family militants recruited by SN (41.1% versus 58.9%),
Large family militants recruited by SN (49.1% versus 50.9%)

p = .104

H8: Having more family income increases the likelihood of being
recruited by SN

Poor family militants recruited by IS (49.7% versus 50.3%),
Average family militants recruited by SN (40.3% versus 59.3%),
Rich family militants recruited by SN (36% versus 64%)

p = .289

18.2% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SN

p = .559

51.1% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SN

p =.491

H9: College student‟s religiosity level is more likely to increase
the likelihood of being recruited through IS when compared to
SN.
H10: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited
through SN
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Because RQ 3 provided a better theory for explaining the Turkish Hezbollah‟s
recruitment strategies, the data structure had to be compatible with the assumptions of
social control and social learning, two important criminological theories. As explained in
the methods section, two groups of college educated Hezbollah militants who met were
excluded from my study if they met the following specifications:
Group 1 (N = 4): While pursuing a college education, these students included
those who were with their families, were recruited when in college, and had militants
within their social networks (i.e., institutional structure efficiency). This group was
excluded because it was not clear whether the student was recruited purely through
institutional structures. Having militants within the family made these groups easy targets
for recruitment by the Turkish Hezbollah. From the social learning theory perspective, if
there were militants or criminals who existed within a student‟s social network, the
recruited militant most probably would sympathize with the organization. Because this
group did not provide ample information regarding their psychological reasons for
joining the terrorist organization, by including them may have lead to false results from a
theoretical perspective.
Group 2 (N = 8): College students who were away from their family while
pursuing a college education, were recruited when in college, and had militants within
their social networks (i.e., institutional structure efficiency). Similar to the first group, I
difficulty in identifying the exact reasons that lead these militants to take participate in
the Hezbollah‟s organization.
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4.3.1 Frequency Table for Research Question Three
Hypothesis 11
H11: Social learning theory provides a better explanation regarding the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies when compared to social control theory.
After excluding two groups, my sample size was N = 327. Initially, a frequency
table was used to reveal the best theory that fit in explaining the Turkish Hezbollah‟s
recruitment strategies. As shown in Table 18, social learning theory was more helpful in
understanding how militants were recruited through the terrorist organization. While
social control theory explained Hezbollah‟s recruitment pattern for 146 out of 327 college
educated militants (44.6%), social learning theory provides a wider explanation. Figure 4
provides a bar chart that shows the statistical results when a comparison was made
between the two theories.

Table 18. Social Control Theory versus Social Learning Theory

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Social Control Theory
(SC)

146

44.6

44.6

44.6

Social Learning Theory
(SL)

181

55.4

55.4

100.0

Total

327

100.0

100.0
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Figure 4. A comparison between social control and social learning theories.

4.3.2 Logistic regression for RQ 3
Table 19 provides a model that includes 327 college students who were recruited
by the Turkish Hezbollah. As shown, there are no missing cases. Table 20 consists of
recruited college militants whose behaviors were best explained through social control
theory and social learning theory.
Table 21 reveals two categorical variables that were encoded into the equation. As
shown, family income level was grouped into three categories that included poor (N =
190), average (N = 114), and rich families (N = 23). Family size was also grouped into
three categories that included small (N = 25), average (N = 134), and large (N = 168).
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Table 19. Case Processing Summary for Research Question Three
Unweighted Casesa
Selected Cases

Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total

Unselected Cases
Total
a

a

N

Percent

327

100.0

0

.0

327

100.0

0

.0

327

100.0

If weight is in effect, refer to Table 22 for the total number of cases.

Table 20. Encoding of Dependent Variable for Research Question Three
Original Value

Internal Value

Social Control Theory (SC)

0

Social Learning Theory (SL)

1

Table 21. Coding of Income Level and Family Size Categorical Variables
Parameter coding

Income Level

Family Size

Frequency

(1)

(2)

Poor

190

1.000

.000

Average

114

.000

1.000

Rich

23

.000

.000

Small Family Size

25

1.000

.000

Average Family Size

134

.000

1.000

Large Family Size

168

.000

.000
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As depicted in Table 22, 181 (55.4%) out of 339 college students were classified
as being recruited through social learning theory assumptions. Further, Table 23
identifies the variables in the equation in which .053 was the significance level. This
revealed that the model was not statistically significant according to the .05 significance
level. Because there were no IVs in the model, it is not explained any further.

Table 22. Classification Tablea,b for RQ 3
Predicted
Social Control Theory (SCT) or
Social Learning Theory (SLT) Percentage
SCT
SLT
Correct

Observed
Step 0 Social Control
Theory or Social
Learning Theory

SCT

0

146

.0

SLT

0

181

100.0

Overall Percentage
a

55.4
b

Constant is included in the model; Cut value = .500

Table 23. Variables Contained in the Equation for Research Question Three

Step 0

Constant

B

SE

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

.215

.111

3.732

1

.053

1.240

As presented in Table 24, the Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients revealed that
the step, model, and block statistics were the same because stepwise logistic regression or
blocking had not been used. The value shown in the Sig. column represents the
probability of obtaining the chi-square statistic to determine whether or not the null
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hypothesis was true. In the model, a high chi-square 200.930 was reached and was
significant for 10 degrees of freedom (df) at the .000 significance level.

Table 24. Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for Research Question Three

Step 1

Chi-square

df

Sig.

Step

200.930

10

.000

Block

200.930

10

.000

Model

200.930

10

.000

2

In the model summary shown in Table 25, Cox and Snell R had a value of .459,
2

2

while Nagelkerke R had a value of .614. According to Cox and Snell‟s R value, 45.9%
2

of the variability was explained by this set of variables. Nagelkerke R also suggested
that 61.4of the variability was explained by this set of variables. Compared to the
previous model that was described in RQ 1, the IVs explained the broader percentage of
the DV (43% vs. 45.9%). Hence, it may be concluded that removing those groups helped
to better explain the model.

Table 25. Model Summary for Research Question Three

a

2

2

Step

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R

Nagelkerke R

1

248.635a

.459

.614

Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by <
.001.
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Table 26 represents an output classification table for the dichotomous DVs. The
columns illustrate the two predicted values whereas the rows include their two observed
values. As shown, the model had an 85.9% correct rate with 80.1% for institutional
structures and 90.6% for social networks.

Table 26. Classification Table for RQ 3
Predicted
Social Control Theory
(SCT) or Social Learning
Theory (SLT)
Percentage
SCT
SLT
Correct

Observed
Step 1 Social Control
Theory or Social
Learning Theory

SCT

117

29

80.1

SLT

17

164

90.6

Overall Percentage

85.9

a

Cut value = .500

4.3.3 Interpreting the Meaning of Each Coefficient Associated with IVs and Comments
Regarding the Statistical Significance of Each Coefficient
This model‟s output is presented in Table 27 that depicts each coefficient‟s power
followed by discussion of the hypotheses. In RQ 3, because the same variables as RQ 1
were used, and a broader explanation was made for the previous model, I tested the
hypotheses and compared the results between these models.
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Table 27. Variables in the Equation for Research Question Three

Step 1

a

B

SE

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Having Hezbollah militants
within Social Networks

3.298

.418

62.125

1

.000

27.067

Being away from family during
college education

-.500

.419

1.421

1

.233

.607

Family ideology

.119

.363

.107

1

.744

1.126

Online or campus education

-.850

.417

4.162

1

.041

.427

4.204

2

.122

Family Size
Family Size (1)

.580

.630

.848

1

.357

1.786

Family Size (2)

.720

.359

4.024

1

.045

2.055

3.807

2

.149

Income level

a

Income level (1)

-1.248

.683

3.338

1

.068

.287

Income level (2)

-.879

.702

1.569

1

.210

.415

Militant‟s ideology

-.194

.368

.277

1

.599

.824

Political motivation

-.667

1.097

.369

1

.543

.513

Constant

.497

1.317

.142

1

.706

1.644

Variable(s) entered in step 1: Any_milt_wth_SN; Wth_or_Awy_frm_Fmly; Famly_ideolgy; Online_camp,;

Family_Size_grp,;Income_level; Militants_ideology; Pol_motiv.
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Hypothesis 12
H12: Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions.
The logistic regression coefficient for having militants within social networks
(any_milt_wth_SN) showed that a one unit increase increased the logged odds of being
recruited through social learning theory by 3.298 while holding others constant. The
coefficient for having militants within social networks was both significant and
significantly different than 0 (p = .000). The Exp(B) of having militants within social
networks was 27.067 (eany_milt_wth_SN – 1 = 26.067) (positive value) meaning that there
was nearly a 26 times increase in the likelihood of being recruited through social learning
theory assumptions due to the one unit change in having militants within social networks.
Compared to the previous model, the odds ratio increased which was good for the
purposes of my study (16.415 vs, 26.067). Removing group I and group II from the
model increased the effect of having militants within social networks over the DV.

Hypothesis 13
H13: Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared
to social learning theory assumptions.
The logistic regression coefficient of -.500 for being with or away from family
while pursuing a college education (wth_or_Awy_frm_fmly) showed that a one unit
increase decreased the logged odds of being recruited through social learning theory
assumptions by .500 while holding others constant. The coefficient for being with or
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away from family during college education was not significant and was not significantly
different than 0 (p = .233). The Exp(B) of being with or away from family during college
education was .607 (ewth_or_awy_frm_fmly – 1 = -.393) (negative value) meaning that there
was a 39.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory
assumptions due to a one unit change in being with or away from family while pursuing a
college education.
Compared to the first model, the significance level changed to p = .233.
Excluding the militant group that were away from their family, were recruited in college,
and had militants in SN dropped the significance level of this variable. In other words,
because it was not clear whether the excluded group was recruited by IS or SN, the
current model provided a clearer picture regarding the most frequently used method of
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. Accordingly, the result of this variable revealed that
students who were away from their families during college were not significantly
different in terms of being recruited through either social control theory or social learning
theory assumptions. Both methods were found to be effective in providing an explanation
of recruited college student militants.
From a theoretical perspective, social learning theory provided a better
explanation for the entire model when compared to social control theory. Thus, it may be
concluded that social learning theory offers a better explanation on the recruitment
process of college students who are either with or away from their families. However, as
discussed in Hypothesis 9, there was a significant difference between social learning and
social control theories when providing an explanation for the recruitment process of
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college students who had militants in their social networks. Parallel to my expectations,
social learning theory provided a better explanation.

Hypothesis 14
H14: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared
to social control theory assumptions.
The logistic regression coefficient for family ideology (famly_ideolgy) revealed
that a one unit increase for family ideology increased the logged odds of being recruited
through social learning theory assumptions by .119 while holding others constant. The
coefficient for family ideology was not significant and or significantly different than 0 (p
= .744). The Exp(B) of family ideology was 1.126 (efamly_ideolgy – 1 = .126) (positive
value) meaning that there was a 12.6% increase in the likelihood of being recruited
through social learning theory assumptions due to the one unit change in family ideology.
Similar to the first model, this model also confirmed that there was no significant
difference between the assumptions of both theories that explain the Hezbollah‟s
recruitment process of college students.

Hypothesis 15
H15: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be
recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared to social learning
theory assumptions.
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The logistic regression coefficient of -.850 for online or campus education
(online_camp) showed that a one unit increase for online or campus education decreased
the logged odds of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions by .850
while holding others constant. The coefficient for online or campus education was
significant as well as significantly different than 0 (p = .041). The Exp(B) of campus
education was .427 (eonline_camp – 1 = -.573) (negative value) indicating that there was a
57.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory
assumptions due to the one unit change in the online or campus education.
Obtaining a campus education had a significant effect on explaining the
recruitment process through social control theory assumptions compared to social
learning theory assumptions. Compared to the first model, the second model had less
effect on the likelihood of being recruited through the social control theory assumptions.
Recall that research question two included college students who had militants in their SN
were predominantly recruited through social control theory assumptions. By eliminating
those groups from this model caused the social learning theory to increase in providing a
better explanation for recruitment of college students.

Hypothesis 16
H16: The larger the family, the more likely are college students to be recruited
through social control theory assumptions.
As discussed in the methods section of my study, family size (Family_size) was a
categorical variable consisting of three categories: (a) small (a) average, and (c) large.
Hence, the reference variable was the large family size that made it possible to compare
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small and average size families to large families. Accordingly, the odds of recruited
students who are being reared in an average size family when compared to a large size
family were increased by a factor of 1.786 when controlling other variables in the model.
Likewise, the odds of being reared in a small size family when compared to a large size
family was increased by a factor of 2.055 when controlling other variables in the model.
According to the p =.122 significance level, family size had no significant effects
as to whether being recruited through the assumptions of social control theory or social
learning theory. The cross tabulation table as depicted in Table 28 revealed the following
three results: (a) Within small size families, institutional structures recruited 48% of the
college educated militants and social networks recruited 52% of the militants; (b) within
average size families, institutional structures recruited 40.3% of the college educated
militants and social networks recruited 59.7% of the militants; and (c) within large size
families, institutional structures recruited 47.6% of the college educated militants and
social networks recruited 52.4% of the militants.

Hypothesis 17
H17: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be
recruited through social control theory assumptions.
Income level (Income_level) was also a categorical variable consisting of
categories: (a) poor, (b) average, and (c) Rich. Garson (2010) inferred that categorical
variables should be interpreted according to the omitted reference category similar to
OLS regression. Since logistic regression keeps the higher valued category as a default
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Table 28. Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 16
Social Control Theory (SC) or Social Learning Theory (SL) * Family Size Groups Crosstabulation
Family Size Groups

Social Control Theory
Social Control Theory
(SCT) or Social Learning (SCT)
Theory (SL)

Social Learning Theory
(SLT)

Total

Small Family
Size

Average
Family Size

Large Family
Size

Total

12

54

80

146

% within SCT or SLT

8.2%

37.0%

54.8%

% within Family Size
Groups

48.0%

40.3%

47.6%

44.6%

% of Total

3.7%

16.5%

24.5%

44.6%

13

80

88

181

% within SCT or SLT

7.2%

44.2%

48.6%

100.0%

% within Family Size
Groups

52.0%

59.7%

52.4%

55.4%

% of Total

4.0%

24.5%

26.9%

55.4%

25

134

168

327

% within SCT or SLT

7.6%

41.0%

51.4%

100.0%

% within Family Size
Groups

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

7.6%

41.0%

51.4%

100.0%

Count

Count

Count

% of Total

100.0%
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reference, rich represented the reference variable used to make a comparison between
poor and average families. In comparison to rich families, the odds of being from a
family with poor economic power were decreased by a factor of .287 when controlling
other variables in the model. Likewise, the odds of being from a family with average
economic power when compared to rich families were decreased by a factor of .415 when
controlling other variables in the model. Similar to family size, income level had no
significant effect on the likelihood of being recruited according to the assumptions of
both social control and social learning theories as illustrated by the cross tabulations in
Table 29.
Among the college educated militants who came from poor family backgrounds,
50.5% were recruited through social learning theory assumptions and 49.5% were
recruited through social control theory assumptions. The average income family
represented 61.4% versus 38.6% and the rich families represented 65.2% versus 34.8%.
Hypothesis 18

H18: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions.
The logistic regression coefficient of -.194 for militant‟s ideology
(militants_ideology) revealed that a one unit increase for this variable decreased the
logged odds of being recruited through social networks by .194 while holding others
constant. The coefficient for militant‟s ideology was not significant and was not
significantly different than 0 (p = .559). The Exp(B) militant‟s ideology was .824
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Table 29. Crosstabulation for Hypothesis 17
Social Control Theory (SC) or Social Learning Theory (SL) * Income Level Crosstabulation
Income Level
Poor

Average

Rich

Total

94

44

8

146

64.4%

30.1%

5.5%

100.0%

49.5%

38.6%

34.8%

44.6%

28.7%

13.5%

2.4%

44.6%

96

70

15

181

% within SCT or SLT

53.0%

38.7%

8.3%

100.0%

% within Income Level

50.5%

61.4%

65.2%

55.4%

% of Total

29.4%

21.4%

4.6%

55.4%
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114

23

327

% within SCT or SLT

58.1%

34.9%

7.0%

100.0%

% within Income Level

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

% of Total

58.1%

34.9%

7.0%

100.0%

Social Control Theory (SCT) Social Control Theory (SCT) Count
or Social Learning Theory
% within SCT or SLT
(SLT)
% within Income Level
% of Total
Social Learning Theory
(SLT)

Total

Count

Count
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(e

militants_ideology

– 1 = -176 (negative value) meaning that there was a 17.6% decrease in

the likelihood of being recruited through the social learning theory assumptions due to
the one unit change in ideology of the militants.
According to the results, there was no change in providing a better explanation for
recruitment of college students through the assumptions of either social control or social
learning theories. When compared to the first model, there was a difference in the odds
ratio power (.513 versus .489).

Hypothesis 19
H19: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social
learning theory assumptions.
The logistic regression coefficient of -.667 for political motivation (Pol_motiv)
showed that a one unit increase for political motivation decreased the logged odds of
recruitment into the Hezbollah through social learning theory assumptions by .667 while
holding others constant. The coefficient for political motivation was neither significant
nor significantly different than 0 (p = .543). The Exp(B) of political motivation was .513
(epol_motiv – 1= -487) (negative value) meaning that there was a 48.7% decrease in the
likelihood of being recruited through social networks due to the one unit change in the
political motivation. Political motivation also had no significant difference in explaining
Hezbollah‟s recruitment process of college students through either social control theory
or social learning theory.
The findings of Hypotheses 12 through 19 are summarized in Table 30.
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Table 30. Hypotheses and Findings for RQ 3 (SLT = Social Learning Theory, SCT = Social Control Theory)
Hypotheses

Key findings

Sig. Level

H12: Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives
increases the likelihood of being recruited through SLT
assumptions

Nearly 26 times increase in the likelihood of being recruited
through SLT perspectives comparing to SCT assumptions

p =.000

H13: Pursuing a college education away from one‟s family
increases the likelihood of being recruited through SCT
assumptions when compared to SLT assumptions

39.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT
assumptions

p =.233

H14: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies
increases the likelihood of being recruited through SLT
assumptions when compared to SCT assumptions

12.6% increase in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT
assumptions

p =.744

H15: College students who obtain a campus education are more
likely to be recruited through SCT assumptions when compared
to SLT assumptions.

57.3% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT
assumptions

p = .041

H16: The larger the family, the more likely are college students to
be recruited through SCT assumptions

Small Family militants recruited through SLT assumptions (48%
versus 52%), Average family militants recruited through SLT
assumptions (41.1% versus 58.9%), Large family militants
recruited through SLT assumptions (49.1% versus 50.9%)

p = .122

H17: Students who come from higher family income levels are
less likely to be recruited through SLT assumptions

Poor Family militants recruited through SLT assumptions (49.7%
versus 50.3%), Average family militants recruited through SLT
assumptions (40.3% versus 59.3%), Rich family militants
recruited through SLT assumptions (36% versus 64%)

p = .149

H18: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to
increase the likelihood of being recruited through SCT
assumptions

17.6% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT
assumptions

H19: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited
through SLT assumption

48.7% decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through SLT
assumptions

p = .599

p = .543
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4.4

Conclusions
My study revealed that social networks and institutional structures are two

important methods that are used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students. In a
comparison between the two structures, social networks were found to be more
effectively used by the terrorist organization, a finding that was parallel to my
expectations given that families who reside in Turkey‟s southeastern part have quite
strong social bonds. Accordingly, RQ 3 provided a clearer picture regarding the
effectiveness of social networks. After excluding college student militants whose
recruitment styles were not apparent, social networks became more effective in the
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. Especially, students who had militants within their
family or relatives increased the likelihood of being recruited through social networks. In
addition to this variable and others, being reared in a large religious family with an
average or greater income increased the likelihood of recruitment through social
networks.
On the other hand, my study revealed that besides social networks, institutional
structures are effective tools used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit more college
students into their organization. For example, social and cultural activities provide
opportunities for members to meet new targets. This applies especially to college
newcomers who to can be contacted by offering free food and shelter. As revealed by my
study, being away from one‟s family had a significant effect on the likelihood of being
recruited through institutional structures. In addition, obtaining an online education,
being religious, and having political motivations were other variables that increased the
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likelihood of a college student‟s recruitment into the organization through institutional
structures.

5
5.1

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

Introduction
In my study, I focused on three main issues. First, I explored the institutional

structures and social networks that were most frequently used by the Turkish Hezbollah
to recruit college students and concluded that social networks were the preferred method.
Second, my study was designed to reveal the best theories that explain the behavioral
patterns of recruited militants in choosing to participate in the Hezbollah terrorist
organization. Considering the target population for institutional structures, students who
were away from their families while attending college were generally found to be
favored. Because social control theory predicts that weak social bonds lead to
delinquency, its assumptions provided a better explanation regarding the behaviors of
recruited college students. On the other hand, another finding revealed that the Turkish
Hezbollah uses social networks very effectively in their attempt to recruit new militants.
Because social learning theory assumes that crime is learned through observing other
people‟s behaviors, outcomes, and attitudes; this was the best fit theory that explained the
behavior of college educated students who were recruited through social networks.
Finally, I examined demographic details to determine whether a recruited student was
influenced through institutional structures or social networks by including eight
independent variables in the equation.
In this chapter, research findings are linked to the literature review, related
theories, and policies. Implications gathered from terrorism literature are discussed
through the findings of my dissertation.
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Because recruited militants‟ personnel reports were seized that provided factual
details in their own words concerning how they were recruited as well as an account of
their personal demographics, the findings of my research were expected to provide
valuable information that would serve to create innovative counterterrorism policies and
policy implications for future studies.

5.2

Discussion of Findings
Hypotheses 1 and 2
H1: Social networks and institutional structures are two general methods used
extensively by the Turkish Hezbollah for recruiting new college student militants
within universities.
H2: Using social networks is a more effective method in recruiting college educated
militants when compared to institutional structures.
Both hypotheses focused on institutional structures and social networks that were

proposed to reveal the most effective tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit
college students. Considering the social structure of Turkey‟s southeastern part, there are
strong social ties among family members that greatly influence an individual‟s behavior.
In my study, I found that college students who had militants among their relatives or peer
groups increased the likelihood of being recruited through social networks. On the other
hand, institutional structures proved to be more effective within the group that had no
militants within their social network and were educated away from their families as will
be further discussed in related hypotheses.
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Oguz (2007) claimed that an individual can be affected through criminals who
exist within the family circle. For example, family members or relatives who commit
criminal and terrorist activities not only set a bad example but also misguide other family
members who are around them. My findings supported Oguz‟s assumption that most
college educated militants were recruited through social networks.
On the other hand, Oguz (2007) argued that individuals who suffer from weak
family ties and social networks often results in a lack of self-confidence. In this case,
their participation in social life activities and sharing common societal values may be
difficult. Thus, these individuals become easy recruitment targets for terrorist groups
even if there are no militants within their social networks. Although institutional
structures are quite effective recruitment tools, they were found to be less likely preferred
by the Turkish Hezbollah when compared to social networks.

Hypothesis 3
H3: Having Hezbollah militants within one‟s social structure increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional
structures.
According to my findings, students having militants within their families and/or
peer groups had a significant effect on being recruited through social networks rather
than institutional structures. As discussed, social networks that are comprised of relatives
as well as peers have a great influence over an individual because social and
psychological needs are met through these groups. Alkan and Citak (2007) suggested that
when compared to relatives, peer group pressure is often so strong that it has a greater
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effect on influencing an individual. According to Alkan and Citak, terrorist organizations
take advantage of these types of relationships.
On the other hand, the relationship between relatives was another factor that had a
tremendous influence over recruited student militants. Like peer group relations, terrorist
organizations manipulate potential targets through family member associations. In terms
of assessing the influence of Turkish relatives on other family members, the following
quote expressed by a left terror group militant is worthy of note:
My uncle was arrested after he was injured in the fight against the security forces
in 1992 and sentenced to the life-long imprisonment. Inspired by my uncle, I
started to feel sympathy to this organization at the very small age. (Alkan &
Citak, 2007, p. 292)
Parallel to the above discussions, my research confirms the strength that social
networks had over college students in my study who were recruited by the Turkish
Hezbollah. As observed in the odds ratio of having Hezbollah militants within social
networks (Exp(B) = 17.415), there was nearly a 16 times increase in the likelihood of
being recruited through social networks rather than institutional structures if there were
militants included among peer groups and relatives.

Hypothesis 4
H4: Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the
likelihood of being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social
networks.
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Being away from one‟s social networks often results in weak social bonds that
increase the likelihood of being recruited into the Turkish Hezbollah through institutional
structures. Although college students may not have any militants within their social
networks, this group may provide easy targets for terrorists when they are away from
their families. When compared to social networks, my study‟s findings supported the
theory that Turkish Hezbollah uses institutional structures quite effectively to recruit new
militants. For example, college students who were away from their families while
pursuing a college education were found to be recruited through institutional structures
statistically more than through social networks.
Quite different from the United States, college social life in Turkey is more
active. In other words, ideologies are represented through legal structures wherein social
and cultural gatherings are arranged in order for students to meet one another through
sporting events, tea parties, interviews, youth camps, meetings with friends, concerts,
picnics, et cetera. Even in smaller college cities, each evening is planned around these
types of student organizational events. In addition, most of these institutional structures
provide complimentary shelter and food for newcomers who typically come from poor
families; thus, these students may easily be manipulated and recruited by the Turkish
Hezbollah.

Hypothesis 5
H5: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social networks when compared to institutional
structures.
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According to Ozeren (2004), literature regarding the religious effect over terror
suggests that there is no direct link between terrorism and religion. Irbec (2005) further
claimed that religion is generally used to justify terrorism by religiously motivated
organizations. According to Irbec, a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of religion
helps terror groups to widen their targets and promote their cause. Parallel to the
literature, findings of my study revealed that there was no significant difference between
being recruited either through institutional structures or through social networks. In
general, if there were any links between religion and terrorism, social networks would
supposedly have a significant effect on the recruitment of college students. According to
the results of my study, the null hypothesis should therefore be accepted: In terms of
recruitment methods, there is no difference between college students who were reared in
religious families when compared to those who were reared in nonreligious families.

Hypothesis 6
H6: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be
recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks.
In my study, if college students were with their families while pursuing a college
education and had no militants within their social networks, they were less likely to be
recruited by the Hezbollah‟s institutional structures. On the other hand, if they were with
their families and had militants within their social networks, they were more likely to be
recruited through social networks. Considering that these two hypothetical options are
true, there should be a significant difference in terms of being recruited through either
institutional structures or through social networks according to the type of education
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pursued. Parallel to this argument, the model provided significant differences according
to type of recruitment.
Referring to Table 16, cross tabulation results run between recruitment and
education types revealed that out of 96 online-educated college students, 81 were
recruited through social networks. This finding also supported the idea that social
networks are important tools used by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students.
Placing emphasis on types of education, institutional structures were found to be more
effective for on-campus versus online college students.
These two principal findings revealed that while institutional structures generally
focus on college students who are away from their families, social networks are more
often used to recruit new militants from within their respective peer groups and relatives.
As described in the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment patterns, the net model best explains
the organization‟s institutional structures that are generally used to recruit new militants
through social activities.

Hypothesis 7
H7: The larger the family size, the more likely are college students to be recruited
through institutional structures.
For the overall model, my study revealed that family size had no significant
influence on the likelihood of college students being recruited through either institutional
structures or social networks. However, students who came from average size families
were significantly recruited through social networks when compared to small and large
family sizes. Except for this group, there was no significant difference for small family
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size and large family size in terms of recruitment methods. As clearly shown by cross
tabulation (c.f., Table 17), 58.9% of the students from average size families were
recruited through social networks and 41.1% were recruited through institutional
structures.
As previously discussed, social networks were more likely used by the Turkish
Hezbollah to recruit college students who had militants among their peer groups and
relatives. Having no significant difference within the smaller size families indicated that
institutional structures were as effective as social network recruitment methods. Because
this was related more to social control theory, further discussion is provided in
Hypothesis 16.

Hypothesis 8
H8: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be
recruited by institutional structures when compared to social networks.
For the overall model and contrary to family size, there was no significant
difference between militants who came from families who had poor, average, or rich
income levels. According to Krueger and Maleckova (2003), the relationship between
education, poverty, and terrorism is complicated, indirect and quite weak. In other
words, students who come from poor families should be dominantly recruited through
social networks if there is a relationship between poverty and terrorism. Due to the
strength of institutional structures, however, my study showed no significant difference
between institutional structures and social networks.
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Hypothesis 9
H9: College student‟s religiosity level is more likely to increase the likelihood of
being recruited through institutional structures when compared to social networks.
As discussed in Hypothesis 5, the religiosity level of a college educated militant‟s
family did not provide statistical significant difference in terms of whether students were
recruited through institutional structures or social networks. If, however, a family‟s
religiosity level had played a significant role, college students would have generally been
recruited through institutional structures given that they would be more open to
manipulation. The significance level of this variable also supported that religious as well
as nonreligious students were recruited through both IS and SN methods with no
significant difference.

Hypothesis 10
H10: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social
networks.
Political motivation had no significant difference between college students who
were recruited through either institutional structures or social networks. According to the
majority of militants‟ statements, they all chose to join the Turkish Hezbollah for
religious reasons. From their viewpoints, Islam‟s teachings were in danger either across
the world or in Turkey, and therefore Turkey should be an Islamic state ruled according
to Sharia (Islamic law). According to the findings of my study, the Turkish Hezbollah
used religion through both institutional structures and social networks to effectively
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recruit college students thus indicating that the militants were manipulated through
religious ideology. In addition, religious groups have also used terror to obtain their ends.

Hypothesis 11
H11: Social learning theory provides a better explanation regarding the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies when compared to social control theory.
As discussed in the methods section, two groups (N = 12) were excluded from my
study in order to meet the assumptions of social control and social learning theories.
Because there was no precise information as to which assumptions the militants were
recruited under, skewness in the model‟s data could have possibly resulted. Other than
the excluded groups, if institutional structures were used as a recruitment method, college
students were considered to be enlisted through social control theory given that having
weak bonds may be explained through reasons such as being away from one‟s family or
being reared larger families, for example.
According to the equation, types of methods used to recruit college students were
best explained through social learning theory. For example, out of 327 students 181
(55.4%) were recruited through the assumptions of social learning theory and 146
(44.6%) were recruited through social control theory assumptions.
A comparison between the first and second model revealed that the effectiveness
of social networks and social learning theory in explaining the Turkish Hezbollah
militants resulted in a 1.1% increase when two groups were disqualified, an indicator that
the excluded students (N = 12) who also had Hezbollah militants within their social
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networks were most likely recruited through institutional structures even though they did
not provide any details as to how they were initially motivated.

Hypothesis 12
H12: Having Hezbollah militants within peer groups or relatives increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social networks comparing to social learning
assumption.
Excluding the two groups (N = 12) from the equation increased the likelihood of
college students being recruited through social learning theory assumptions according to
having militants within their social networks. Similar to the first model, the second model
also provided significant differences between both models. While Exp(B) for having
Hezbollah militants within social networks in the first model was 17.415, Exp(B) for the
second model was 27.067 indicating that there was a 26 times increase in the likelihood
of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions if militants were within the
student‟ social networks. When compared to social control theory, this variable revealed
that social learning theory provided the best explanation for the Turkish Hezbollah‟s
recruitment strategy.

Hypothesis 13
H13: Pursuing a college education while away from one‟s family increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared
to social learning theory assumptions.
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Like Hypothesis 12, excluding college students (N = 12) from the model
increased the likelihood of being recruited through social networks. While the first model
revealed that being either away from or with one‟s family decreased the likelihood by
58.6% of recruitment through social networks, the second model increased the likelihood
by 17.3%, a percentage increase that dropped the significance level. Although this
variable had a significant effect on the first model, the effect was nonsignificant in the
second model.

Hypothesis 14
H14: Being reared in families who have religious ideologies increases the
likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions when compared
to social control theory assumptions.
Again, this model had no significant effect on the type of recruitment method
used, and there was no difference in terms of providing a theoretical explanation to
Hezbollah‟s strategies. There was, however, a slight difference in the effectiveness of this
variable on both models. For example, the odds ratio was 1.113 for the first model and
1.126 for the second model which revealed a 1.3% increase in the likelihood of being
recruited into the Turkish Hezbollah through social learning theory assumptions.

Hypothesis 15
H15: College students who obtain a campus education are more likely to be
recruited through social control theory assumptions when compared to social learning
theory assumptions.
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After excluding above mentioned college students from the equation, obtaining an
online education decreased the significance level of this model. A decrease in the number
of college students who were with their families and were recruited through institutional
structures was the main reason for this change.

Hypothesis 16
H16: The larger the family, the more likely are college students to be recruited
through social control theory assumptions.
Hirschi and Gottfredson (1990) claimed that the greater the family size, the less
time parents tend to direct supervision over their children. Thus, the major reason for a
person‟s low self control appears to be ineffective child rearing.
According to social learning theory assumptions, the likelihood of college
students being recruited in this second model when compared to the first model increased
for those reared in small or average size families. On the other hand, college students
who came from a large family were more likely to be recruited through social control
theory assumptions. These results supported that being reared in larger families increases
the chance of forming weak social bonds that could be a reason for recruitment into the
Hezbollah through social control theory assumptions.

Hypothesis 17
H17: Students who come from higher family income levels are less likely to be
recruited through social control theory assumptions.
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According to each family‟s income level, this model revealed that having more
income decreased the likelihood of a college student being recruited by the Hezbollah
through social learning theory assumptions. While in the first model, there was a 61.7%
decrease in the likelihood of being recruited through social networks, the second model
revealed that the likelihood of being recruited through social networks decreased to
71.3%. There was a similar decrease for students who came from families having average
incomes. These percentages showed that the second model provided a better explanation
through social control theory assumptions in terms of income level or an indicator that
low income families have less control over their children. Even though an individual has
no militants within social networks and has low income level, he or she is more likely to
be recruited through social control theory assumptions, since they are more prone to be
manipulated.

Hypothesis 18 and 19
H18: The religiosity level of college students is more likely to increase the
likelihood of being recruited through social control theory assumptions.
H19: Religious reasons increase the likelihood of being recruited through social
learning theory assumptions.
Similar to other variables in my study, religiosity level and religious reasons
provided a better explanation for this model through social learning theory when
compared to the previous model. However, the equation revealed that there was no
significant difference between recruitment through IS or SN theories‟ assumptions when
considering the religiosity level of college students. In other words, religiosity level did
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not show any significant difference between the theories in terms of providing an
explanation for the behavior of recruited student militants. Therefore, both religious and
nonreligious college educated militants may be recruited through social networks as well
as institutional structures. Differences between the findings of RQ 2 and RQ 3 in terms
of Beta level (B), significance level (p) and odds ratio (Exp (B) values are illustrated in
Table 31.
5.3

Theoretical Implications
Although terrorism is a significant threat to societies and governments

(Mendelson, 2007), the literature lacks theoretical guidance, and most applied theories
are adapted from other academic disciplines (Yilmaz, 2009). Such as, as discussed by
O‟Connor, economics is used to understand terrorism from the point of supply and
demand. In this section, I connected the findings of my study to the theoretical
explanations related to the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies.

5.3.1 Social Learning Theory
Findings in my study revealed that when college educated students have militants
among their peers or relatives, the likelihood of being recruited through social networks
increased significantly. By using eight IVs to test the type of recruitment most frequently
used by the Turkish Hezbollah, this variable had the strongest effect. Parallel to social
learning theory assumptions, strong social networks that are prevalent in the southeastern
part of Turkey had a significant effect on the recruited college educated militants.
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Table 31. Comparison between the Findings of Research Questions Two and Three
RQ 2–Exp(B)

RQ 3–Exp(B)

Comparison Between the Findings of RQ 2 and RQ 3

17.415

27.067

Compared to Model 1, there is a 55% increase in the
likelihood of being recruited through SN

Being away from family while
pursuing a college education

.414

.607

Likelihood of being recruited through social network
is increased by 19.3%

Family Ideology

1.113

1.126

Likelihood of being recruited through social network
is increased by 1.3%

Having Online or Campus
Education

.451

.427

Likelihood of being recruited through social network
is decreased by 2.4%

Small Family Size

1.944

1.786

Likelihood of being recruited through social network
is decreased by 15.8%

Average Family Size

1.969

2.055

Likelihood of being recruited through social network
is increased by 8.6%

Low Income Level

.383

.287

Likelihood of being recruited through social network
is decreased by 9.6%

Average Income Level

.496

.415

Likelihood of being recruited through social network
is decreased by 8.1%

.824

Likelihood of being recruited through social network
is increased by 0.6%

.513

Likelihood of being recruited through social network
is increased by 2.4%

Having Hezbollah militants within
social networks

Militant‟s Ideology
Political Motivation

.818
.489
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The second variable that increased the likelihood of recruitment through social
learning theory assumptions was being reared in religious families. Although this variable
did not significantly affect the likelihood of being recruited through social learning
theory, it did, however, increase the likelihood of being recruited through the
assumptions of social learning theory. Given that the Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously
motivated terror organization, this finding supported social learning from a theoretical
perspective.
Cross tabulation tables for family size illustrated that college student militants
who were reared in an average size family were most likely to be recruited through social
learning theory assumptions. On the other hand, social learning and social control
theories had a similar effect on the students who came from either small or large size
families.
Another variable that increased the likelihood of being recruited by the Turkish
Hezbollah through social networks was income level. For example, college students who
came from rich families were more likely to be recruited through social learning theory
assumptions in comparison to college students who came from poor or average family
incomes. This finding supported the assumptions of both social learning and social
control theories. Because college students who come from wealthy rich families are
typically more likely to meet their own personal expenses and needs, they were less
likely to be connected to the terrorist organization through institutional structures. Hence,
the most effective way for the Hezbollah to recruit this group is through the use of social
networks as indicated in my study.
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In sum, findings revealed that the four IVs─militants within peer groups or
among relatives, religious families, family size, and family income─supported the social
learning theory consistent with Burgess and Akers‟ (1966) differential association theory.
Accordingly, Jessor et al. (1968) considered peer and parental influence to be two
important variables related to either positive or negative behaviors among teenagers.
Akers (2004) further stated that an individual learns behavior through both nonsocial
situations and social interactions by observing the behavioral consequences common to
others. The data related to the recruited Turkish Hezbollah college educated militants
supported the perspectives held by these scholars; thus, it can be concluded that most of
the college educated Hezbollah militants in my study were recruited through interaction
with peers and relatives.

5.3.2 Social Control Theory
Although the majority of recruitment styles were best explained through the
assumptions of social learning theory, social control was another important theory that
provided a good explanation regarding Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment tactics. Booth et
al. (2008) inferred that social control theory emphasizes the role of control in terms of
counteracting delinquency through strong social bonds that hinder delinquency. Contrary
to other criminology theories, social control theory states that if individuals are left to
their own devices, they are more prone to commit crime (Vold et al., 2002).
Accordingly, acquiring a college education while away from social networks was
an independent variable that increased the likelihood of being recruited by the Hezbollah
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through institutional structures. This finding provided the strongest support for the
strength of social control theory assumptions given that being away from social networks
weakens social bonds that significantly affect the chances of recruitment.
Obtaining a campus college education was the second variable that supported the
assumptions of social control theory. Because campus educated students are more likely
to interact through the institutional structures of terror groups, they are also possible
targets for the Turkish Hezbollah. Accordingly, the likelihood of recruiting college
students through institutional structures was another significant effect that indicated the
strength of social control.
Having religious ideologies was another variable that increased the likelihood of
college students being recruited through social control theory assumptions. Because these
groups were more vulnerable to religious propaganda, recruiting more students into the
Turkish Hezbollah through institutional structures showed the strength of social control
theory.
Finally, political motivation also increased the likelihood of being recruited
through social control theory assumptions. As previously discussed, the Turkish
Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terror organization in which institutional structures
focus on individuals who may be more prone to religious propaganda.

5.4

Policy Implications
According to the findings of my study, the following policy suggestions for

security forces, scholars, and policy makers are recommended. In addition to policy
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implications, personal demographic data related to my sample of recruited college
educated militants are provided.

5.4.1 Policy makers should consider religious citizens to be represented in the system,
and tension between laicism and religion should be eliminated
Influenced by the positivist argument, founders of Turkey were under the
impression that religion in general prevented modernization and sustained backwardness.
They assessed that religion was the basic reason behind the Ottoman Empire‟s
disintegration and was the main threat to the stability and longevity of the new regime.
Thus, they followed the example of the Ottomans in controlling religion under
government hierarchy by instituting the Directory of Religious Affairs (Kologlu, 1999).
According to Casanova (1994), modernization was intended to drive away religion or at
least repel its social and political role. He further claimed that religion was thought to
become a private matter between God and the individual believer. However, this never
actually happened, at least not uniformly, anywhere in the world including across Europe.
Unlike other religions, Islam does not encourage secularization (Gellner, 1981).
Consequently, Gellner argued that the Islamic religion has always occupied a central
place in the lives of Muslim societies to the point that, interestingly, its influence over
society is apparently independent from other aspects of society. Toprak (1981) further
claimed that while secularization in the normative model is thought to be associated with
enlightenment and freedom of thought, it is imposed from above and protected in an
authoritarian manner in Turkey by state institutions that include the military.
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To religious people, state policy is based on this misguided assumption which is
under the assumption that a „„secular‟‟ regime is beset with intolerance. More especially,
the state‟s headscarf policy that is forbidden in schools and workplaces is broadly
criticized; therefore religious people claim that there is discrimination against religious
individuals (Gulalp, 2003). As previously discussed, religion has a powerful influence
over Turkey‟s Kurdish originated citizens. Therefore, this controversy between religious
and laic people created an opportunity for the Turkish Hezbollah to produce effective
propaganda against the state.
Demographic details provided by the recruited college educated Hezbollah
militants also revealed the importance of religion. For example, my study revealed that
165 (48.6%) out of 339 families and 162 (47.7%) out of 339 militants were identified as
being religious. In addition, 328 (96.6%) out of 339 militants stated that religious reasons
were the driving forces behind joining the Hezbollah‟s terrorist organization. This
statistics reveals that religion is widely used propaganda tool for the Turkish Hezbollah.
As mentioned above, weakness of the laicism is effectively used by the religiously
motivated terror groups. Government policies over the religion should be well balanced
that laic system should not be used as a tool to limit religious independence. Instead, laic
system may be used to provide religious independence to the society that nobody can be
classified according to their religion. On the other hand, religious rules should not be
used as a tool to create pressure on the society. Religion should be lived in the individual
level and everybody should be respected on his/her religious chooses.
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Therefore, to halt this process, I recommend that Turkey should develop a new
approach to current policies. Unfortunately, I believe that the problem with Turkish
laicism stems from the policy implementation. In other words, the traditional background
practices of Turkey‟s governmental system created this problem. Clearly, laicism is one
of the most important policies in Turkey and implementation of this policy is therefore
vital. Through implementing this policy, public policy makers should eliminate the
harmful side of this policy by distinguishing between the religious and fundamentalists.
In addition, teaching religion through private organizations should be supported and
controlled through the state. As Ozeren (2004) argued, not only do all religions denounce
terrorist attacks, they also condemn terrorist behaviors. In other words, teaching the basic
principles of religions offers fundamental importance in dealing with terrorism.

5.4.2 Response to terrorist activities should be well balanced
As discussed by Mehdiyev (2007), ideological terrorism stems from political,
social, and economic problems. Religious intolerance and political oppression are only a
few of the arguments widely used by militants to justify terrorist activities. In case of
adjusting the political system to these arguments, namely providing an environment to
discuss these ideas, responding to terrorist groups in an unstable manner creates a worse
scenario. As previously discussed, an unbalanced response from the state represents one
strong argument that terrorist groups effectively use. Because people sometimes believe
that the state strives to oppress its citizens, unbalanced responses generally create
sympathy toward terrorist organizations. Therefore, the state should only attempt to
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prevent illegal terrorist activities while fighting against terrorism. Although militants may
die during the clash in order to protect citizens, the state should not purposefully kill them
in an effort to fight the militants‟ ideologies.
As revealed in my study, most of the college students were recruited through
social networks. It is clear that having militants within social networks has great impact
on the likelihood of being recruited by the social networks. Unbalanced response to terror
groups not only weakens State‟s position on fighting against terrorism, but also creates
powerful propaganda tools for the terror groups. Accordingly, my study‟s findings
support this argument that having Hezbollah militants within social networks increases
the likelihood of being recruited through social learning theory assumptions by 26 times
comparing to being recruited through social learning theory assumptions.
In other words, this was an indicator suggesting that the state may kill one
terrorist but in the process the Hezbollah terrorist organization may target ten
sympathizers who are possible candidates for recruitment. In this respect, a balanced
response to terrorism was found to be the core element in the fight against terrorism.
By offering a more democratic atmosphere rather than forbidding each ideology
may provide a free discussion environment that can result in a more effective way to fight
against terrorism. As discussed by Mehdiyev (2007), if an individual believes that it is
impossible to reach his or her goals through the legal system, he or she may search for
other ways to achieve these goals. In my opinion, the speakers‟ corner located in
London‟s Hyde Park is an excellent example for people to freely convey their messages
and ideologies. For example, provided that speeches do not tend to provoke violence
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(Wikipedia, 2010), everyone is given the opportunity to voice their diverse ideologies
through this method. Thus, this kind of environment has the power to eliminate one of the
strongest arguments of terror groups.

5.4.3 More effective policies should be implemented to fight against poverty and
decrease unemployment
According to the economic power of family income level, my study revealed that
195 (57.5%) out of 339 militants identified themselves as coming from poor households,
119 (35.1%) came from families with normal income levels, and only 25 (7.3%) militants
came from wealthy family backgrounds. These statistics showed that there was a
tremendous gap between the percentage of rich militant families to normal and poor
families. As Koseli (2007) pointed out, socioeconomic conditions, namely inequalities
and poverty, are important variables that lead individuals to join terror groups. His study
revealed that there is a significant relationship between the poverty, inequality, and
violent crime.
For example, the southeastern region of Turkey where the Hezbollah is more
active is one of the most underprivileged parts of the country (Karaca, 2004). According
to the State Institute of Statistics (2001), while the southeastern cities have the gross
domestic product per capita as between 568 and 918, western cities have between 2500
and 6168. In addition, unemployment in the southeastern region of Turkey has the
highest rate (11.5 to 17.5) comparing to western part of the Turkey (3.6 to 9.4).
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Considering the recruited college students who have campus or online education,
there is a significant difference between these groups in terms of their recruitment
method. College students who have online education are most likely to be recruited by
the institutional structures while college students who have campus education are more
likely to be recruited the institutional structures. I believe that providing free shelter and
free foods helps the Turkish Hezbollah to get more sympathizers. Decreasing the poverty
level will help to decrease the number of possible new targets.
Thus, statistics concerning poverty and unemployment rates reveal that the state
should take proactive measures in an effort to lessen inequalities and poverty.

5.5

Suggestions for Future Research

5.5.1 More quantitative research is required to examine the recruitment process of
militants in order to explore the factors that increase one‟s likelihood of being
recruited into the Turkish Hezbollah
Although terrorism has received spectacular international attention over the past
decade, unfortunately there remains sparse quantitative research in relation to the
recruitment strategies used by terror groups. In other words, most researchers have
focused on profiling the terrorist from psychological or sociological perspectives.
According to Hudson (1999), studies have revealed that terrorists‟ personalities are so
diverse that they can be observed in any legal profession. Contrary to the general
perception of literature related to terrorism, terrorists are typically normal people who are
generally misled through religious or ideological ways of viewing the world. Therefore,
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until terrorists are assigned to execute their missions, it is impossible to differentiate them
from normal people. Hudson therefore inferred that it is useless to describe the terrorist in
terms of physical and behavioral characteristics.
Comparable to the above argument, I believe that researchers should identify the
required circumstances that lead individuals to join terrorist organizations rather than
simply profiling terrorists. From this perspective and through the self reports of recruited
college educated militants, I believe that my study has contributed greatly to the literature
pertaining to recruitment tactics used by the Turkish Hezbollah. Through my sample of
self reports, it was possible for me to provide a quantitative explanation concerning how
militants were recruited and what factors lead to their recruitment.
In addition, I believe that counterterrorism is not an easy task. For example, any
state should not only fight against terrorists in the field but should identify and fight
against their justifications for committing terrorist activities. Through my study, I
examined and determined the recruitment factors that were effective in the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s practices. Despite these significant contributions, additional quantitative
research should be conducted in order to confirm my findings and produce scientific
results. Although my data were unique in terms of reflecting the pure ideology of college
educated militants recruited by the Turkish Hezbollah, future researchers may find it
difficult to obtain these sources of information. Therefore, I recommend that scholars
focus more attention on newspapers, magazines, and other periodical documents
produced by terrorists that may reveal details concerning effective tactics used to recruit
members. In Turkey, for example, most terrorist publications are written in an attempt to
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motivate sympathizers by providing anonymous details related to why militants choose to
participate in their organization and what behavioral factors influenced them to join.

5.5.2 Future researchers may consider conducting studies related to the leaders‟
perspectives on selecting new recruitment targets
Not only from the perspectives of terrorist militants but also from those of their
leaders, researchers should make an effort to understand explicit recruitment tactics used
by terrorist organizations, specifically the Turkish Hezbollah. Clearly, terror groups apply
certain recruitment strategies that are commonly produced by their group leaders. Thus, it
is possible for scholars to obtain recruitment strategies through periodicals or through
militant statements that have been seized by security forces. Fortunately, I was given the
opportunity to read and examine numerous self reported statements submitted by arrested
militants in which detailed information was outlined pertaining to how the Hezbollah
motivated and manipulated sympathizers into joining their organization. Thus, similar
types of academic research may also provide excellent information related to recruitment
tactics used by the terrorist groups. In addition, the significance of my findings can be
validated through future research.

5.5.3 More studies are required to reveal how all religions strictly condemn terrorism
Given that most terror activities in this decade claim to be related to religious
ideologies, scholars should be required to reveal how terrorism and religion are two terms
that cannot be interrelated. As mentioned, religion is one of the most important mediators
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used in the Turkish Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies. As Sageman (2004) observed,
religion represents one of the basic tools used to recruit new militants. The findings of my
study also supported the assumption that religion is a tool that is effectively used by the
Turkish Hezbollah through either institutional structures or social networks to enlist new
militants. Therefore, the content analysis between religion and terrorism is required to
explain how groups use religious terminology to manipulate and entice potential militants
into joining their organization. I believe that such research can provide innovative policy
implications that may bring to an end to the recruitment process of terrorist groups.

5.6

Conclusions
In my study, two main objectives were achieved. First, I identified the tactics used

by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college students into becoming members of their
terrorist organization, and second, I provided detailed demographics related to recruited
college educated militants. For example, I determined how Hezbollah militants were
recruited, their economic profiles, if they had militants within their social networks,
whether they were educated while being with or away from their families, their family‟s
ideology as well as their own, justification for joining the Hezbollah, and their family size
and income.
To achieve these objectives, I developed 19 hypotheses that were dependent upon
eight IVs entered twice into the equation in order to weigh their influence over the DVs.
The IVs were initially tested to reveal how the effectiveness of institutional structures and
social networks increased or decreased depending upon the IVs. Finally, the IVs were
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tested to determine which theories provided a better explanation for the Turkish
Hezbollah‟s recruitment strategies.
My study revealed that recruited college educated militants who had Hezbollah
militants within their social networks, pursued their college education away from their
families, and obtained an online education had a significant effect on the likelihood of
being recruited through either institutional structures or social networks. These findings
supported the assumptions of social control theory and social learning theory. According
to the results of my study, the following important points were made:
•

Weak social bonds increase the likelihood committing crimes (social control
theory assumption)

•

Crime is a behavior learned through observing the activities of others (social
learning theory assumption)

In addition to these findings, my study revealed that being reared in a religious
family, having religious ideologies, family‟s income level, and family size did not
significantly differ in terms of the Hezbollah‟s recruitment tactics and the theory that
provides a better explanation. Accordingly, it can be concluded that college educated
students who displayed these specifications were not recruited by any specific Hezbollah
structure.
Considering the results of my research, the following suggestions are
recommended:
First, although findings of my study supported the assumptions of social control
and social learning theories, social learning was the most useful theory in explaining the

221

recruitment methods used by the Turkish Hezbollah. As explained in the literature
review, social control and social learning theories were applicable to conduct further
research in relation to terrorism. Through these theories, it is possible to provide an
explanation concerning recruitment strategies frequently used by terrorist groups.
Second, my findings suggested that social networks and institutional structures
are two important tools used effectively by the Turkish Hezbollah to recruit college
educated students. As discussed in the policy implication section, Turkey‟s political
system should therefore include as many ideologies as possible in an effort to maintain
individuals within its system. In addition, responding to terrorist activities in a well
balanced manner should be considered by policy makers.
Finally, I suggest that literature related to terrorism should be supported through
more quantitative studies in terms of identifying the extrinsic factors that result in college
educated students to become recruited by terrorist organizations, namely the Turkish
Hezbollah.
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